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From assigning students to public schools to arriving at divorce settlements, there are many
settings where preferences expressed by a set of stakeholders are used to make decisions
that affect them. Due to its numerous applications, and thanks to the range of questions
involved, such settings have received considerable attention in fields ranging from philosophy
to political science, and particularly from economics and, more recently, computer science.
Although there exists a significant body of literature studying such settings, much of the
work in this space make the assumption that stakeholders provide complete and accurate
preference information to such decision-making procedures. However, due to, say, the high
cognitive burden involved or privacy concerns, this may not always be feasible. The goal of
this thesis is to explicitly address these limitations. We do so by building on previous work
that looks at working with incomplete information, and by introducing solution concepts and
notions that support the design of algorithms and mechanisms that can handle incomplete
and inaccurate information in different settings.
We present our results in two parts. In Part I we look at decision-making in the presence of
incomplete information. We focus on two broad themes, both from the perspective of an
algorithm or mechanism designer. Informally, the first one studies the following question:
Given incomplete preferences, how does one design algorithms that are ‘robust’, i.e., ones
that produce solutions that are “good” with respect to the underlying complete preferences?
We look at this question in context of two well-studied problems, namely, i) (a version of)
the two-sided matching problem and ii) (a version of) the facility location problem, and
show how one can design approximately-robust algorithms in such settings. Following this,
we look at the second theme, which considers the following question: Given incomplete
preferences, how can one ask the agents for some more information in order to aid in
the design of ‘robust’ algorithms? We study this question in the context of the one-sided
matching problem and show how even a very small amount of extra information can be
used to get much better outcomes overall.
In Part II we turn our attention to decision-making in the presence of inaccurate information
and look at the following question: How can one design ‘stable’ algorithms, i.e., ones that
do not produce vastly different outcomes as long as there are only small inaccuracies in a
stakeholder’s report of their preferences? We study this in the context of fair allocation of
indivisible goods among two agents and show how, in contrast to popular fair allocation
algorithms, there are alternative algorithms that are fair and approximately-stable.
v
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There are numerous settings where an algorithm interacts with a set of stakeholders and
asks their preferences over a set of outcomes in order to make decisions that affect them. For
instance, centralized algorithms, that ask the students to submit a ranking over the schools
they would like to attend, are used in many cities to assign students to public schools
[AS03; APR05; Abd+05]; in many countries, medical residents are matched to hospitals
using algorithms that ask the residents to submit their preferences over the hospitals and
vice-versa [Rot84; Rot86; Man16; NRM; CAR]; such algorithms are also used to fairly divide
different types of resources (e.g., compute resources [Gho+11]). Perhaps unsurprisingly,
then, and because of the interdisciplinary nature of the questions involved, the design of such
decision-making systems have been extensively studied by mathematicians, philosophers,
political scientists, economists, and, more recently, computer scientists. Collectively, the
study of formal frameworks to analyse and aggregate preferences in collective-decision
making systems has been referred to as social choice theory, and its birth can be dated
back to the 18th century French philosopher and mathematician Condorcet [Con85]. The
more recent field of computational social choice (also commonly referred to as algorithmic
economics, computational economics, algorithmic game theory), under which the work in
this thesis falls, aims to provide a computational lens into such settings.
Despite the existence of a large body of work across disciplines that studies various collective
decision-making settings, there are certain issues that have not received much attention.
One issue, highlighted in this thesis, is that a disproportionate amount of the work on
such problems assume that stakeholders—which could be humans, software agents, or a
combination of both (and so henceforth are referred to as agents)—are capable, and willing,
to provide complete and accurate preference information. While a formal definition of what
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it means for preferences to be complete and accurate differs based on the decision-making
setting, for now it is enough to think of the former in terms of a setting where agents are
asked to provide a ranking over all the candidates in, say, an election. As for the latter, for
now it is enough to think of it in terms of a setting where agents are expected to indicate
their exact utility—i.e., their value, which is, say, a positive integer—for different outcomes.
The assumption that agents provide complete and accurate preference information is
reasonable in some settings. For instance, consider a simplified scenario where an agent
is trying to decide which house to rent among the n they have had a viewing for, and
their only concern is whether there is a grocery store within m kilometres from the house.
Assuming that n is small (say, n = 7) and that the agent has access to information on
the distance to the nearest grocery store, it is reasonable to believe that they will be able
provide a ranking over all the houses (with potentially some houses being tied).
However, in many scenarios it is unrealistic to assume this will be the case. Indeed, in
the setting mentioned above, the houses might have different monthly rents, they might
have slightly different amenities, and the agent might care about not just the distance
to the nearest grocery store, but also whether that store is accessible by public transit.
Given this, ranking all the houses might no longer be feasible since it not only requires the
agent to compile all the relevant information for all the houses—which in turn places a
considerable cognitive burden on them—but might also require them to attribute numerical
values to how much they value the different amenities and the ease of access to the grocery
store. More broadly, an agent may not be able to provide complete and accurate preference
information because i) there are just too many options to evaluate and they do not have
much information or the expertise to evaluate them all, ii) they have some privacy concerns
and hence do not want to reveal their complete preferences, and iii) determining their
preferences exactly and accurately places too high a cognitive burden on them.
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to the theoretical foundations for the design of
decision-making systems that are capable of handling incomplete and inaccurate information.
The hope is that if there exists a solid foundation for the design of decision-making systems
that can handle more realistic assumptions on the kind of information it has access to, then
the general ideas from the field of (computational) social choice will see wider adoption. So,
with this hope, we make progress towards our goal by
i) considering several settings where assuming availability of complete or accurate
preference information is unrealistic and in turn using them to highlight different
issues that arise when working with incomplete or inaccurate information
ii) expanding or complementing existing work that looks at how to deal with, and design
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algorithms for, scenarios where agents’ preferences are incomplete
iii) introducing and analysing new solution concepts and notions that aid in the design
of algorithms that provide certain guarantees even in the presence of incomplete or
inaccurate preferences.
Before we delve more into these points and the technical overview of the work in this thesis,
we present a brief, and informal, introduction to some basic terms and concepts that will
be useful for understanding the rest of this chapter. A more formal treatment of all the
terms and definitions is presented in the respective chapters where they are used.
1.1 Some Basic Terms and Concepts
All the work in this thesis deals with settings where a set of agents provide an algorithm
with their preferences, and the overarching goal in all of these situations is for the algorithm
to select an outcome that is socially desirable. In particular, we consider the following
four settings, namely, i) two-sided matching, ii) one-sided matching, iii) fair allocation
of indivisible goods, and iv) facility location. Each of these settings are well-studied in
the (computational) social choice literature and enable us to highlight different aspects of
working with incomplete and inaccurate preference information. For instance, motivated by
applications in assigning students to public schools, the one-sided matching setting allows us
to think of scenarios where an algorithm, when presented with incomplete preferences, can
ask the agents to provide some more information in order for it to pick a better outcome;
facility location is arguably the simplest setting that allows us to talk about incentive
issues that arise when working with incomplete preference information; and motivated
by observations we encountered on a popular fair division website, the setting of fairly
allocating indivisible objects allows us to highlight the challenges when working with
inaccurate preferences. Below we provide a very broad description of these settings.
i) Two-sided matching: In this setting, there are two disjoint sets of agents U and W ,
and each agent in a set provides their preferences over agents in the other set. The
goal is to find a matching—which in turn is a collection of pairs, one from each set,
such that no agent is part of more than one pair—that is socially desirable.
ii) One-sided matching: In this setting, there is a set of agents and a set of objects, and
each agent provides their preferences over the objects. The goal is again to find a
socially desirable matching such that each agent is assigned at most one object.
3
iii) Fair allocation of indivisible goods: In this setting, there is a set of agents and a set
of indivisible goods, and each agent provides their preferences over the goods. The
goal is to find a fair (which in this case is what is considered to be socially desirable)
assignment (a.k.a. division, allocation), where an assignment is a partition of the
goods among the agents.
iv) Facility location: In this setting, there is a set of agents who have preferences for
where they want a facility (like, say, a public school) to be located, and the goal is to
pick a location that is socially desirable.
Given that we consider several settings, naturally, the definitions of preferences, the outcome
space, and what is socially desirable, etc., will vary depending on the context. Nevertheless,
below we informally introduce some of these terms and related definitions. As mentioned
previously, the formal definitions appear in the chapters.
Preferences: In order to understand how much an agent likes a particular outcome (a.k.a.
alternative), the algorithm requires some information. There are two common approaches
to elicit this information.
i) A common approach is to ask the agents to submit ordinal preferences, which typically
entails that the agents submit a linear or weak order over the set of outcomes. For
an agent i and outcomes a, b, we typically use a i b (respectively, a i b) to denote
that agent i strictly prefers (respectively, weakly prefers) outcome a over b.
ii) The second common approach is to ask the agents to submit cardinal preferences,
which entails that the agents submit their utility (a.k.a. value, which can be real
number or integer) for each outcome. For an agent i, we use vi to denote their utility
function (a.k.a. valuation function), and often times we are interested in the cardinal
preferences that are consistent with the given ordinal preferences. Here, by consistent
we mean that, for outcomes a and b, a i b⇔ vi(a) ≥ vi(b).
Matching: Given two disjoint sets U and W , throughout, we use the term matching to
refer to a bijection µ : U → W .
Stable matchings: Although, depending on the application, there are several properties
that can be considered as ‘desirable’ in a two-sided matching setting, a large fraction of the
work on two-sided matching, including Chapter 2 of this thesis, focuses on finding stable
matchings. Given two disjoint sets of agents U and W , where each agent in a set specifies
a linear order over agents in the other set, a matching µ is said to be stable if there is
no blocking pair, i.e., a pair (m,w), where m ∈ U and w ∈ W , such that w m µ(m) and
m w µ(w) (i.e., m prefers w over their partner in the matching and vice-versa).
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Pareto optimality and Pareto optimal matchings: In general an outcome is called
Pareto optimal if no agent can be made better off without making another agent worse-off.
Although, just like in two-sided matching settings, there are several properties that can
be considered as ‘desirable’ in a one-sided matching setting, the most well-studied one,
and one we consider in Chapter 4, is Pareto optimal matchings. Given a set of agents
N = {a1, . . . , an} and objects H = {h1, . . . , hm}, where agents specify their preferences
over objects, a matching µ is Pareto optimal if for all matchings µ′,
(∃ai ∈ N , µ′(ai) i µ(ai))⇒ (∃aj ∈ N , µ′(aj) ≺j µ(aj)) .
In words, a matching µ is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching µ′ where all the
agents are assigned an object that they prefer at least as much as in the original matching
and there is at least one agent who strictly prefers their assignment in the new matching.
Social welfare: In settings where the agents express cardinal preferences, social welfare
refers to the sum of utilities that the agents have for an outcome. Finding the optimal
(social) welfare refers to the goal of finding the outcome that maximizes social welfare. Note
that an outcome with the optimal social welfare is also Pareto optimal.
Equipped with these informal definitions, in the next section we present an overview of the
structure of the thesis and our results.
1.2 Overview of the Thesis
The results in this thesis are presented in two parts. The first part consists of three chapters
and focusses on making decisions with incomplete information in different settings. The
second part consists of a chapter that looks at making decisions with inaccurate information.
1.2.1 Part I: Making decisions with incomplete information
As mentioned previously, there are several reasons why an agent might not be able, or
willing, to provide complete preferences. (Throughout, we often use the terms ‘incomplete
preferences’ and ‘partial preferences’ interchangeably.) In this part of the thesis we look at
three different settings, one in each chapter, and focus on two broad themes, both from
the perspective of an algorithm or mechanism designer. Informally, the first one deals with
the following question: Given incomplete preferences, how does one design algorithms that
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are ‘robust’, i.e., ones that produce solutions that are “good” with respect to the underlying
complete preferences? Chapters 2 and 3 directly deal with this question.
Chapter 2: Two-Sided Matching under Partial Information
In Chapter 2 we consider the well-studied stable marriage (SM) problem. In this problem,
we are given two disjoint sets U and W , where each agent in U and W provides some
preferences over agents in the other set, and the goal is usually to match the agents in U to
the ones in W so that the resulting matching is stable. While the most basic version of this
problem assumes that the agents provide strict linear orders over agents in the other set,
we consider a setting where they are allowed to submit strict weak orders.1
Although the issue of incomplete preferences has been previously studied in the context of
SM, the approach in most of them has been to either work with weakly-stable matchings,
which are stable matchings that arise as a result of an arbitrary linear extension of the
submitted partial orders, or to look at super-stable matchings, which are matchings that
are stable with respect to all the possible linear extensions of the submitted partial orders.
In the case of the former, one key issue is that we often do not really know how “good” a
particular weakly-stable matching is with the respect to the underlying true orders of the
agents, and in the case of the latter they often do not exist. Therefore, in this chapter, we
move away from these extremes and instead try to find a middle-ground when it comes to
working with incomplete information. In particular, we look at answering the following two
questions: i) How can a designer generate matchings that are robust and what is a possible
measure of how “good” a matching is with respect to the underlying complete preferences?
ii) What is the trade-off between the amount of missing information and the “quality” of
solution one can get?
With the goal of resolving these questions through a simple and prior-free approach, we look
at matchings that minimize the maximum number of blocking pairs with respect to all the
possible underlying true orders as a measure of “goodness” or “quality”, and subsequently
provide results on finding such matchings. In particular, we first restrict our attention to
matchings that have to be stable with respect to at least one of the completions (i.e., weakly-
stable matchings) and show that in this case arbitrarily filling-in the missing information
and computing the resulting stable matching can give a non-trivial approximation factor for
1A strict linear order is a binary relation  that is irreflexive, transitive, and connected—meaning,
for two agents a, b, where a 6= b, either a  b or b  a. A strict weak order a binary relation  that is
irreflexive, transitive, and where for agents a, b, c, if a and b are incomparable—meaning, neither a  b nor
b  a—and b and c are incomparable, then a and c are incomparable.
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our problem in certain cases. We complement this result by showing that, even under severe
restrictions on the preferences of the agents, the factor obtained is asymptotically tight in
many cases. We then investigate a special case, where only agents on one side provide strict
weak orders and all the missing information is at the bottom of their preference orders, and
show that in this special case the negative result mentioned above can be circumvented in
order to get a much better approximation factor; this result, too, is tight in many cases.
Finally, we move away from the restriction on weakly-stable matchings and show a general
hardness of approximation result.
Chapter 3: Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility under Partial Information
Continuing with the theme of finding ‘robust’ solutions, we move to Chapter 3 where we
study the facility location problem. Informally, in the simplest version of this problem,
a planner wants to locate a facility on the real line and there are n agents, each with
a preferred location xi for the public facility. The goal, then, is to see if it is possible
to design mechanisms—which can be essentially thought of as algorithms with incentive
built-in—that can minimize some objective function (like, for instance, minimize the sum
of distances for the agents to the facility), perhaps even approximately, and at the same
time incentivize the agents to report their preferred locations truthfully—meaning, no agent
i obtains a higher utility by reporting an x′i 6= xi.
Although this problem has been extensively studied, the assumption in all of this work
is that the agents are always precisely aware of their preferred locations on the real line.
However, this might not always be the case, and so in this chapter we deal with the scenario
where agents only provide coarse information—namely, that for each agent i their preferred
location lies in some interval Ki. While almost all of mechanism design deals with the
case when agents provide complete preference information, we explore the design of robust
mechanisms given such incomplete information when considering two well-studied objective
functions. This in turn raises some technical questions since notions like truthfulness, or
more formally the usual equilibrium solution concepts, are no longer well-defined in this
setting. Therefore, we consider two natural equilibrium solution concepts for this setting,
namely, i) very weak dominance and ii) minimax dominance. We show that under the
former solution concept, there are no mechanisms that do better than a naive mechanism
which always, irrespective of the information provided by the agents, outputs the same
location. However, when using the latter, weaker, solution concept, we show that one
can do significantly better, and we provide upper and lower bounds on the performance
of mechanisms when considering different objective functions of interest. Furthermore, it
7
also turns out that our mechanisms can be viewed as extensions to the classical optimal
mechanisms in that they perform optimally when agents precisely specify their preferences.
Chapter 4: Improving Welfare in One-sided Matching using Threshold Queries
While Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the case when the designer has to work with the given
incomplete information, it might be possible to request agents to provide more information
to improve the final outcome. This is precisely the kind of setting considered in Chapter 4
and here we explore the second theme, which considers the following question: Given
incomplete preferences, how can one ask the agents for some more information in order
to design algorithms that produce solutions that are “good” with respect to the underlying
complete preferences?
In particular, here we study one-sided matching problems where n agents have preferences
over m objects and each of them need to be assigned at most one object. Most work on
such problems assume that the agents only have ordinal preferences and usually the goal in
these is to compute a matching that satisfies some notion of economic efficiency like Pareto
optimality. However, agents may have some preference intensities or cardinal utilities that,
e.g., indicate that they like an an object much more than another object. We first show
how not taking these into account can result in a significant loss in social welfare. While
one way to potentially account for these is to directly ask the agents for this information,
such an elicitation process is cognitively demanding. Therefore, we focus on learning more
about their cardinal preferences using simple threshold queries which ask an agent if their
utility for an object is greater than a certain value, and use this in turn to come up with
algorithms that produce a matching that, for a particular economic notion X, satisfies X
and also achieves a good approximation to the optimal welfare among all matchings that
satisfy X. We focus on several notions of economic efficiency, and look at both adaptive
and non-adaptive algorithms. Overall, our results show how one can improve welfare by
even non-adaptively asking the agents for just one bit of extra information per object.
1.2.2 Part II: Making decisions with inaccurate information
In situations where agents are asked for cardinal preferences, attributing exact numerical
values to outcomes can be a cognitively demanding task, and so it is not hard to imagine
scenarios where an agent might make “mistakes” while reporting their preferences—meaning,
instead of reporting x, they might report x′ due to the inherent difficulty in attributing
numerical values to preferences. The second part of the thesis deals with a such a setting.
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Chapter 5: Algorithmic Stability in Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
In Chapter 5 we look at the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set
of agents. The main constraint is that the goods need to be divided among the agents in
a ‘fair’ way (for specific definitions of what it means to be ‘fair’). Most of the literature
on this problem assume that the agents provide cardinal preferences. However, given the
difficulty in translating preferences to numerical values, ideally we would like algorithms to
not be overly sensitive to the exact numerical values provided.
Therefore, towards this end, and in particular to reduce the impact of “small” or “innocuous”
mistakes, we propose a notion of algorithmic stability for scenarios where cardinal preferences
are elicited. Informally, our definition captures the idea that an agent should not experience
a large change in their utility as long as they make “small” or “innocuous” mistakes while
reporting their preferences. We study this notion in the context of fair and efficient
allocations of indivisible goods among two agents, and show that it is impossible to achieve
exact stability along with even a weak notion of fairness and even approximate efficiency.
As a result, we propose two relaxations to stability, namely, approximate-stability and
weak-approximate-stability, and show how popular fair division algorithms that guarantee
fair and efficient outcomes perform poorly with respect to these relaxations. This leads us
to the explore the possibility of designing new algorithms that are more stable. Towards
this end we present a general characterization result for a notion of fairness called pairwise
maximin share allocations, and in turn use it to design an algorithm that is approximately-
stable and guarantees a pairwise maximin share and Pareto optimal allocation for two
agents. Finally, we present a simple framework that can be used to modify existing fair and
efficient algorithms in order to ensure that they also achieve weak-approximate-stability.
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Part I




Two-Sided Matching Under Partial
Information
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we begin with the theme of working with incomplete preferences. In
particular, we are interested in designing ‘robust’ algorithms—informally, algorithms that
when given access to incomplete preferences provide some guarantees with respect to the
underlying complete preferences. We look at this question in the context of two-sided
matching problems. Broadly, two-sided matching problems model scenarios where there are
two disjoint sets of agents that want to be matched with each other. Each agent in a set
has preferences over agents in the other set, and the goal is to match the agents in some
socially desirable way. Given their numerous applications, e.g., in matching students to
dormitories (known as the Stable Roommates problem (SR) [Irv85]), residents to hospitals
(known as the Hospital-Resident problem (HR) [Man16]) etc., such problems have been
extensively studied (see the books by Gusfield and Irving [GI89] and Manlove [Man13] for
a survey on two-sided matching problems) and they are ubiquitous in practice.
While the class of two-sided matching problems is large, the focus of this chapter is on
a specific two-sided matching problem called the Stable Marriage problem (SM), first
introduced by Gale and Shapley [GS62]. In SM we are given two disjoint sets U and W
(colloquially referred to as the set of men and women) and each agent in one set specifies
a strict linear order over the agents in the other set. The objective, then, is to find a
stable matching, i.e., a collection of pairs (m,w), where m ∈ U and w ∈ W , such that each
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man/woman is part of at most one pair and where there is no unmatched pair (m′, w′) such
that m′ prefers w′ over their partner in the matching and vice-versa. A pair which satisfies
the latter criterion is called a blocking pair.
Although the assumption that the agents will be able to specify strict linear orders is
not unreasonable in small markets, in general, as the markets get larger, it may not be
feasible for an agent to determine a complete ordering over all the alternatives. Furthermore,
there may arise situations where agents may simply be unwilling to provide their complete
preferences due to, say, privacy concerns. Thus, it is natural for a designer to allow agents
the flexibility to specify partial orders, and so here we assume that the agents submit strict
weak orders1 (i.e., strict partial orders where the incomparability relation is transitive) that
are consistent with their underlying true strict linear orders. Although the issue of partially
specified preferences has received attention previously, we argue below that certain aspects
have not been addressed sufficiently.
In particular, the common approach to the question of what constitutes a “good” matching
in such a setting has been to either work with weakly-stable matchings, which are stable
matchings that arise as a result of an arbitrary linear extension of the submitted partial
orders, or to look at super-stable matchings, which are matchings that are stable with
respect to all the possible linear extensions of the submitted partial orders [Irv94; Ras+14].
Although these are useful notions and approaches that are analogous to weakly-stability
and super-stability have been studied in other contexts like, for instance, voting, where one
talks about possible and necessary winners (e.g., see [XC11; Bau+12]), and in the context of
one-sided matchings (e.g., see [AWX15; Azi+19]), one key issue with weak-stability is that
we often do not really know how “good” a particular weakly-stable matching is with the
respect to the underlying true preferences of the agents. And in the case of super-stability,
one key issue that such matchings often do not exist for many instances. Furthermore, we
believe that it is in the interest of the market-designer to understand how robust or “good”
a matching is with respect to the underlying true preferences of the agents, for, if otherwise,
issues relating to instability and market unravelling can arise since the matching that is
output by a mechanism can be arbitrarily bad with respect to these true preferences.
Hence, in this chapter we propose to move away from the extremes of working with either
arbitrary weakly-stable matchings or super-stable matchings, and to find a middle-ground
when it comes to working with partial preference information. To this end, our aim here is to
answer two questions from the perspective of a market-designer: i) How should one handle
1All our negative results naturally hold for the case when the agents are allowed to specify strict partial
orders. As for our positive results, most of them can be extended for general partial orders, although the
resulting bounds will be worse.
12
partial information so as to be able to provide guarantees with respect to the underlying
true preference orders? ii) What is the trade-off between the amount of missing information
and the quality of a matching that one can achieve? We discuss these in more detail in the
following sections.
2.1.1 Working with partial information
When agents do not submit full preference orderings, there are several possible ways to cope
with the missing information. One approach is to assume that there exists some underlying
distribution from which the agents’ true preferences are drawn (e.g., see [Haz+12]), and
then use this information to find a “good” matching—which is, say, the one with the least
number of blocking pairs in expectation. However, the success of such an approach crucially
depends on having access to information about the underlying preference distributions which
may not always be available. Therefore, here we make no assumptions on the underlying
preference distributions and instead adopt a prior-free and absolute-worst-case approach
where we assume that any of the linear extensions of the given strict partial orders can be
the underlying true order, and we aim to provide solutions that perform well with respect
to all of them. We note that similar worst-case approaches have been looked at previously,
for instance, by Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA12] in the context of auctions.
The objective we concern ourselves with here is that of minimizing the number of blocking
pairs, which is well-defined and has been considered previously in the context of matching
problems (for instance, see [ABM05; BMM10]). In particular, for a given instance I our
goal is to return a matching µopt that has the best worst case—i.e., a matching that has
the minimum maximum ‘regret’ after one realises the true underlying preference orders.
We refer to µopt as the minimax optimal solution.
More precisely, let I = (pU , pW ) denote an instance, where pU = {pu1 , · · · , pun}, pW =
{pw1 , · · · , pwn}, U = {ui}i∈{1,2,··· ,n} and W = {wi}i∈{1,2,··· ,n} are the set of men and women
respectively, and pi is the strict partial order submitted by agent i. Additionally, let C(pi)
denote the set of linear extensions of pi, C be the Cartesian product of the C(pi)s, i.e.,
C =×i∈U∪W C(pi), bp(µ, c) denote the set of blocking pairs that are associated with the
matching µ according to some linear extension c ∈ C, andMI denote the set of all possible
matchings with respect to I. Then, the matching µopt that we are interested in is defined as





While we are aware of just one work by Drummond and Boutilier [DB13] who consider the
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minimax regret approach in the context of stable matchings (they consider it mainly in
the context of preference elicitation; see Section 2.1.4 for more details), the approach, in
general, is perhaps reminiscent, for instance, of the works of Hyafil and Boutilier [HB04]
and Lu and Boutilier [LB11] who looked at the minimax regret solution criterion in the
context of mechanism design for games with type uncertainty and preference elicitation in
voting protocols, respectively.
Remark: In the usual definition of a minimax regret solution, there is a second term which
measures the ‘regret’ as a result of choosing a particular solution. That is, in the definition
above, it would usually be µopt = arg minµ∈S maxc∈C |bp(µ, c)| − |bp(µc, c)|, where µc is the
optimal matching (with respect to the objective function |bp()|) for the linear extension
c. This is not included in the definition above because |bp(µc, c)| = 0 as every instance of
the marriage problem with linear orders has a stable solution (which by definition has zero
blocking pairs). Additionally, the literature on stable matchings sometimes uses the term
‘regret’ to denote the maximum cost associated with a stable matching, where the cost of a
matching for an agent is the rank of its partner in the matching and the maximum is taken
over all the agents (for instance, see [Man+02]). However, here the term regret is used in
the context of the minimax regret solution criterion.
2.1.2 Measuring the amount of missing information
For the purposes of understanding the trade-off between the amount of missing information
and the “quality” of solution one can achieve, we need a way to measure the amount of
missing information in a given instance, and for this here we adopt the following. For a
given instance I, the amount of missing information, δ, is the average fraction of pairwise
comparisons one cannot infer from the given strict partial orders. That is, we know that





comparisons from it. Now, instead, if an agent i submits a strict partial order pi, then





comparisons one cannot infer from pi (this is the







Although, given a strict partial order pi, it is straightforward to calculate δi, we will
nevertheless assume throughout that δ is part of the input. Hence, our definition of an
instance will be modified the following way to include the parameter for missing information:
I = (δ, pU , pW ).
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Remark: δ = 0 denotes the case when all the preferences are strict linear orders. Also, for
an instance with n agents on each side, the least value of δ when the amount of missing




(this happens in the case where there is only one agent with
just one pairwise comparison missing). However, despite this, in the interest of readability,
we sometimes just write statements of the form “for all δ > 0”. Such statements need to be
understood as being true for only realizable or valid values of δ that are greater than zero.
2.1.3 Our contributions
The focus in this chapter is on computing the minimax optimal matching, i.e., a matching
that, when given an instance I, minimizes the maximum number of blocking pairs with
respect to all the possible linear extensions (see Section 2.2.1 for a formal definition of the
problem). Towards this end, we make the following contributions.
• First, we formally define the problem and show that it is equivalent to the problem
of finding a matching that has the minimum number of super-blocking pairs (i.e.,
man-woman pairs where each of them weakly-prefers the other over their current
partners). Although an optimal answer to our question might involve matchings that
have man-woman pairs such that each of them strictly prefers the other over their
partners, we start by focusing on matchings that do not have such pairs. Given the
fact that any matching with no such pairs are weakly-stable, through this setting we
address the question: Given an instance, is it possible to find weakly-stable matching
that performs well, in terms of minimizing the number of blocking pairs, with respect to
all the linear extensions of the given strict partial orders? We show that by arbitrarily
filling-in the missing information and computing the resulting stable matching, one
can obtain a non-trivial approximation factor (i.e., one that is o(n2)) for our problem
for many values of δ. We complement this result by showing that, even under severe
restrictions on the preferences of the agents, the factor obtained is asymptotically
tight in many cases.
• By assuming a special structure on the agents’ preferences—one where strict weak
orders are specified by just one set of agents and all the missing information is at
the bottom of their preference orders—we show that there is an O(n)-approximation
algorithm for our problem. The proof of this is via finding a 2-approximation for
another problem (see Problem 3) that might be of independent interest.
• In Section 2.4 we remove the restriction to weakly-stable matchings and show a
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general hardness of approximation result for our problem. Following this, we discuss
one possible approach that can lead to a near-tight approximation guarantee.
2.1.4 Related work
Starting with the work of Gale and Shapley [GS62], two-sided matching problems have
been extensively studied, due, in part, to their numerous applications [GI89; RS90; Man13].
For instance, it is used to match medical residents to hospitals [Rot84; Rot86; Man16] in
many countries [NRM; CAR], to match students to universities [Rom98; BB04], etc. We
refer the reader to the books by Gusfield and Irving [GI89] and Manlove [Man13] for a
survey on two-sided matching problems.
In this vast literature, there are several papers that have looked at problems relating to the
topic of chapter, and that broadly deal with missing preference information or uncertainty
in preferences. We discuss them below.
Drummond and Boutilier [DB13] used the minimax regret solution criterion in order to
drive preference elicitation strategies for matching problems. While their paper discusses
about computing robust matchings subject to a minimax regret solution criteria, their focus
was on providing an NP-completeness result and heuristic preference elicitation strategies
for refining the missing information. In contrast, in addition to focusing on understanding
the exact trade-offs between the amount of missing information and the solution “quality”,
our main concern here is to derive approximation algorithms for computing such robust
matchings.
Rastegari et al. [Ras+14] studied a partial information setting in labour markets. However,
again, the focus of this paper was different. They looked at pervasive-employer-optimal
matchings, which are matchings that are employer-optimal (see [Ras+14] for the definitions)
with respect to all the underlying linear extensions. In addition, they also discussed how to
identify, in polynomial time, if a matching is employer-optimal with respect to some linear
extension.
Aziz et al. [Azi+16] looked at the stable matching problem in settings where there is
uncertainty about the preferences of the agents. They considered three different models of
uncertainty and primarily studied the complexity of computing the stability probability
of a given matching and the question of finding a matching that will have the highest
probability of being stable. In contrast to their work, here we do not make any underlying
distributional assumptions about the preferences of the agents and instead take an absolute
worst-case approach, which in turn implies that our results hold irrespective of the underlying
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distribution on the completions.
Finally, we also briefly mention another line of research which deals with partial information
settings and goes by the name of interview minimization (see, for instance, the papers by
Rastegari et al. [Ras+13] and Drummond and Boutilier [DB14]). One of the main goals in
this line of work is to come with a matching that is stable (and possibly satisfying some
other desirable property) by conducting as few ‘interviews’ (which in turn helps the agents
in refining their preferences) as possible. We view this work as an interesting, orthogonal,
direction from the one we pursue here.
2.2 Preliminaries
Let U and W be two disjoint sets. The sets U and W are colloquially referred to as the
set of men and women, respectively, and |U | = |W | = n. We assume that each agent in U
and W has a strict linear order (i.e., a ranking without ties) over the agents in the other
set, but this strict linear order may be unknown to the agents or they may be unwilling
to completely disclose the same. Hence, each agent in U and W specifies a strict partial
order over the agents in the other set (which we refer to as their preference order) that is
consistent with their underlying true orders. For an agent i, their preference order pi is
consistent with their underlying strict linear order if agent i prefers a to b in pi only if it
prefers a to b according to the underlying linear order.
Throughout, we use pU and pW , respectively, to denote the collective preference orders of all
the men and women (a.k.a. profile of preferences of men and women). For a strict partial
order pi associated with agent i, we denote the set of linear extensions associated with pi by
C(pi) and denote by C the Cartesian product of the C(pi)s, i.e., C =×i∈U∪W C(pi). We
refer to the set C as “the set of all completions” where the term completion refers to an
element in C. Also, throughout, we denote strict preferences by  and use  to denote the
relation ‘weakly-prefers’. So, for instance, we say that an agent i strictly prefers a to b and
denote this by a i b and use a i b to denote that either i strictly prefers a to b or finds
them incomparable. As mentioned in the introduction, we restrict our attention to the case
when the strict partial orders submitted by the agents are strict weak orders over the set of
agents in the other set.
Remark: Strict weak orders are defined to be strict partial orders where incomparability
is transitive. Hence, although the term tie is used to mean indifference, it is convenient to
think of strict weak orders as rankings with ties. Therefore, throughout, we will use the
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terms ‘ties’ and ‘incomparabilities’ interchangeably, and whenever we say that agent c finds
a and b to be tied, we mean that c finds a and b to be incomparable.
An instance I of the stable marriage problem (SM) is defined as I = (δ, pU , pw), where δ
denotes the amount of missing information in that instance and this in turn, as defined in
(2.1), is the average number of pairwise comparisons that are missing from the instance, and
pU and pW are as defined above. We useMI to denote the set of all possible matchings
with respect to I, where a matching µ ∈M is a set of disjoint pairs (m,w), where m ∈ U
and w ∈ W .
Given an instance I, the goal is usually to come up with a matching µ ∈MI that is stable.
There are different notions of stability that have been proposed and below we define two of
them that are relevant to our results here: i) weak-stability and ii) super-stability. However,
before we look at their definitions we introduce the following terminology that will be used
throughout this chapter. (Note that in the definitions below we implicitly assume that in
any matching µ all the agents are matched. This is so because of the standard assumption
that is made in the literature on SM—i.e., the stable marriage problem where every agent
has a strict linear order over all the agents in the other set—that an agent always prefers
to be matched to some agent than to remain unmatched.)
Definition 1 (blocking pair/obvious blocking pair). Given an instance I and a matching
µ ∈ MI , (m,w) is said to be a blocking pair associated with µ if w m µ(m) and
m w µ(w). The term blocking pair is usually used in situations where the preferences
of the agents are strict linear orders, so in cases where the preferences of the agents have
missing information, we refer to such a pair as an obvious blocking pair.
Definition 2 (super-blocking pair). Given an instance I where the agents submit partial
preference orders and a matching µ ∈ MI , we say that (m,w), where µ(m) 6= w, is a
super-blocking pair with respect to µ if w m µ(m) and m w µ(w).
Given the definitions above we can now define weak-stability and super-stability.
Definition 3 (weakly-stable matching). Given an instance I and matching µ ∈MI , µ is
said to be weakly-stable with respect to I if it does not have any obvious blocking pairs.
When the preferences of the agents are strict linear orders, such a matching is just referred
to as a stable matching.
Definition 4 (super-stable matching). Given an instance I and matching µ ∈ MI , µ is
said to be super-stable with respect to I if it does not have any super-blocking pairs.
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2.2.1 Problem definitions
As mentioned in the introduction, we are interested in finding the minimax optimal matching
where the objective is to minimize the number of blocking pairs, i.e., to find, for an instance
I, a matching that has the minimum maximum number of blocking pairs with respect to
all the completions of the preferences. This is formally defined below.
Problem 1 (δ-minimax-matching). Given a δ ∈ [0, 1] and an instance I = (δ′, pU , pW ),
where δ′ ≤ δ is the amount of missing information and pU , pW are the preferences submitted
by men and women, respectively, compute µopt, where




|bp(µ, c)| . (2.2)
Although the problem defined above is our main focus, for the rest of this chapter we
will be talking in terms of the following problem which concerns itself with finding an
approximately super-stable matching (i.e., a super-stable matching with the minimum
number of super-blocking pairs). As we will see below, this is because both the problems
are equivalent.
Problem 2 (δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching). Given a δ ∈ [0, 1] and an instance I =
(δ′, pU , pW ), where δ′ ≤ δ is the amount of missing information and pU , pW are the preferences
submitted by men and women, respectively, compute µSSopt, where
µSSopt = arg min
µ∈MI
|super-bp(µ)| , (2.3)
and super-bp(µ) is the set of super-blocking pairs associated with µ for the instance I.
Below we show that both the problems are equivalent. However, before that we prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given an instance I = (δ, pU , pW ), let µ ∈MI, α denote the maximum number
of blocking pairs associated with µ for any completion of I, and β denote the number of
super-blocking pairs associated with µ for the instance I. Then, α = β.
Proof. First, it is easy to see that if there are α blocking pairs associated with µ for
a completion, then there are at least as many super-blocking pairs associated with µ.
Therefore, α ≤ β.
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Next, we will show that if β is the number of super-blocking pairs associated with µ, then
I has at least one completion such that it has β number of blocking pairs associated with
µ. To see this, for each mi ∈ U and for each wj ∈ W such that (mi, wj) is a super-blocking
pair, do the following:
• if mi finds wj incomparable to µ(mi), then construct a new partial order p′mi for mi
such that it is the same as pmi except for the fact that in p′mi we have that mi strictly
prefers wj over µ(mi).
• if wj finds mi incomparable to µ(wj), then construct a new partial order p′wj for wj
such that it is the same as pwj except for the fact that in p′wj we have that wj strictly
prefers mi over µ(wj).
Once the above steps are done, if there still exists any agent whose preference order is
partial, then complete it arbitrarily. Now, consider this instance I ′ that is obtained and
observe that every (mi, wj) which was a super-blocking pair associated with µ in I forms a
blocking pair in µ with respect to I ′. Therefore, this completion has β blocking pairs, and
since the maximum number of blocking pairs in any completion is α, we have that β ≤ α.
Combining this with the case above, we have that α = β.
Given the lemma above, we can now show that the problems are equivalent.
Proposition 2. For any δ ∈ [0, 1], the δ-minimax-matching and δ-min-bp-super-stable-
matching problems are equivalent.
Proof. Let I = (δ′, pU , pW ) be an arbitrary instance, where δ′ ≤ δ, and µ ∈MI . We show
that µ is an optimal solution for the δ-minimax-matching problem if and only if it is an
optimal solution for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem.
(⇒) Let us suppose that µ is not an optimal solution for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-
matching problem. This implies that there exists some other µ′ such that |super-bp(µ′)|
< |super-bp(µ)|. However, from Lemma 1 we know that the maximum number of blocking
pairs associated with µ′ for any completion with respect to I is equal to |super-bp(µ′)|,
which in turn contradicts the fact that µ was optimal for the δ-minimax-matching problem.
(⇐) We can prove this analogously as in the case above.
For the rest of this chapter, we assume that we are always dealing with instances which do
not have a super-stable matching since the existence of such a matching can be checked
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in polynomial-time [Irv94, Theorem 3.4]. So, now, in the context of the δ-min-bp-super-
stable-matching problem, it is easy to show that if the number of super-blocking pairs k in
the optimal solution is a constant, then we can solve it in polynomial-time. We show this
below. Later, in Section 2.4, we will see that the problem is NP-hard, even to approximate.
Proposition 3. An exact solution to the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem can be
computed in O(n2(k+1)) time, where k is the number of super-blocking pairs in the optimal
solution.
Proof. We will describe the algorithm below whose main idea is based on the following
observation.
For an instance I, consider its optimal solution µopt and let the k super-blocking pairs
associated with µopt be B = {(m1, w1), · · · , (mk, wk)}. Next, for each such pair (mi, wi),
put mi (respectively, wi) at the end of wi’s (respectively, mi’s) preference list (i.e., in I,
make every other man (woman), except those involved in another blocking pair with wi
(mi), rank better than mi (wi)). If either of them are involved in multiple blocking pairs
in B, then make those partners as incomparable at the end of the preference list. Let us
call the resulting instance I ′. Notice that µopt is super-stable with respect to I ′ as the
pairs in B are no longer blocking and no new blocking pairs are created because of our
manipulations to the preference list.
Given the above observation, we can now describe the exponential algorithm.
• Initially j = 1. Given a j, try out every possible set of pairs of size j to see if they
are the right blocking pairs.
• For each set generated in the previous step, modify the original instance I to I ′ as
described above and see if I ′ has a super-stable matching (as mentioned previously,
this can be done in polynomial time [Irv94, Theorem 3.4]). If yes, then return the
super-stable matching as that is the solution. Otherwise, if none of the sets of size j
result in a “yes”, then go back to step 1 and try again with the next value of j.
Now, it is easy to see that we end up with the optimal solution this way since we try
all possible sets of blocking pairs. As for the time, we know that for each j we have at
most (n2)j choices of sets and for each set we need at most 2n2 time to do the necessary






2.3 Investigating Weakly-Stable Matchings
In this section we focus on situations where obvious blocking pairs are not permitted
in the final matching. In particular, we explore the space of weakly-stable matchings
and ask whether it is possible to find weakly-stable matchings that also provide good
approximations to the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem (and thus the δ-minimax-
matching problem).
2.3.1 Using weakly-stable matchings to approximate the δ-min-bp-
super-stable-matching problem
It has previously been established that a matching is weakly-stable if and only if it is stable
with respect to at least one completion [Man+02, Section 1.2]. Therefore, given this, one
immediate question that arises in the context of approximating the δ-min-bp-super-stable-
matching problem is: What if we just fill in the missing information arbitrarily and then
compute a stable matching associated with such a completion? This is the question we
consider here, and we show that weakly-stable matchings do give a non-trivial (i.e., one
that is o(n2), as any matching has only O(n2) super-blocking pairs) approximation bound
for our problem for certain values of δ. The proof of the following theorem is through a
simple application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Theorem 4. For any δ > 0 and an instance I = (δ′, pU , pW ) where δ′ ≤ δ, any weakly-










Proof. Let µ be a weakly-stable matching associated with I. By the definition of weakly-
stable matchings we know that µ does not have any obvious blocking pairs. This implies
that for every super-blocking pair (m,w) associated with µ, either m finds w incomparable
to his partner µ(m) or w finds m incomparable to her partner µ(w). If it is the former
then we refer to the super-blocking pair (m,w) as one that is associated with m and if
not we say that it is associated with w. Next, let us suppose that there are d agents who
have a blocking pair associated with them and let bi denote the number of super-blocking
pairs associated with agent i. So, now, the number of super-blocking pairs, |super-bp(µ)|,
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(`i − 1) =
d∑
i=1
`i − d, (2.4)
where `i refers to the length of largest tie associated with agent i and the inequality follows
from the definition of an association of a super-blocking pair with an agent.






missing with respect to i (since i has a tie of length `i). Therefore, using the Cauchy-Schwarz



























Also, since the total amount of missing information δ′ in the instance I is less than or equal


















Now, using (2.6) and the fact that d is also upper-bounded by 2n (as there are only 2n
agents in the instance), we have that d ≤ min{2n, δn3}. Therefore, using (2.5) and again


























This in turn implies that if we solve for
∑d













d2 + 8dn2(n− 1)δ.
So, now, we can use the fact that d ≤ min{2n, δn3} to see that
d∑
i=1




Finally, this along with (2.4) gives our result since the number of super-blocking pairs in the
optimal solution is at least 1 (since, as mentioned in Section 2.2.1, we are only considering
instances that do not have a super-stable matching).
2.3.2 Can we do better when restricted to weakly-stable match-
ings?
While Theorem 4 established an approximation bound for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-
matching problem when considering only weakly-stable matchings, it was simply based on
arbitrarily filling-in the missing information. Therefore, there remains the question as to
whether one can be clever about handling the missing information and as a result obtain
improved approximation bounds. In this section we consider this question and show that
for many values of δ the approximation factor obtained in Theorem 4 is asymptotically the
best one can achieve when restricted to weakly-stable matchings.




], if there exists an α-approximation algorithm for δ-







. Moreover, this result is true even if we allow only one side to specify ties
and also insist that all the ties need to be at the top of the preference order.
Proof. At a very high-level, the key idea in this proof is to create an instance I such that
if we insist on there being no obvious blocking pairs, then this results in some kind of a
“cascading effect”, thus in turn causing a very sharp blow-up in the number of super-blocking
pairs. With this intuition, we first construct an instance I as shown in Figure 2.1, where
ties appear only on the women’s side. Furthermore, we define the following:




, z = n
2y
(for simplicity we assume that y and z are integers; we can
appropriately modify the proof if that is not the case)
• bj = n2 + jy + 1,∀j ∈ [0, . . . z], Bi = {bi−1, . . . , bi − 1}, ∀i ∈ [1, . . . z]
• F = {1, . . . , n
2
}, S = {n
2
+ 1, . . . , n}
• WX (MX) : for some set X, place all the women (men) with index in X in the
increasing order of their indices
• W TX (MTX) : for some set X, place all the women (men) with index in X as tied
• [. . .] : place all the remaining alternatives in some strict order.
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Men
m1 : w1 WB1  . . . WBz WF\{1}
m2 : w1  w2  [. . .]
m3 : w2  w3 WF\{2,3} WS









mb0 : w1  wb0 WB1\{b0} WS\B1 WF\{1}
...
mb1−1 : w1  wb1−1 WB1\{b1−1} WS\B1 WF\{1}
mb1 : w1  wb1 WB2\{b1} WS\B2 WF\{1}
...
mb2−1 : w1  wb2−1 WB2\{b2−1} WS\B2 WF\{1}
...
mbz−1 : w1  wbz−1 WBz\{bz−1} WS\Bz WF\{1}
...
mbz−1 : w1  wbz−1 WBz\{bz−1} WS\Bz WF\{1}
Women
w1 : m2  m1  [. . .]
w2 : m2 M(F∪S)\{1}  m1
w3 : m1  m3  [. . .]




: m1  mn
2
 [. . .]
wb0 : M
T




B1\{b1−1} MS\B1  m1  mb1−1 MF\{1}
wb1 : M
T












B1\{bz−1} MS\B1  m1  mbz−1 MF\{1}
Figure 2.1: The instance I that is used in the proof of Theorem 5
Next, we will show that all the weakly-stable matchings associated with I have O(n2
√
δ)
super-blocking pairs, whereas the optimal solution has exactly one super-blocking pair.
To do this, first note that the optimal solution µopt associated with the instance is µopt =
{(m1, w1), (m2, w2), . . . , (mn, wn)}, where (m2, w1) is the only super-blocking pair (and it
is an obvious blocking pair). Also, it can be verified that the total amount of missing
information in I is at most δ. So, next, we prove the following claim.
Claim 1. If µ is a weakly-stable matching associated with the instance I, then ∀i ∈
{n
2
+ 1, . . . , n}, µ(mi) 6= wi.
Proof. First, note that in any weakly-stable matching m2 will always be matched to w1 as
otherwise it will result in an obvious blocking pair. Next, let us suppose that there exists
an i ∈ {n
2
+ 1, . . . , n} such that µ(mi) = wi. Now, we will consider the following two cases
and show that in both the cases this is impossible.
Case 1. m1 is matched to a woman w ∈ WF\{1} in µ: In this case one can see that (m1, wi)
forms an obvious blocking pair.
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Case 2. m1 is matched to a woman w ∈ WS in µ: Note that if this is the case, then there
is at least one j ∈ S such that mj is matched with a woman w ∈ WF . Now, notice that
(mj, wi) forms an obvious blocking pair.
Given the claim above, consider a man m whose index is in some block Bj and let his
index value be k. From the way the preferences are defined, it is easy to see that in any
weakly-stable matching, m will be matched to a woman w whose index lies in the same
block Bj (because otherwise it will result in an obvious blocking pair). At the same time,
from the claim above we know that this w’s index is not k. Now, let us consider the woman
wbj−1 who is the woman with the highest index value in Bj and let m′ denote the man who
is matched to wbj−1 in a weakly-stable matching. From the observation above we know that
m′ has an index value in Bj. Additionally, given the way the preferences are defined for
m′ and using the fact that any woman wp such that p ∈ Bj finds all the men in Bj \ {p}
to be incomparable, one can see that m′ forms (|Bj| − 2) super-blocking pairs (with all
the women in Bj except wbj−1 and the one with the same index value as m′). Also, by
using the same argument again, but with respect to wbj−2, we can show that partner of
wbj−2 in the matching forms at least (|Bj| − 3) super-blocking pairs (with all women except
wbj−2, wbj−1, and the one with the same index). Continuing this way we see that each
block Bj contributes O(|Bj|2) super-blocking pairs. And so, since there are z blocks and
|Bj| = y for all j, we have that there are O(n2
√
δ) super-blocking pairs in any weakly-stable
matching.
2.3.3 The case of one-sided top-truncated preferences: An O(n)
approximation algorithm
Although Theorem 5 is an inherently negative result, in this section we consider an
interesting restriction on the preferences of the agents and show how this negative result
can be circumvented. In particular, we consider the case where only agents on one side
are allowed to specify ties and all the ties need to be at the bottom. Such a restriction
has been looked at previously in the context of matching problems and as noted by Irving
and Manlove [IM08] is one that appears in practise in the Scottish Foundation Allocation
Scheme (SFAS). Additionally, restricting ties to the bottom models a very well-studied
class of preferences known as top-truncated preferences, which has received considerable
attention in the context of voting (see, for instance, [Bau+12]).
Top-truncated preferences model scenarios where an agent is certain about their most
preferred choices, but is indifferent among the remaining ones or is unsure about them.
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More precisely, in our setting, the preference order submitted by, say, a woman w is said to
be a top-truncated order if it is a linear order over a subset of U and the remaining men are
all considered to be incomparable by w. In this section we consider one-sided top-truncated
preferences, i.e., where only men or women are allowed to specify top-truncated orders,
and show an O(n)-approximation algorithm for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching under this
setting. (Without loss of generality we assume throughout that only the women submit
strict weak orders.) Although arbitrarily filling-in the missing information and computing
the resulting weakly-stable matching can lead to an O(n2
√
δ)-approximate matching even
for this restricted case (see Appendix A.2 for an example), we will see that not all weakly-
stable matchings are “bad” and that in fact the O(n)-approximate matching we obtain is
weakly-stable.
However, in order to arrive at this result, we first introduce the following problem which
might be of independent interest. (To the best of our knowledge, this has not been previously
considered in the literature.) Informally, in this problem we are given an instance I and
are asked if we can delete some of the agents to ensure that the instance, when restricted
to the remaining agents, will have a perfect super-stable matching.
Problem 3 (min-delete-super-stable-matching). Given an instance I = (δ, pU , pW ), where
δ is the amount of missing information and pU , pW are the preferences submitted by men
and women, respectively, compute the set D of minimum cardinality such that the instance
I−D = (δ−D, pU\D, pW\D), where δ−D = 1|(U∪W )\D|
∑
i∈(U∪W )\D δi, has a perfect super-stable
matching (i.e., every agent in (U ∪W ) \D is matched in a super-stable matching).
Below we first show a 2-approximation for the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem
when restricted to the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences. Subsequently, we use
this result in order to get an O(n)-approximation for our problem. However, before that,
we introduce the following terminology which will be used throughout in this section.
• An instance I of the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem can also be thought
of as the set of agents along with their preference lists. Initially for every agent this
list has all the agents in the other set listed in some order. Now, during the course of
our algorithm sometimes we use the operation “delete(a, b)” which removes agent a
from b’s list and b from a’s. After such a deletion (or after a series of such deletions)
our instance now refers to the set of agents along with their updated lists.
• We say that a matching µ is internally super-stable with respect to an instance I if µ
is super-stable with respect to the instance that is obtained by only considering the
matched agents in µ (i.e., consider I and remove all the agents who are not matched
in µ from I).
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Procedure: proposeWith(A, I)
1: assign each agent a ∈ A to be free
2: while some a ∈ A is free do
3: b← first agent on a’s list
4: if b is already engaged to agent p && b finds p and a incomparable then
5: delete (a, b)
6: else
7: if b is already engaged to agent p, then assign p to be free
8: assign a and b to be engaged
9: for each agent c in b’s list such that a b c, delete (c, b)
10: end if
11: end while
12: for each man m do
13: w ← first woman on m’s list
14: if there exists m′ such that w finds m and m′ incomparable, then delete (m′, w)
15: end for . deletions in this loop only happen once and removes all the remaining ties
16: return I . this returns the updated lists
Main:
Input: a one-sided top-truncated instance I = (δ, pU , pW )
17: I ′ ← proposeWith(U, I)
18: I ′ ← proposeWith(W, I ′)
19: while there exists some exposed rotation (m1, w1), (m2, w2), . . . , (mr, wr) in I ′ do
20: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, delete (mi, wi)
21: I ′ ← proposeWith(U, I ′)
22: I ′ ← proposeWith(W, I ′)
23: end while
24: µ← for all men m ∈ U , match m with the only woman in his list
25: construct G = (U ∪W,E), where (m,w) ∈ E if (m,w) is super-blocking pair in µ w.r.t. I
26: D ← minimum vertex cover of G
27: for each a ∈ D do
28: D ← D ∪ µ(a)
29: end for
30: return (D,µ)
Algorithm 1: For the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences, the set D returned by
the algorithm is a 2-approximation for the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem and
the matching µ returned is an O(n)-approximation for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching.
• We say that an instance I with no ties has an exposed rotation ρ = (m1, w1),
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. . . , (mr, wr) if, in I, wi is the first agent in mi’s list and wi+1 is the second agent in
mi’s list (here (i+ 1) is done modulo r).
Proposition 6. Algorithm 1 is a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm for the min-
delete-super-stable-matching problem when restricted to the case of one-sided top-truncated
preferences.
Proof. The main idea for Algorithm 1 is inspired by the work of Tan [Tan90] who looked at
the problem of finding the maximum internally stable matching for the stable roommates
problem (which is equivalent to the problem of finding the minimum number of agents to
delete so that the rest of the agents will have a stable matching when the instance is just
restricted to themselves). Informally, at a very high level, the key idea in Tan’s algorithm was
to show that some of the entries in each agent’s list can be deleted by running the proposal-
rejection sequence like in Gale-Shapley algorithm and through rotation eliminations, while
at the same time maintaining at least one solution of the maximum size. As we will see
below, this is essentially what we do here as well, adapting this idea as necessary for our
case when there are ties on one side but only at the bottom.
Before we go on to the main lemmas, let us suppose that I = (δ, pU , pW ) is an arbitrary
instance of the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem when restricted to the case of
one-sided top-truncated preferences, where δ is the amount of missing information, pU , pW
are the preference orders submitted by the men and women, respectively, and |U | = |W | = n.
Also, let Dopt be the optimal solution for this instance. This in turn implies that we can
form a perfect and internally super-stable matching of size k = n− Dopt
2
, and that in fact k
is the maximum size of any such matching (as otherwise Dopt cannot be optimal). Next, for
now, let us assume the correctness of the following lemmas (note that all the instances we
talk about in this section are restricted to the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences).
Their proofs appear in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 7. Let I1 denote some instance and I2 denote the instance returned by the procedure
proposeWith(A, I1), where the set A represents the proposing side. If there exists a matching
of size t in I1 that is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there exists a matching
of size t in I2 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
Lemma 8. Let I1 denote some instance that does not contain any ties, (m1, w1), (m2, w2),
. . . , (mr, wr) be a rotation that is exposed in I1, and I2 be the instance that is obtained by
deleting the entries (mi, wi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r} from I1. If there exists a matching of size
t in I1 that is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there exists a matching of size
t in I2 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
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Lemma 9. If I1 is an instance that does not contain any exposed rotation, then the list of
every man in I1 has only one woman and vice versa.
Given the above lemmas and given the fact that the instance I has an internally super-stable
matching of size k = n − Dopt
2
, we can start with the instance I and repeatedly apply
Lemma 7 and see that the instance Î that we obtain after line 18 of Algorithm 1 has a
matching of size k that is internally super-stable matching with respect to I. Next, starting
with the instance Î, we can again repeatedly apply Lemma 8 and see that the instance I ′
that remains after line 23 of Algorithm 1 also has a matching of size k that is internally
super-stable matching with respect to I. Additionally, from Lemma 9 we know that in this
instance each man has only one woman in his list and vice versa. So, now, consider the
matching µ that can be obtained by matching each man with the only woman in his list.
Next, consider the bipartite graph G = (V,E) where V = U ∪W and (m,w) ∈ E if (m,w)
is a super-blocking pair with respect to the original instance I, and consider a minimum
vertex cover C of G. We show below that k ≤ n− |C|
2
.
Suppose this is false and that I has an internally super-stable matching of size greater than
n− |C|
2
. Now, from the discussion above, we know that this implies I ′ also has a matching
of size greater than n− |C|
2
such that it is internally super-stable with respect to I. This in
turn implies that we can remove less than |C| agents and have a matching that is internally
super-stable with respect to I. That is, we can remove less than |C| agents and also at the
same time ensure that for every (m,w) ∈ E, this matching has only one of m or w matched
in it, for if otherwise it will not be internally super-stable with respect to I. However, this
implies that |C| is not the size of the minimum vertex cover of G, and hence we have a
contradiction.
Now, to get our approximation bound, consider the set D that is returned by the algorithm.
We know that D ≤ 2|C| ≤ 4(n − k) = 2Dopt, where the first inequality arises because
of lines 27–29 in Algorithm 1 and the second inequality uses the observation above that
k ≤ n− |C|
2
. Finally, it is easy to see that all the steps can be done in polynomial-time (it
is well-known through the Kőnig’s Theorem that one can find a minimum vertex cover of a
bipartite graph in polynomial-time).
Given Proposition 6, we can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 10. For any δ > 0, Algorithm 1 is a polynomial-time O(n)-approximation
algorithm for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem when restricted to the case of
one-sided top-truncated preferences. Moreover, the O(n)-approximate matching that is
returned is also weakly-stable.
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary instance I of the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem
when restricted to the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences. Let µopt be the optimal
solution associated with I. Next, consider the same instance I for the min-delete-super-
stable-matching problem and let us consider the matching µ that is returned by Algorithm 1
for this instance. Also, let Dopt be the optimal solution of the min-delete-super-stable-
matching problem for the instance I and D be the set that is returned by Algorithm 1. (We
can assume throughout that Dopt ≥ 1, for if otherwise this implies that it has a super-stable
matching, and as mentioned in Section 2.2.1 we do not consider such instances.) First, it is
easy to see that this matching is weakly-stable (because in every instance that results after
the first proposal-rejection sequence (which is in line 23), a matching that is formed by
matching each man with the first woman on his list will be weakly-stable). Second, note that
we can rewrite µ as µ = µ1 ∪ µ2, where µ1 = µ \ {∪a∈D(a, µ(a))} and µ2 = ∪a∈D(a, µ(a)).
Now, if S1 (respectively, S2) denotes the number of super-blocking pairs associated with
men in µ1 (respectively, µ2), then












≤ n · |D|
≤ 2n · |Dopt|, (2.8)
where the second step is using the fact that the men in µ1 can form at most |D|2 super-
blocking pairs with women outside of µ1 and the men in µ2 can in the worst case form a
blocking pair with all the women, and the last step is using the fact that Dopt ≥ 1 and that
|D| ≤ 2 · |Dopt|, which we know is true by Proposition 6.






as otherwise one can delete all the men who are involved in super-blocking pairs in µopt
and their corresponding partners and get a super-stable matching on the remaining agents.
Finally, combining (2.8) and (2.9) gives us our theorem.
Before we end this section, we address one final question as to whether, for the class of
one-sided top-truncated preferences, one can obtain a better approximation result if one
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Men
m1 : w2  w1  [. . .]
m2 : w3  w1  w2  [. . .]
m3 : w4  w1  w3  [. . .]
...
mn−y : wn−y+1  [. . .]
mn−y+1 : wn−y+2  w1  wn−y+1  [. . .]
mn−y+2 : wn−y+2  w1  w2  [. . .]
mn−y+3 : wn−y+2  w1  wn−y+3  [. . .]
...
mn : wn−y+2  w1  wn  [. . .]
Women
w1 : m1  . . .  mn−y  (mn−y+1, . . . ,mn)
w2 : m1  [. . .]
w3 : m2  [. . .]
w4 : m3  [. . .]
...
wn−y+1 : mn−y  [. . .]
wn−y+2 : mn−y+1  mn−y+2  [. . .]
wn−y+3 : mn−y+3  [. . .]
wn−y+4 : mn−y+4  [. . .]
...
wn : mn  [. . .]
Figure 2.2: The instance I that is used in the proof of Theorem 11
continues to consider only weakly-stable matchings. In the theorem below we show that for
δ ∈ Ω( 1
n
) Algorithm 1 is asymptotically the best one can do under this restriction.
Theorem 11. For δ ≤ 1
2
, if there exists an α-approximation algorithm for δ-min-bp-super-
stable-matching that always returns a matching that is weakly-stable for the case of one-sided


















presence of [. . .] in a preference list implies that the rest of the alternatives can be placed
in some strict order, and (mn−y+1, . . . ,mn) implies that these agents are tied with respect
to w1. Below we show that the statement of the theorem is true when δ ≤ 12n , i.e., show








. For δ > 1
2n
it is then trivial to extend our instance by just
having some of the other women (other than w1) specify partial preferences.
First, it is easy to verify that this instance has at most δ amount of information missing.
Second, one can see that the optimal solution, i.e., the matching with the minimum number
of super-blocking pairs, for this instance is
µopt =
{
(m1, w1), (m2, w3), . . . , (mn−y+1, wn−y+2), (mn−y+2, w2),
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(mn−y+3, wn−y+3), . . . , (mn, wn)
}
,
where (m1, w2) is the only super-blocking pair.
Given the above observation, let us now consider an arbitrary matching µ that is weakly-
stable. Since mi prefers wi+1 the most and vice versa for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− y+ 1}, we know
that µ(mi) = wi+1. Hence, µ(w1) = mk, for some k ∈ {n− y + 2, . . . , n}. Additionally, we
also know that for all j ∈ {n−y+2, . . . , n} such that j 6= k, w1 mj µ(mj), as none of these
can men can be matched to wn−y+2. This in turn implies that since w1 finds mk and mj
incomparable for j ∈ {n− y + 2, . . . , n} such that j 6= k, (mj, w1) is a super-blocking pair.





In the previous section we investigated weakly-stable matchings and showed several results
for the case when the output matching is weakly-stable. Here we move away from this
restriction and explore what happens when we do not place any restriction on the matchings.
In particular, we begin this section by showing a general hardness of approximation result,
and then follow it with a discussion on one possible approach that can lead to a near-tight
approximation result.
2.4.1 Inapproximability of δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching
We show a hardness of approximation result for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem
through a reduction from the Vertex Cover (VC) problem, which is a well-known NP-
complete problem [Kar72]. In the VC problem, we are given a graph G = (V,E), where
V = {v1, . . . , vk}, and a k0 ≤ k and are asked if there exists a subset of the vertices with
size less than or equal to k0 such that it contains at least one endpoint of every edge.
When given an instance I of VC, the key idea in the proof is to create an instance I ′ of
δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching such that if I is a “yes” instance of VC, then I ′ will have
a very small number of super-blocking pairs, and if otherwise, then I ′ will have a large
number of super-blocking pairs.
Theorem 12. For any constant ε ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1), one cannot obtain a polynomial-
time (n
√
δ)1−ε approximation algorithm for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem
unless P = NP.
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Proof. The proof here is similar to the one by Hamada, Iwama, and Miyazaki [HIM16,
Theorem 1]. The main difference is in the construction of the instance, which in our case is
more involved.
Given an instance I = (G = (V,E), k0) of the VC problem, where |V | = k, we construct






, y = kd + 1, z = d 1√
δ
e
• MA1 = {m1, . . . ,mk0}, MA2 = {mk0+1, . . . ,mk}, WA = {w1, . . . , wk}
• for every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E and c ∈ {1, . . . , z}, Si,jc = {s
i,j
c,1, . . . s
i,j
c,y},
T i,jc = {t
i,j
c,1, . . . t
i,j
c,y}, P i,jc = {p
i,j
c,1, . . . p
i,j
c,y}, and V i,jc = {v
i,j
c,1, . . . v
i,j
c,y}
• Si,j = {Si,j1 , . . . Si,jz }, T i,j = {T
i,j
1 , . . . T
i,j
z }, P i,j = {P
i,j
1 , . . . P
i,j
z }, and V i,j = {V
i,j
1 , . . .
V i,jz }




T i,j, P =
⋃
P i,j, and V =
⋃
V i,j
• U = MA ∪ S ∪ P and W = WA ∪ T ∪ V
• for each i, j the preference orders of the agents are as given in Figure 2.3. For an
agent a, if RS appears in its preference list for some R and S, then this implies that
a finds all the agents in RS as incomparable. Also, [. . .] denotes that the rest of the
agents can be placed in any order.
Note that n = |U | = |W | = k + 2yz|E|. Also, the amount of missing information per























≤ δ. Next, in order to show the correctness, we prove the
following claims. Throughout, for every mi, if mi is not matched to a woman in WA, then
we call such a pair as a bad pair. Additionally, for every si,ja,b, if s
i,j
a,b is matched to a woman
who is outside of the top three women in his list (i.e., for instance, if si,j1,1 is matched with




+1,1), then we again refer to such pairs as bad.
Claim 2. If a matching µ contains a bad pair, then it has at least y − 1 super-blocking
pairs.
Proof. Consider the case when mi is matched to a woman w′ who is not in WA. This
implies that it at least forms a super-blocking pair with all w ∈ V i,j1 such that w 6= w′. And
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Men
mi : WA  V i,j1  [. . .]
si,j1,1 : t
i,j






1  [. . .]
si,j1,2 : t
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1  [. . .]
si,j2,1 : t
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2,y  wi  ti,j
3,1
































































z,y−1  wj  t
i,j
z,y  V i,jz  [. . .]
si,jz,y : t
i,j






z  [. . .]
pi,j1,1 : v
i,j





z,y  [. . .]
Women
wi : MA1  S MA2






1  [. . .]






1  [. . .]




1  [. . .]
...




1  [. . .]




2  [. . .]
...














+1  [. . .]
ti,jz
2








+1  [. . .]
...
...




z  [. . .]




1,1  [. . .]
...




1,y  [. . .]




2,1  [. . .]
...




2,y  [. . .]
...
...
vi,jz,y : MA  Si,jz  pi,jz,y  [. . .]
Figure 2.3: The instance I ′ that is used in the proof of Theorem 12
since every women in V i,j1 finds all the men in MA as incomparable, therefore we at least
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have |V i,j1 | − 1 = y − 1 super-blocking pairs.
Next, consider the case when there is a man si,ja,b who is matched to a woman w
′ who is
outside of the top three women in his list. This implies that it at least forms a super-blocking
pair with all w ∈ V i,ja such that w 6= w′. And since we can assume that no women in V i,ja
is matched to a man in MA (as this would anyway result in y − 1 super-blocking pairs as
proved above) and since all of them find the men in Si,ja as incomparable, this implies that
we have at least |V i,ja | − 1 = y − 1 super-blocking pairs.
Before we go on to the next claim, for every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, consider the sets
Si,j and T i,j and let us the define the following two perfect matchings, µi,j1 and µ
i,j
2 , between
Si,j and T i,j. The matching µi,j1 (µ
i,j
2 ) can be inferred from Figure 2.3 by matching every









































































Claim 3. For every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, µi,j1 and µ
i,j
2 are the only perfect matchings
between Si,j and T i,j that do not include a bad pair. Moreover, both µi,j1 and µ
i,j
2 have only
one super-blocking pair (m,w) such that m ∈ Si,j and w ∈ T i,j.
Proof. It is easy to observe the first part. As for the second part, note that none of




,y form any super-blocking pair in µ1 as they are matched to their topmost
choices. Also, none of si,jz
2
+1,2, . . . , s
i,j
z,y form any super-blocking pairs since the only woman
they can form super-blocking pairs with, which are ti,jz
2
+1,2, . . . t
i,j
z,y respectively, strictly prefers
their currently matched partner, which are si,jz
2
+1,2, . . . , s
i,j
z,y respectively. Hence, the only




1,2). We can make similar arguments with respect to µ2 to
show that (si,j1,1, t
i,j
1,1) is the only super-blocking pair.
Given the two claims above, we can now prove the correctness of the reduction through the
following lemmas.
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Lemma 13. If I = (G, k0) is a “yes” instance of VC, then I ′ has a solution with at most
2k2 super-blocking pairs.
Proof. Let the vertex cover of G be C and since it is a “yes” instance, we know that |C| ≤ k0.
If the size of C is strictly less than k0, then add arbitrary vertices to it in order to make its
size k0. So from now on we assume that |C| = k0. Next, construct the following matching
µ for the instance I ′.
• For every woman wi ∈ WA, if vi ∈ C, then match wi with some man in MA1 .
Otherwise, match wi with some man in MA2 .
• For every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, if vi ∈ C, then match every man in Si,j with a
woman in T i,j using µi,j2 as defined above. Otherwise, match every man in Si,j with a
woman in T i,j using µi,j1 as defined above.
• For every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, match pi,ja,b with v
i,j
a,b.
Now, we know that the each man in MA can form at most k super-blocking pairs (one with
each woman in WA). Additionally, we know from Claim 3 that both µi,j1 and µ
i,j
2 have at
most one super-blocking pair, and that none of the men in P form any super-blocking pair
as they all get their topmost choice. Hence, the total number of blocking pairs is at most
k2 + |E| ≤ 2k2.
Lemma 14. If I = (G, k0) is a “no” instance of VC, then every matching for I ′ has at
least y − 1 super-blocking pairs.
Proof. Here we will show that if there exists a matching µ with less than y−1 super-blocking
pairs for I ′, then I has a vertex cover of size at most k0. To see this, consider µ. Since it
has less than y − 1 blocking pairs, we know from Claim 2 that it does not have any bad
pair. This in turn implies that all the men in MA are matched with a woman in WA (since
all men in MA have to be attached to a woman in WA and size of both the sets are equal).
Next, for every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, let us consider the men and women in Si,j and
T i,j. Since, again, we cannot have any bad pairs, we know that there has to be a perfect
matching between these two sets. Additionally, from Claim 3 we know that µi,j1 and µ
i,j
2 are
the only two perfect matchings that have no bad pairs. Now, for an (i, j), if we were using
µi,j1 , then it is easy to see that wj should be matched with a man in MA1 as otherwise she
would form a super-blocking pair with all the men in {si,jz
2
,1, . . . , s
i,j
z,y}, thus resulting in at
least zy > y − 1 super-blocking pairs for µ. Similarly, if we were using µi,j2 , then wi should
be matched with a man in MA1 as otherwise we would have at least zy > y − 1 blocking
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pairs. Therefore, we have that for each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E at least one of the women wi or wj
should be matched to a man in MA1 . So, now, if we define C = {vi | µ(wi) ∈MA1}, then
we have a vertex cover of size at most k0 (as size of MA1 is k0).
Finally, from Lemmas 13 and 14, we have an inapproximability gap of α, where



















. (since n = 2yzk2 + k > 2yz > 2kd 1√
δ
)
2.4.2 A possible general approach for obtaining a near-tight ap-
proximation factor for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching
While obtaining a general near-tight approximation result for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-
matching problem is still open, here we propose a potentially promising direction for this
problem. In particular, we demonstrate how solving even a very relaxed version of the
min-delete-stable-matching problem will be enough to get an O(n)-approximation for δ-min-
bp-super-stable-matching in general. Below, we first define the relaxation in question, which
we refer to as an (α, β)-approximation to the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem.
Definition 5 ((α, β)-min-delete-super-stable-matching). Given an instance I = (δ, pU ,
pW ), compute a set D′ such that |D′| ≤ α · |Dopt|, where |Dopt| is the size of the optimal
solution to the min-delete-super-stable-matching for the same instance, and the instance
I−D′ = (δ−D′ , pU\D′ , pW\D′), where δ−D′ = 1|(U∪W )\D′|
∑
i∈(U∪W )\D′ δi, has a matching with
at most β super-blocking pairs.
Next, we show that an (α, β)-approximation to the min-delete-super-stable-matching prob-
lem gives us an (αn+β)-approximation for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching. So, in particular,
if we have an (α, β)-approximation where α is a constant and β ∈ O(n), then this in turn
gives us an O(n)-approximation for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching in general.
Proposition 15. If there exists an (α, β)-approximation algorithm for the min-delete-super-
stable-matching problem, then there exists an (αn + β)-approximation algorithm for the
δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem.
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Proof. We can proceed to prove this almost exactly as in the proof of Theorem 10. Here,
if D denotes the (α, β)-approximate solution returned by the algorithm, then the only
difference is that we define µ1 to be the matching with the set of agents in (U ∪W ) \D
such that it has at most β super-blocking pairs (from the definition of the problem we know
that such a matching exists) and µ2 to be an arbitrary matching on the set of agents in D.
Once we have this, then we can arrive at the bound by proceeding exactly as in the proof of
Theorem 10, with the only difference being that here we would use S1, which is the number









The focus of this chapter was on working with partial information in the context of two-sided
matching and in particular to investigate i) what makes a matching “good” in this context
and ii) to better understand the trade-off between the amount of missing information and
the quality of different matchings. Towards this end, we introduced a measure for accounting
for missing preference information in an instance, and argued that a natural definition of a
“good” matching in this context is one that minimizes the maximum number of blocking
pairs with respect to all the possible completions. Subsequently, using an equivalent problem
(δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching) we first explored the space of matchings that contained
no obvious blocking pairs (i.e., weakly-stable matchings) in order to better understand how
missing preference information affected the quality, in terms of approximation with respect
to the objective of minimizing the number of super-blocking pairs. Later on, by expanding
the space of matchings we considered (i.e., removing the restriction that matches must be
weakly-stable), we asked whether it was possible to improve on the approximation factors
that were achieved under the restriction to weakly-stable matchings.
There are a number of interesting directions for future work. First, while in Section 2.4.2 we
proposed one possible approach that can lead to near-tight approximations, there may be
other approaches that can prove fruitful. Second, given that in many instances a super-stable
matching often does not exist, we believe that the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem
introduced here is potentially of independent interest, since it determines the maximum
number of disjoint pairs of agents that can be matched in order to form a super-stable
matching among themselves. Therefore, an open question is to see if one can obtain general
results on this problem (or its relaxation defined in Definition 5). In Proposition 6 we saw
that a 2-approximation was achievable for the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences
and hence it would also be interesting to determine if there are other interesting classes
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of preferences for which constant-factor approximations are possible. Finally, there are
possible extensions, like, for instance, allowing incompleteness—meaning the agents can
specify that they are willing to be matched to only a subset of the agents on the other
set—that one could consider and ask similar questions like the ones we considered.
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Chapter 3
Mechanism Design for Locating a
Facility Under Partial Information
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we continue on the theme of working with incomplete information and we look
at a classic problem in mechanism design. The field of mechanism design, which originated
in economics and is now extensively studied by both economists and computer scientists,
considers scenarios where there are multiple self-interested agents who are interacting with
a decision-making system, and it aims to design mechanisms—which one can essentially
think of as algorithms with incentives built-in—where rational agents would act in a
socially-desirable way (see Section 3.2 for formal definitions).
A canonical problem in this broad field (see Part II of the book by Nisan et al. [Nis+07]
and the references therein for an introduction to (algorithmic) mechanism design) is that of
locating a public facility on a real line or an interval, which is often referred to as the facility
location problem. In the simplest version of this problem, there are n agents, denoted by
the set [n] = {1, · · · , n}, and each agent i ∈ [n] has a preferred location xi for the public
facility. The cost of an agent for a facility located at p is given by C(xi, p) = |p − xi|,
the distance from the facility to the agent’s ideal location, and the task in general is to
locate a facility that minimizes some objective function. The most commonly considered
objective functions are a) sum of costs for the agents and b) the maximum cost for an
agent. In the mechanism design version of the problem, the main question is to see if the
objective under consideration can be implemented, either optimally or approximately, in
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weakly-dominant strategies. Informally, a strategy, which one can think of as a set of actions
that an agent takes, is weakly-dominant if the outcome associated with it is at as least good
for the agent as the outcome associated with any other strategy, no matter the strategies
of the other players. A mechanism (approximately) implements an objective function in
weakly-dominant strategies if there is a set of weakly-dominant strategies, one for each
agent, where the outcome associated with the mechanism (approximately) optimizes for
the objective function (again, formal definitions appear in Section 3.2).
Although the facility location problem has received much attention, with several different
variants like extensions to multiple facilities (e.g., [PT13; Lu+10]), looking at alternative
objective functions (e.g., [FW13; CFT16]), etc., being extensively studied, the common
assumption in this literature is that the agents are always precisely aware of their preferred
locations on the real line (or the concerned metric space, depending on which variant is
being considered). However, this might not always be the case and it is possible that
the agents currently do not have accurate information on their ideal locations, or their
preferences in general. To illustrate this, imagine a simple scenario where a city wants to
build a school on a particular street (which we assume for simplicity is just a line) and aims
to build one at a location that minimizes the maximum distance any of its residents have
to travel to reach the school. While each of the residents is able to specify which block they
would like the school to be located, some of them are unable to precisely pinpoint where
on the block they would like it because, for example, they do not currently have access
to information (like infrastructure data) to better inform themselves, or they are simply
unwilling to put in the cognitive effort to refine their preferences further. Therefore, instead
of giving a specific location x, they end up giving an interval [a, b], intending to say “I know
that I prefer the school to be built between the points a and b, but I am not exactly sure yet
as to where I want it.”
The above described scenario is precisely the one we are concerned about in this chapter.
That is, in contrast to the standard setting of the facility location problem, we consider the
setting in which agents are uncertain (or partially informed) about their own true locations
xi and the only information they have is that their preferred location xi ∈ [ai, bi], where
bi − ai ≤ δ for some parameter δ which models the amount of inaccuracy in the agents’
reports. Now, given such partially informed agents, our task is to look at the problem from
the perspective of a designer whose goal is to design ‘robust’ mechanisms under this setting.
Here by ‘robust’ we mean that, for a given performance measure and when considering
implementation under an appropriate solution concept, the mechanism should provide
good guarantees with respect to this measure for all the possible underlying unknown true
locations of the agents. The performance measure we use here is based on the minimax
regret solution criterion, which, informally, for a given objective function, S, is an outcome
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Average cost Maximum cost































Table 3.1: Summary of our results which show the bounds obtained under each of the
solution concepts for the objective functions considered. All the bounds are with respect to
deterministic mechanisms.
that has the “best worst case”, or one that induces the least amount of regret after one
realizes the true input (see Section 3.2.2 for a discussion on the choice of regret as the
performance measure).
More formally, if P = [0, B] denotes the set of all points where a facility can be located
and I = [a1, b1]× · · · × [an, bn] denotes the set of all the possible vectors that correspond
to the true preferred locations of the agents, then the minimax optimal solution, popt, for
some objective function S (like the sum of costs or the maximum cost) is given by












where S(I, p) denotes the value of S when evaluated with respect to I ∈ I and a point p.
Thus, our aim is to design mechanisms that approximately implement the optimal minimax
value (i.e., maxRegret(popt, I)) with respect to two of the commonly-studied objective
functions—average cost and maximum cost—and under two solution concepts—very weak
dominance and minimax dominance—that naturally extend to our setting (see Section 3.2
for definitions). In particular, we focus on deterministic and anonymous mechanisms, where
anonymity entails that the mechanism returns the same output on any permutation of the
input (in other words, the agents’ identity is irrelevant), and aim to find ones that additively
approximate the optimal minimax value. Our results are summarized in Table 3.1.
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3.2 Preliminaries
In the standard (mechanism design) version of the facility location problem there are n
agents, denoted by the set [n] = {1, . . . , n}, and each agent i ∈ [n] has a true preferred1
location `∗i ∈ [0, B], for some fixed constant B ∈ R.2 A vector I = (`1, . . . , `n), where
`i ∈ [0, B], is referred to as a location profile and the cost of agent i for a facility located at
p is given by C(`∗i , p) = |p− `∗i | (or equivalently, their utility is −|p− `∗i |), the distance from
the facility to the agent’s location.3 In general, the task in the facility location problem
is to design mechanisms—which are, informally, functions that map location profiles to a
point (or a distribution over points) in [0, B]—that (approximately) implement the outcome
associated with a particular objective function.
In the version of the problem that we are considering, each agent i, although they have a
true location `∗i ∈ [0, B], is currently unaware of their true location and instead only knows
an interval [ai, bi] ⊆ [0, B] such that `∗i ∈ [ai, bi]. The interval [ai, bi], which we denote by
Ki, is referred to as the candidate locations of agent i, and we use Ki to denote the set of
all possible candidate locations of agent i (succinctly referred to as the set of candidate
locations). Now, given a profile of the set of candidate locations (K1, . . . ,Kn), we have the
following definition.
Definition 6 (δ-uncertain-facility-location-game). For all n ≥ 1, B > 0, and δ ∈ [0, B], a
profile of the set of candidate locations (K1, . . . ,Kn) is said to induce a δ-uncertain-facility-
location-game if, for each i, Ki = {[ai, bi] | bi − ai ≤ δ and [ai, bi] ⊆ [0, B]} (or in words, for
each agent i, their set of candidate locations can only have intervals of length at most δ).
Remark: We refer to δ as the inaccuracy parameter. In general, when proving lower bounds
we assume that the designer knows this δ as this only makes our results stronger, whereas
for positive results we explicitly state what the designer knows about δ. Additionally, note
that in the definition above if δ = 0, then we have the standard facility location setting
where the set of candidate locations associated with every agent is just a set of points in
[0, B]. For a given profile of candidate locations (K1, . . . , Kn), we say that “the reports are
exact” when, for each agent i, Ki is a single point and not an interval.
1We often omit the term ‘preferred’ and instead just say that `∗i is agent i’s location.
2Note that here we make the assumption that the domain under consideration is bounded instead
of assuming that the agents can be anywhere on the real line. This is necessary only because we are
focusing on additive approximations instead of the usual multiplicative approximations. (For a slightly
more elaborate explanation, see the introduction section of the paper by Golomb and Tzamos [GT17].)
3This particular utility function that is considered here is equivalent to the notion of symmetric
single-peaked preferences that is often used in the economics literature (see, e.g., [MD11]).
44
3.2.1 Mechanisms, solution concepts, and implementation
A (deterministic) mechanismM = (X,F ) in our setting consists of an action space X =
(X1, . . . , Xn), where Xi is the action space associated with agent i, and an outcome function
F which maps a profile of actions to an outcome in [0, B] (i.e., F : X1 × . . .×Xn → [0, B]).
A mechanism is said to be direct if, for all i, Xi = Ki, where Ki is the set of all possible
candidate locations of agent i. For every agent i, a strategy is a function si : Ki → Xi, and
we use Σi and ∆(Σi) to respectively denote the set of all pure and mixed strategies of agent
i.
Since the outcome of a mechanism needs to be achieved in equilibrium, it remains to be
defined what equilibrium solution concepts we consider. Below we define, in the order of
their relative strengths, the two solution concepts that we use here. We note that the first
(very weak dominance) was also used by Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA12] in the
context of auctions.
Definition 7 (very weak dominance). In a mechanism M = (X,F ), an agent i with
candidate locations Ki has a very weakly dominant strategy si ∈ Σi if ∀s′i ∈ Σi,∀`i ∈ Ki,
and ∀s−i ∈ Σ−i,
C (`i, F (si(Ki), s−i(K−i))) ≤ C (`i, F (s′i(Ki), s−i(K−i))) .
In words, the definition above implies that for agent i with candidate locations Ki, it is
always best for i to play the strategy si, irrespective of the actions of the other players and
irrespective of which of the points in Ki is her true location.
Definition 8 (minimax dominance). In a mechanism M = (X,F ), an agent i with












i(Ki), s−i(K−i))− C(`i, F (σi(Ki), s−i(K−i)).
Before we explain what the definition above implies, let p = F (si(Ki), s−i(K−i)) be the
outcome of the mechanism when agent i plays strategy si and all the others play some s−i.





C(`i, p)− C(`i, F (σi(Ki), s−i(K−i))), (3.1)
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which calculates agent i’s maximum regret (i.e., the absolute worst case loss agent i will
experience if and when she realizes her true location from her candidate locations) for
playing si and hence getting the output p. Then, what the above definition implies is that
for a regret minimizing agent i with candidate locations Ki, it is always best for i to play
si, irrespective of the actions of the other players, as any other strategy s′i results in an
outcome p′ with respect to which agent i experiences at least as much maximum regret as
she experiences with p.
Remark: Note that both the solution concepts defined above can be seen as natural
extensions of the classical (i.e., the usual mechanism design setting where the agents know
their types exactly) weak dominance notion to our setting. That is, for all i ∈ [n], if Ki is a
single point, then both of them collapse to the classical weak dominance notion.
As stated previously, for a profile of candidate locations (K1, . . . , Kn) and some objective
function S, we want mechanisms that “perform well” against all the possible underlying
true locations of the agents, i.e., with respect to all the location profiles I = (`1, . . . , `n)
where `i ∈ Ki. Before we define what “perform well” means formally, we first define the
maximum regret associated with a point p ∈ [0, B].
Given an instance I = K1 × . . .×Kn and an objective function S, if S(I, p) denotes the
value of the function S when evaluated with respect to the vector I ∈ I and the point p,
then








Throughout, we refer to the point popt as the optimal minimax solution for the instance I,
where
popt = arg min
p∈[0,B]
maxRegret(p, I). (3.3)
Equipped with this, we can now formally state our objective as trying to find mechanisms
that achieve a good approximation to the optimal minimax value, which for an instance I
is denoted by OMVS(I) and is defined as
OMVS(I) = maxRegret(popt, I). (3.4)
Finally, now that we have our performance measure, we define implementation in very
weakly dominant and minimax dominant strategies.
Definition 9 (Implementation in very weakly dominant (minimax dominant) strategies).
For a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game, we say that a mechanismM = (X,F ) implements
α-OMVS, for some α ≥ 0 and some objective function S, in very weakly dominant (minimax
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dominant) strategies, if for some s = (s1, . . . , sn), where si is a very weakly dominant
(minimax dominant) strategy for agent i with candidate locations Ki,
maxRegret(F (s1(K1), . . . sn(Kn)), I)−OMVS(I) ≤ α.
3.2.2 Some Q & A on the definitions
Why regret? As stated above, our performance measure is based on minimizing the
maximum regret. We argue why this is a good measure by considering some alternatives.
1. Perhaps one of the first approaches that comes to mind is to see if we can, for every
possible input I ∈ I, bound the ratio of the objective values of a) the outcome that is
returned by the mechanism and b) the optimal outcome for that input. For instance,
this is the approach taken by Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA12] in the case
of single good auctions. However, here this is not a good measure because we can
quickly see that this ratio is always unbounded if there exists a point that is in the
candidate locations of all the agents (i.e., if there is a p ∈ [0, B] such that for all
i ∈ [n], p ∈ [ai, bi]).
2. Another natural approach is to show that for all possible inputs we can bound the
difference between the objective values of a) the outcome that is returned by the
mechanism and b) the optimal outcome for that input. For instance, this is the
approach taken by Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA15]. Technically, this is
essentially what we are doing when using regret and finding an answer that has a max.
regret that is additively close to the max. regret associated with the minimax optimal
solution (one could argue in a similar way even when approximating multiplicatively—
i.e., when finding an answer that has a max. regret that is multiplicatively close to
the max. regret associated with the minimax optimal solution). The reason why using
regret is more informative is because if we were to just mention that, for all I ∈ I,
the point p that is returned by the mechanism satisfies,
S(I, p)− S(I, pI) ≤ X,
where X is the bound we obtain, then the only information this conveys is that for
every I we are additively at most X-far from the optimal objective value, pI , for I.
However, instead, if we were to write it as
maxRegret(p, I)−maxRegret(popt, I) ≤ Y,
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where popt is the minimax optimal solution, then this conveys two things: a) for
any point p′ there is at least one I ∈ I such that S(I, p′) − S(I, pI) ≥ Z, where
Z = maxRegret(popt) = optimal minimax value (i.e., it gives us a sense on what is
achievable at all—which in turn can be thought of as a natural lower bound) and b)
the point p that is chosen by the mechanism is at most (Y + Z)-far from the optimal
objective value for any I ∈ I. Hence, to convey these, we employ the notion of regret.
Why additive approximations? Even when working with regret, when it comes to
implementing a particular objective using some solution concept, one could potentially
aim to find a solution p such that F = maxRegret(p,I)maxRegret(popt,I) is bounded (i.e., use a multiplicative
approximation rather than additive). Although this is reasonable, there at at least two
issues that become apparent:
1. When considering implementation in very weakly dominant strategies, it turns out
that there are no bounded mechanisms when using either of the objective functions
(this can be proved by proceeding like in the proof of Theorem 18).
2. When considering the objective of minimizing the maximum cost and minimax
dominant strategies, it is clear that minimax dominant strategies are useless to look
at as there are no bounded mechanisms. Why? Because suppose there was one. Then
this implies that when the reports are exact—meaning every agent reports a single
point—the mechanism should always return the optimal solution associated with
this location profile, for if otherwise F will not be bounded as minimum maximum
regret when valuations are exact is zero. However, given that a minimax dominant
mechanism is weakly dominant under exact reports, this in turn implies that we now
have a mechanism that implements the optimal solution associated with the max.
cost objective in weakly dominant strategies when the reports are exact. But then,
we already know that there is no such mechanism due to a result by Procaccia and
Tennenholtz [PT13, Theorem 3.2].
Hence, we focus on additive approximations.4
4In mechanism design, there are other contexts in which additive approximations have been considered.
For instance, the work by Golomb and Tzamos [GT17] uses additive approximations in the context of
facility location, Caragiannis, Christodoulou, and Protopapas [CCP19] use in the context of impartial
selection, and Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA15] use it in the context of auctions.
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3.3 Related Work
Equipped with the definitions, we can now better discuss related work. There are two
broad lines of research that are related to the topic of this chapter. The first is, naturally,
the extensive literature that focuses on designing mechanisms in the context of the facility
location problem and the second is the work done in mechanism design which considers
settings where the agents do not completely specify their preferences.
Designing mechanisms with incomplete preferences. A disproportionate amount of
the work in mechanism design considers settings where the agents have complete information
about their preferences. Nevertheless, as one might expect, the issue of agents not specifying
their complete preferences has been considered and the papers that are most relevant to
the topic here are the series of papers by Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA12; CMA14;
CMA15], and the works of Hyafil and Boutilier [HB07a; HB07b]. Below we briefly discuss
each of these papers.
The series of papers by Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA12; CMA14; CMA15] considers
settings where the agents are uncertain about their own types and they look at this model
in the context of auctions. In particular, in their setting the only information agents have
about their valuations is that it is contained in a set K, where K is any subset of the set
of all possible valuations.5 Under this setting, Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA12]
look at single-item auctions and they provide several results on the fraction of maximum
social welfare that can be achieved under implementation in very weakly dominant and
undominated strategies; subsequently, Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA14] study the
performance of VCG mechanisms in the context of combinatorial auctions when the agents
are uncertain about their own types and under undominated and regret-minimizing strategies;
and finally, Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA15] analyze the Vickrey mechanism in
the context of multi-unit auctions and, again, when the agents are uncertain about their
types, and in this case they essentially show that it achieves near-optimal performance
(in terms of social welfare) under implementation in undominated strategies. The partial
information model that we use here is inspired by this series of papers. In particular, our
prior-free and absolute worst-case approach under partial information is similar to the one
taken by Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA12; CMA14; CMA15] (although such absolute
5Chiesa, Micali, and Allen-Zhu [CMA14] argue that their model is equivalent to the Knightian uncertainty
model that has received much attention in decision theory (see related works section in [CMA14] and the
references therein). However, here we do not use the term Knightian uncertainty, but instead just say that
the agents are partially informed. This is because, the notion we use here, which we believe is the natural
one to consider in the context of our problem, is less general than the notion of Knightian uncertainty.
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worst-case approaches are not uncommon and have been previously considered in many
different settings). However, our work is also different from theirs in that, unlike auctions,
the problem we consider falls within the domain of mechanism design without money—i.e.,
mechanism design in the context of problems where money cannot be used to incentivize
agents—and so their results do not carry over to our setting.
The other set of papers that are most relevant to the broad theme here is the work of Hyafil
and Boutilier [HB07a; HB07b] who considered the problem of designing mechanisms that
have to make decisions using partial type information. Their focus is again on contexts where
payments are allowed and in [HB07a] they mainly show that a class of mechanisms based
on the minimax regret solution criterion achieves approximate efficiency under approximate
dominant strategy implementation. In [HB07b] their focus is on automated mechanism
design within the same framework. While the overall theme in both their works is similar
to ours, i.e., to look at issues that arise when mechanisms only have access to partial
information, the questions they are concerned with and the model used are different. For
instance, in the context of the models used, whereas in ours and Chiesa et al.’s models
the agents do not know their true types and are therefore providing partial inputs, the
assumption in the works of Hyafil and Boutilier [HB07a; HB07b] is that the mechanism has
access to partial types, but agents are aware of their true type. This subtle change in turn
leads to the focus being on solution concepts that are different from ours.
In addition to the papers mentioned above, note that another way to model uncertain
agents is to assume that each of them has a probability distribution which tells them the
probability of a point being their ideal location. For instance, this is the model that is used
by Feige and Tennenholtz [FT11] in the context of task scheduling. However, in our model
the agents do not have any more information than that they are within some interval, which
we emphasize is not equivalent to assuming that, for a given agent, every point in the its
interval is equally likely to be its true preferred location.
Related work on the facility location problem. Starting with the work of Moulin
[Mou80] there has been a flurry of research looking at designing strategyproof mechanisms
(i.e., mechanisms where it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for an agent to reveal her true
preferences) for the facility location problem. These can be broadly divided into two
branches. The first one consists of work, e.g., [Mou80; BJ94; SV02; MD11; Dok+12],
that focuses on characterizing the class of strategyproof mechanisms in different settings
(see [Bar01] and [Nis+07, Chapter 10] for a survey on some of these results). The second
branch consists of more recent papers which fall under the broad umbrella of approximate
mechanism design without money, initially advocated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [PT13],
that focus on looking at how well a strategyproof mechanism can perform under different
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objective functions [PT13; Lu+10; FW13; FT16; FSY16]. Our work here, which looks at
the performance of mechanisms under different solution concepts and objective functions
when the agents are partially informed about their own locations, falls under this branch of
the literature.
3.4 Implementing the Average Cost Objective
In this section we consider the objective of locating a facility so as to minimize the average
cost (sometimes succinctly referred to as avgCost and written as AC). While the standard
objective in the facility location setting is to minimize the sum of costs, here, like in work
of Golomb and Tzamos [GT17], we use average cost because since we are approximating
additively, it is easy to see that in many cases a deviation from the optimal solution results
in a factor of order n coming up in the approximation bound. Hence, to avoid this, and to
make comparisons with our second objective function, maximum cost, easier we use average
cost.
In the standard setting where the agents know their true location, the average cost of
locating a facility at a point p is defined as 1
n
∑
i∈[n] C(xi, p), where xi is the location of
agent i. Designing even optimal strategyproof/truthful mechanisms in this case is easy since
one can quickly see that the optimal location for the facility is the median of x1, . . . , xn
and returning the same is strategyproof. Note that, for some k ≥ 0, when n = 2k + 1, the
median is unique and is the (k+ 1)-th largest element. However, when n = 2k, the “median”
can be defined as any point between (and including) the (n/2)-th and ((n/2) + 1)-th largest
numbers. As a matter of convention, here we consider the (n/2 + 1)-th element to be the
median. Hence, throughout, we always write that the median element is the (k + 1)-th
element, where k = bn
2
c.
In contrast to the standard setting, for some δ ∈ (0, B] and a corresponding δ-uncertain-
facility-location-game, even computing what the minimax optimal solution for the average
cost objective (see (3.3)) is is non-trivial, let alone seeing if it can be implemented with
any of the solution concepts discussed in Section 3.2.1. Therefore, we start by stating
some properties about the minimax optimal solution that will be useful when designing
mechanisms. A complete discussion on how to find the minimax optimal solution when
using the average cost objective, as well as the proofs for the lemmas stated in the next
section, are in Appendix B.2.
51
3.4.1 Properties of the minimax optimal solution for avgCost
Given the candidate locations Ki = [ai, bi] for all i, where, for some δ ∈ [0, B], bi − ai ≤ δ,
consider the left endpoints associated with all the agents, i.e., the set {ai}i∈[n]. We denote
the sorted order of these points as L1, . . . , Ln (throughout, by sorted order we mean sorted
in non-decreasing order). Similarly, we denote the sorted order of the right endpoints, i.e.,
the points in the set {bi}i∈[n], as R1, . . . , Rn. Next, we state the following lemma which gives
a succinct formula for the maximum regret associated with a point p (i.e., maxRegret(p, I),
where I = [a1, b1]× . . .× [an, bn]; see (3.2)). As stated above, all the proofs for lemmas in
the section appear in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 16. Given a point p, the maximum regret associated with p for the average cost
objective can be written as max(objAC1 (p), objAC2 (p)), where






i=j(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)
)
, where j is the smallest index
such that Rj > p and j ≤ k






i=k+2(p− Li) + (n− 2k)(p− Lk+1)
)
, where h is the largest index
such that Lh < p and h ≥ k + 2.
Our next lemma states that the minimax optimal solution, popt, associated with the avgCost
objective function is always in the interval [Lk+1, Rk+1].
Lemma 17. If popt is the minimax optimal solution associated with the avgCost objective
function, then popt ∈ [Lk+1, Rk+1].
Equipped with these properties, we are now ready to talk about implementation under the
solution concepts defined in Section 3.2.1.
3.4.2 Implementation in very weakly dominant strategies
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the strongest solution concept that we consider is very weak
dominance, where for an agent i, with candidate locations Ki, strategy si is very weakly
dominant if it is always best for i to play si, irrespective of the actions of the other players
and irrespective of which of the points in Ki is her true location. While it is indeed a
natural solution concept which extends the classical notion of weak dominance, we will
see below in, Theorem 18, that it is too strong as no deterministic mechanism can achieve
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a better approximation bound than B
2
. This in turn implies that, among deterministic
mechanisms, the naive mechanism which always, irrespective of the reports of the agents,
outputs the point B
2
is the best one can do.
Theorem 18. Given a δ ∈ (0, B], let M = (X,F ) be a deterministic mechanism that
implements α-OMVAC in very weakly dominant strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-
game. Then, α ≥ B
2
.
Proof. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that, for some γ > 0, α = B
2
− γ.
First, note that here we can restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms since Chiesa, Micali,
and Allen-Zhu showed that the revelation principle holds with respect to this solution
concept [CMA14, Lemma A.2].6 So, now, let us consider a scenario where the profile of true
candidate locations of the agents are ([a1, b1], . . . , [an, bn]) and let p = F ([a1, b1], . . . , [an, bn]).
Since reporting the true candidate locations is a very weakly dominant strategy inM, this
implies that for an agent i and for all ` ∈ [ai, bi],
|`− p| ≤ |`− p′|, (3.5)
where for some [a′i, b′i] 6= [ai, bi], p′ = F ([a1, b1], . . . , [a′i, b′i], . . . , [an, bn]).
Next, consider the profile of true candidate locations ([a1, b1], . . . , [a′i, b′i], . . . , [an, bn]). Then,
again, using the fact that reporting the truth is a very weakly dominant strategy, we have
that for agent i and for all `′ ∈ [a′i, b′i],
|`′ − p′| ≤ |`′ − p|. (3.6)
(3.5) and (3.6) together imply that for a k ∈ [ai, bi] ∩ [a′i, b′i],
|k − p| = |k − p′|. (3.7)
So, if Q = [ai, bi] ∩ [a′i, b′i] and |Q| > 1, then (3.7) implies that p = p′.
Now, let us consider F ([a1, b1], . . . , [a1, b1]), where a1 = 0 and b1 = ε, and let p = F ([a1, b1],
. . . , [a1, b1]). By repeatedly using the observation made above, we have that for δ ∈ (0, B],
ε ∈ (0,min{δ, γ}), ε1 ∈ (0, ε), and bi = ε+ i(δ − ε1),
p = F ([a1, b1], . . . , [a1, b1])
6Informally, revelation principle w.r.t. very weakly dominant strategies states that if a mechanism M
implements a social choice function f in very weakly dominant strategies, then there is a direct mechanism
M ′ that implements f and where for every agent reporting their types directly is very weakly dominant
strategy.
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= F ([b1 − ε1, b2], [a1, b1], . . . , [a1, b1])
= F ([b2 − ε1, b3], [a1, b1], . . . , [a1, b1])...
= F ([B − ε1, B], [a1, b1], . . . , [a1, b1])
...
= F ([B − ε1, B], . . . , [B − ε1, B]). (3.8)
Next, it is easy to see that the minimax optimal solution associated with the profile
([a1, b1], . . . , [a1, b1]) is a1+b12 =
ε
2
, whereas for the profile ([B − ε1, B], . . . , [B − ε1, B]) it
is B − ε1
2
. Also, from (3.8) we know that M outputs the same point p for both these
profiles. So, if we assume without loss of generality that p ≤ B+ε/2−ε1/2
2
, this implies that
for I = [B − ε1, B]× . . .× [B − ε1, B],
α ≥ maxRegret(p, I)−OMVAC(I)
≥ regret(p, (B, . . . , B))−OMVAC(I)
≥ (B/2− ε/4 + ε1/4)− ε1/2
≥ B/2− ε
> B/2− γ.
This in turn contradicts our assumption that α = B
2
− γ.
Although one could argue that this result is somewhat expected given how Chiesa, Micali,
and Allen-Zhu also observed similar poor performance for implementation with very weakly
dominant strategies in the context of the single-item auctions [CMA12, Theorem 1], we
believe that it is still interesting because not only do we observe a similar result in a setting
that is considerably different from theirs, but this observation also reinforces their view
that one would likely have to look beyond very weakly dominant strategies in settings like
ours. This brings us to our next section, where we consider an alternative, albeit weaker,
but natural, extension to the classical notion of weakly dominant strategies.
3.4.3 Implementation in minimax dominant strategies
Here we move our focus to implementation in minimax dominant strategies and explore
whether by using this weaker solution concept one can obtain a better approximation bound
than the one obtained in the previous section. To this end, we first present a general result
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that applies to all mechanisms in our setting that are anonymous and minimax dominant,
in particular showing that any such mechanism cannot be onto. Following this, we look
at non-onto mechanisms and here we provide a mechanism that achieves a much better
approximation bound than the one we observed when considering implementation in very
weak dominant strategies.
Remark: Note that in this section we focus only on direct mechanisms. This is without
loss of generality because, like in the case with very weakly dominant strategies, it turns
out that the revelation principle holds in our setting for minimax dominant strategies. A
proof of the same can be found in Appendix B.1.
Theorem 19. Given a δ ∈ (0, B], let M = (X,F ) be a deterministic mechanism that
is anonymous and minimax dominant for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game. Then,M
cannot be onto.
Proof. Suppose this were not the case and there exists a deterministic mechanismM that
is anonymous, minimax dominant, and onto. First, note that if we restrict ourselves to
profiles where every agent’s report is a single point (instead of intervals as in our setting),
thenM must have n − 1 fixed points y1 ≤ . . . ≤ yn−1 such that for any profile of single
reports (x1, . . . , xn),
M(x1, . . . , xn) = median(y1, . . . , yn−1, x1, . . . , xn).
This is so because, given the fact thatM is anonymous, onto, and minimax dominant in our
setting, when restricted to the setting where reports are single points,M is strategyproof,
anonymous, and onto, and hence we know from the characterization result by Massó and
De Barreda [MD11, Corollary 2] that every such mechanism must have n− 1 fixed points
y1 ≤ . . . ≤ yn−1 such that for any profile (x1, . . . , xn),
M(x1, . . . , xn) = median(y1, . . . , yn−1, p1, . . . , pn),
where pi is the most preferred alternative of agent i (i.e., agent i’s peak; since the utility of
agent i for an alternative a ∈ [0, B] is defined as -|xi − a|, we know that the preferences of
agent i is symmetric single-peaked with the peak pi = xi).7,8
7The original statement by Massó and De Barreda [MD11, Corollary 2] talks about mechanisms that
are anonymous, strategyproof, and efficient. However, it is known that for strategyproof mechanisms in
(symmetric) single-peaked domains, efficiency is equivalent to being onto (see, e.g., [Nis+07, Lemma 10.1]
for a proof).
8It is worth noting that the characterization result by Massó and De Barreda [MD11, Corollary 2] for
mechanisms that are anonymous, stratgeyproof, and onto under symmetric single-peaked preferences is
the same as Moulin’s characterization of the set of such mechanisms on the general single-peaked domain
[Mou80, Theorem 1]).
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Now, given the observation above, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, let us consider the smallest j such
that yj 6= yj+1 (if there is no such j define j = n− 1 if yn−1 6= B and j = 0 otherwise) and
consider the following input profile L0yj, . . . , yj,︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−j−1 agents
[`, r], z, B, . . . , B︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−1 agents
 ,




In the profile L0, let a and b denote the agents who report [`, r] and z, respectively, and let
p0 =M(L0). First, note that if L1 denotes the profile where agent a reports ` instead of
[`, r] and every other agent reports as in L0, then
p1 =M(L1) = median(y1, . . . , yn−1, yj, . . . , yj, `, z, B, . . . B) = `.
Also, if L2 denotes the profile where agent a reports r instead of [`, r] and every other agent
reports as in L0, then
p2 =M(L2) = median(y1, . . . , yn−1, yj, . . . , yj, r, z, B, . . . B) = z.





for, if otherwise, agent a can deviate from L0 by reporting `+z2 instead (it is easy to see
that this reduces agent a’s maximum regret), thus violating the fact thatM is minimax
dominant.
Given this, consider the profile L3 which is the same as L0 except for the fact that agent b
reports (2z − `) instead of z. By again using a similar line of reasoning as in the case for
L0, one can see that
p3 =M(L3) = z.
However, this in turn implies that agent b can deviate from L0 to L3, thus again violating
the fact thatM is minimax dominant.
Given the fact that we cannot have an anonymous, minimax dominant, and onto mechanism,
the natural question to consider is if we can find non-onto mechanisms that perform well.
We answer this question in the next section.
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Input: a δ ≥ 0 and for each agent i, their input interval [ai, bi]
Output: location of the facility p
1: A← {g1, g2, . . . , gk}, where g1 = 0, gk ≤ B, and gi+1 − gi = δ2
2: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
3: xi ← point closest to ai in A (in case of a tie, break in favour of the point in [ai, bi] if there
exists one, break in favour of point to the left otherwise)
4: yi ← point closest to bi in A (break ties as in line 3)
5: if |[xi, yi] ∩A| == 1 then . the case when xi = yi
6: `i ← x
7: else if |[xi, yi] ∩A| == 2 then
8: if |[xi, yi] ∩ [ai, bi]| < 2 then
9: if ai + bi ≤ xi + yi then
10: `i ← xi
11: else
12: `i ← yi
13: end if
14: else
15: `i ← xi
16: end if
17: else if |[xi, yi] ∩A| == 3 then
18: `i ← zi, where zi is the point in [xi, yi] ∩A that is neither xi nor yi
19: end if
20: end for





We first show an upper bound, presenting an anonymous mechanism that implements
3δ
4
-OMVAC in minimax dominant strategies. Following this, we present a conditional lower
bound that shows that one cannot achieve an approximation bound better than δ
2
when
considering mechanisms that have a finite range.
An anonymous and minimax dominant mechanism. Consider the δ
2
-equispaced-
median mechanism defined in Algorithm 2, which can be thought of as an extension to the
standard median mechanism. The key assumption in this mechanism is that the designer
knows a δ such that any agent’s candidate locations has a length at most δ. Given this δ,
the main idea is to divide the interval [0, B] into a set of “grid points” and then map every
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profile of reports to one of these points, while at the same time ensuring that the mapping
is minimax dominant. In particular, in the case of the δ
2
-equispaced-median mechanism,
when δ > 0, its range is restricted to the finite set of points A = {g1, g2, . . . gm} such that,
for i ≥ 1, gi+1 − gi = δ2 , g1 = 0, and gm ≤ B.
Below we first prove a lemma where we show that the δ
2
-equispaced-median mechanism is
minimax dominant. Subsequently, we then use this to prove our main theorem which shows
that the δ
2
-equispaced-median mechanism implements 3δ
4
-OMVAC in minimax dominant
strategies.
Lemma 20. Given a δ ∈ [0, B] and for every agent i in a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game,




Proof. Let us first fix an agent i and let [ai, bi] be their candidate locations. Also, let L0 be
some arbitrary profile of candidate locations, where L0 = ([a1, b1], . . . , [an, bn]). We need to
show that it is minimax dominant for agent i to report [ai, bi] in the δ2 -equispaced-median
mechanism (denoted byM from now on), and for this we broadly consider the following two
cases. Intuitively, in both cases what we try to argue is that for an agent i with candidate
locations [ai, bi] the `i that is associated with i in the mechanism is in fact the agent’s “best
alternative” among the alternatives in A (see line 1 in Algorithm 2).
Case 1: ai = bi. In this case, we show that it is a very weakly dominant strategy for agent
i to report ai. To see this, let p be the output ofM when agent i reports ai and xi be the
point that is closest to ai in A (with ties broken in favour of the point which is to the left
of ai). From line 6 in the mechanism, we know that `i = xi. Now, if either `i < p or `i > p,
then any report that changes the median will only result in the output being further away
from agent i. And if `i = p, then since we choose `i to be the point that is closest to ai in
A, it is clear that it is very weakly dominant for the agent to report ai. Hence, from both
the cases above, we have our claim.
Case 2: ai 6= bi. Let p be the output ofM when agent i reports [ai, bi], and let xi and yi
be the points that are closest (with ties being broken in favour of points in [ai, bi] in both
cases) to ai and bi, respectively. From the mechanism we can see that `i ∈ [xi, yi]. Next, let
us first consider the case when p < xi or p > yi. In both these cases, given the fact that xi
and yi are the points closest to ai and bi, respectively, p has to be outside [ai, bi]. And so, if
this is the case, then if agent i misreports and the output changes to some p′ < p or p′ > p,
in both cases, it is easy to see that the maximum regret associated with p′ is greater than
the one associated with p. Hence, the only case where an agent i can successfully misreport
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is if p ∈ [xi, yi]. So, we focus on this scenario below.
Considering the scenario when p ∈ [xi, yi], first, note that the interval [xi, yi] can have at
most three points that are also in A (this is proved in Claim 18, which is in Appendix B.3).
So, given this, let us now consider the following cases.
i) |[xi, yi] ∩ A| = 1. Since p ∈ [xi, yi], this implies that p = xi = `i. Therefore, in this
case, if agent i misreports, then she only experiences a greater maximum regret as the
resulting output p′ would be outside [xi, yi] and we know from our discussion above
that these points have a greater maximum regret than a point in [xi, yi].
ii) |[xi, yi] ∩ A| = 2. First, note that since p ∈ [xi, yi] and the only other point in [xi, yi]
that is also in A is yi, if p < `i or p > `i, then agent i can only increase her maximum
regret by misreporting and changing the outcome (because the new outcome will be
outside [xi, yi]). Therefore, we only need to consider the case when p = `i, and here
we consider the following sub-cases.
(a) p = `i = xi. From the mechanism we know that this happens only when either
both xi and yi are in [ai, bi] (lines 14–15) or when ai + bi ≤ xi + yi (lines 9–10).
Now, since we know that every point outside [xi, yi] is worse in terms of maximum
regret than xi or yi, we only need to consider the case when agent i misreports
in such a way that it results in the new outcome p′ being equal to yi. And below
we show that under both the conditions stated above (lines 9–10 and 14–15,
both of which result in `i being defined as being equal to xi in the mechanism)
the maximum regret associated with yi is at least as much as the one associated
with xi.
To see this, consider the profile where agent i reports ai instead of [ai, bi] and
all the other agents’ reports are the same as in L0. Let pa be the output ofM
for this profile. Note that pa = xi since the `i associated with agent i in this
profile is xi and so the outcome in this profile is the same as p = xi. Similarly,
let pb be the outcome when agent i reports bi instead of [ai, bi]. Since the `i
associated with agent i in this profile is yi, one can see that xi ≤ pb ≤ yi. Now, if
pb = xi, then maxRegreti(xi) = 0, where maxRegreti(xi) is the maximum regret
associated with the point xi for agent i (see (3.1) for the definition), and so xi is
definitely better than yi. Therefore, we can ignore this case and instead assume
that pb = yi. So, considering this, since for the maximum regret calculations
only the endpoints ai and bi matter (this is proved in Claim 19, which is in
Appendix B.3), we have that
maxRegreti(yi) = max{|ai − yi| − |ai − pa| , |bi − yi| − |bi − pb|}
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= |ai − yi| − |ai − pa| (since pb = yi and pa = xi)
≥ |bi − xi| − |bi − pb|
(depending on the case, use either the fact that xi, yi ∈ [ai, bi] or that ai + bi ≤ xi + yi)
= maxRegreti(xi). (since pb = yi and pa = xi)
Hence, we see that in this case agent i cannot gain by misreporting.
(b) p = `i = yi. We can show that in this case maxRegret(xi) ≥ maxRegret(yi) by
proceeding similarly as in the case above.
iii) |[xi, yi] ∩ A| = 3. Let xi < zi < yi be the three points in [xi, yi] ∩ A. Since the length
of [ai, bi] is at most δ, note that both xi and yi cannot be in the interval (ai, bi). So
below we assume without loss of generality that xi ≤ ai. From the mechanism we
know that in this case `i = zi (line 18). Also, as in the cases above, note that if
p < `i or p > `i, then agent i can only increase her maximum regret by misreporting
and changing the outcome (because, again, the new outcome will be outside [xi, yi]).
Therefore, the only case we need to consider is if p = `i, and for this case we show that
both xi and yi have a maximum regret that is at least as much as that associated with
zi (we do not need to consider points outside [xi, yi] since we know that these points
have a worse maximum regret than any of the points in [xi, yi]). Note that if this is
true, then we are done as this shows that agent i cannot benefit from misreporting.
To see why the claim is true, consider the profile where agent i reports ai instead of
[ai, bi] and all the other agents’ reports are the same as in L0. Let pa be the outcome
ofM for this profile. Similarly, let pb be the outcome when agent i reports bi instead
of [ai, bi]. Note that pa ≤ p = zi and pb ≥ p = zi. Now, since, again, for the maximum
regret calculations only the endpoints ai and bi matter (this is proved in Claim 19,
which is in Appendix B.3), we have that
maxRegreti(zi) = max{|ai − zi| − |ai − pa| , |bi − zi| − |bi − pb|}
≤ |bi − xi| − |bi − pb|
(since xi is the closest point to ai in A and using very weak dominance for single reports)
= max{|ai − xi| − |ai − pa| , |bi − xi| − |bi − pb|}
(since xi ≤ ai and |bi − pb| ≤ |bi − pa| by very weak dominance for single reports)
= maxRegreti(xi).
Similarly, we can show that maxRegret(zi) ≤ maxRegret(yi). Hence, agent i will not
derive any benefit from misreporting her candidate locations.
Finally, combining all the cases above, we have that the δ
2
-equispaced-median mechanism is
minimax dominant. This concludes the proof of our lemma.
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Equipped with the lemma above, we can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 21. Given a δ ∈ [0, B], the δ
2
-equispaced-median mechanism is anonymous and
implements 3δ
4
-OMVAC in minimax dominant strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-
game.
Proof. From Lemma 20 we know that the mechanism is minimax dominant. Therefore, the
only thing left to show is that it achieves an approximation bound of 3δ
4
. To do this, consider
an arbitrary profile of candidate locations L0, where L0 = ([a1, b1], . . . , [an, bn]), and let
L1, . . . , Ln and R1, . . . , Rn denote the sorted order of the left endpoints (i.e., {ai}i∈[n]) and
right endpoints (i.e., {bi}i∈[n]), respectively. Next, consider the interval [Lk+1, Rk+1] that is
associated with the given profile L0, where k = bnc2 and Lk+1 and Rk+1 are the medians
of the sets {ai}i∈[n] and {bi}i∈[n], respectively. (Note that Rk+1 − Lk+1 ≤ δ from Claim 15,
which is in Appendix B.3.) Also, let i be an agent who reported an ai such that ai = Lk+1
and j denote one who reported a bj such that bj = Rk+1. Next, from the mechanism,
consider xi (see line 3) and yj (see line 4).
First, for every agent c with bc ≤ Rk+1 (and there are k + 1 of them), `c ≤ yj. This is
so because, for every agent c, the point `c that is associated with the agent is in [xc, yc]
and also for two agents c, c′, if bc′ ≤ bc, then yc′ ≤ yc. Similarly, for every agent d with
ad ≥ Lk+1 (and, again, there are k + 1 of them), `d ≥ xi. Hence, it follows from the two
observations above that the output p of the mechanism, which is the median of {`1, . . . , `n},
will be in the interval [xi, yj].
Second, we will show that if |[xi, yj] ∩ A| = 3, then the output p of the mechanism will be
the point z in interval (xi, yj) such that z ∈ A. To see this, consider the points R1, . . . , Rk+1
and consider the largest q, where q ≤ k, such that Rq ≤ z (define q = 0, if R1 > z). We will
assume without of loss of generality that, for each i, the agent associated with Ri (i.e., one
who reports a right endpoint such that it is equal to Ri) is agent i. Now, for each agent r
from 1 to q, the `r associated with them in the mechanism is at most z. This is so because,
for each such agent r the yr associated with them at most z. Also, for each agent s from
q + 1 to k + 1, the only way the `s associated with agent s is greater than z is if the left
endpoints associated with them are greater than Lk+1 (because if not, then one can see
that the [xs, ys] associated with agent s has xi and z in it and so `s cannot be greater than
z). Now, let n1 be the number of agents among the agents from q + 1 to k + 1 such that
their left endpoints are greater than Lk+1. This implies that there are n1 agents among the
ones that report a left endpoint in {L1, . . . , Lk+1} that have a corresponding right endpoint
greater than or equal to Rk+1. And this in turn implies that the `s associated with these n1
agents can be at most z (because, again, one can see that the [x, y] associated with such an
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agent will have xi and z in it). Hence, combining all the observations above, we see that
q + ((k + 1− (q + 1) + 1)− n1) + n1 = k + 1 agents report an ` that is at most z. Now, we
can employ a similar line of reasoning to show that k + 1 agents report an ` that is at least
z. Hence, it follows that the median of {`1, . . . , `n} must be z.
Given the observations above, let us now look at the following cases. In all the cases we
show that any point in [Lk+1, Rk+1] is at a distance of at most 3δ4 from p, the output of the
mechanism.
Case 1: both xi and yj are not in [Lk+1, Rk+1]. In this case, let us consider the following
sub cases.
a) |[xi, yj] ∩ A| = 2. Since both xi and yj are not in [Lk+1, Rk+1] and there is no other
point in A that is in [Lk+1, Rk+1], we have that the distance from any point in




Also, from the discussion above we know that the median that is returned by the
mechanism is either xi or yj, so we have our bound.
b) |[xi, yj] ∩ A| = 3. In this case we know from above that the output of the mechanism
p = z, where z ∈ [xi, yj] ∩ A and is neither xi nor yj. Therefore, we have that
(z − Lk+1) ≤ (z − xi) = δ2 , and (Rk+1 − z) < (yj − z) =
δ
2
. Hence, any point in
[Lk+1, Rk+1] is a distance of at most δ2 from p.
c) |[xi, yj] ∩ A| > 3. Since for any interval [a, b] of length at most δ, the [x, y] associated
with it can have at most three points in A (this is proved in Claim 18, which is in
Appendix B.3), where x and y are as defined in the mechanism (see lines 3–4), this
case is impossible.
Case 2: at least one of xi or yj is in [Lk+1, Rk+1]. Let us assume without loss of generality
that xi is the point in [Lk+1, Rk+1], and let us consider the following sub cases.
a) |[xi, yj] ∩ A| = 2. In this case, if the output of the mechanism p = xi, then we have
that (xi−Lk+1) ≤ δ4 (since, by definition, xi is the point in A that is closest to Lk+1),
and (Rk+1− xi) ≤ |Rk+1− yj|+ (yj − xi) ≤ δ4 +
δ
2
(since, by definition, yj is the point
in A that is closest to Rk+1). Hence, any point in [Lk+1, Rk+1] is a distance of at most
3δ
4
from p. On other hand, if the output of the mechanism p = yj, then we have that
(yj−Lk+1) = (yj−xi +xi−Lk+1) ≤ δ2 +
δ
4
(since xi is the point in A that is closest to
Lk+1), and |yj −Rk+1| ≤ δ4 (since yj is the point in A that is closest to Rk+1). Hence,
when p = yj , any point in [Lk+1, Rk+1] is a distance of at most 3δ4 from p. Combining
the two, we see that our claim is true in this case.
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b) |[xi, yj] ∩ A| = 3. Here again since p = z, where z ∈ [xi, yj] ∩ A and is neither xi nor
yj , we have that (z −Lk+1) ≤ (z − xi + xi −Lk+1) ≤ δ2 +
δ
4
(since xi is the point in A
that is closest to Lk+1), and (Rk+1 − z) ≤ (yj − z) ≤ δ2 . Hence, even in this case, any
point in [Lk+1, Rk+1] is at a distance of at most 3δ4 from p.
Finally, since the output of the mechanism is a distance of at most 3δ
4
from any point
in [Lk+1, Rk+1], and given the fact that the minimax optimal solution is in [Lk+1, Rk+1]
(from Lemma 17), one can see using Lemma 16 that for I = [a1, b1] × . . . × [an, bn],
maxRegret(p, I)−OMVAC(I) is also bounded by 3δ4 (this is proved in Claim 20, which is
in Appendix B.3).
A conditional lower bound. In the context of our motivating example from the intro-
duction, it is possible, and in fact quite likely, that the city can only build the school at a
finite set of locations on the street. Therefore, an interesting class of non-onto mechanisms
to consider is ones which have a finite range. Below, we consider such mechanisms and show
that the approximation bound associated with any mechanism that is anonymous, minimax
dominant, and has a finite range, is at least δ
2
. The key idea that is required in order
to show this bound is the following lemma, which informally says that if the mechanism
has a finite range, is minimax dominant, and achieves a bound less than 3δ
4
, then there is
“sufficient-gap” between four consecutive points in the range, A, of the mechanism. Once
we have this observation it is then in turn used to construct profiles that will result in the
stated bound.
Lemma 22. Given a δ ∈ (0, B
6
], letM be a deterministic mechanism that has a finite range
A (of size at least six), is anonymous, and one that implements α-OMVAC in minimax
dominant strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game. Then, either α ≥ 3δ
4
, or






≥ δ, where, for i ∈ [3], di = gi+1 − gi.
Proof. The proof here is broadly similar to the proof of Theorem 19 in that here again we use
a characterization result by Massó and De Barreda [MD11], albeit a different one, and then
construct profiles in order to prove that the claim is true. The result we will rely on is the
one that characterizes the set of anonymous and strategyproof mechanisms in the symmetric
single-peaked domain [MD11, Corollary 1]. In particular, Massó and De Barreda showed
that any mechanism that is anonymous and strategyproof in the symmetric single-peaked
domain can be described as a disturbed median. We will not be defining disturbed medians
precisely since the definition is quite involved and we do not need it for the results here,
but broadly a mechanismM′ is a disturbed median if
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i) it has n+ 1 fixed points 0 ≤ y1 ≤ . . . ≤ yn+1 ≤ 1,
ii) its range has a countable number of non-intersecting discontinuity intervals {[am,
bm]}m∈M , where M is some indexation set and where for all i, yi /∈ [am, bm] for all
m ∈M ,
iii) has a family of anonymous tie-breaking rules, and
iv) behaves the following way with respect to a profile (x1, . . . , xn) of exact reports:
if median(y1, . . . , yn+1, x1, . . . , xn) 6= dm for all m ∈ M , where dm = am+bm2 , then
M′(x1, . . . , xn) = median(y1, . . . , yn+1, t1, . . . , tn), where ti is the most preferred alter-
native of agent i in the range ofM′.9
Given the partial description of disturbed medians mentioned above, let us consider the
mechanismM that is anonymous and minimax dominant. First, note that if we restrict
ourselves to profiles where every agent’s report is a single point (instead of intervals as in our
setting), then we know from the result of Massó and De Barreda thatM must be a disturbed
median [MD11, Corollary 1]. Second, note that for each yi,M(yi, . . . , yi) = median(y1, . . . ,
yn+1, yi, . . . , yi) = yi. Therefore, each yi belongs to A, the range ofM. Additionally, also
note that y1 and yn+1 are the minimum and maximum elements, respectively, in A, for if
not then for a g ∈ A that is either less than y1 or greater than yn+1, median(y1, . . . , yn+1,
g, . . . , g) 6= g, which is impossible if g ∈ A andM is minimax dominant.
Next, given the observations above, consider the following two cases.
Case 1: there exists at most 2 points in A that are greater than y2. In this
case, let us consider the points y1 and y2. If y2 − y1 ≥ 3δ2 , then consider the profile L0
where n− 1 agents report y1 and the last agent reports y2, i.e., L0 = (y1, . . . , y1, y2). Let
p0 =M(L0). From above we know that p0 = median(y1, . . . , yn+1, y1, . . . , y1, y2) = y2 (since
y2 is the (n + 1)-th largest number). However, the minimax optimal solution associated
with this profile is y1 and now one can verify from the expressions in Lemma 16 that, for an
appropriate choice of n, α ≥ maxRegret(p0, I)−OMVAC(I) ≥ 3δ4 , where I is the instance
associated with the profile L0. Hence, “the either part” of our lemma is true in this case.
On the other hand, if y2 − y1 < 3δ2 , then consider the case when there are two points
g, g′ ∈ A such that y2 < g′ < g and the three points are consecutive in A (the arguments
below can be easily modified when there is only one or zero points greater than y2). Note
9Note that we have only defined disturbed medians for profiles which satisfy the property mentioned
above since we will only be using such profiles in this proof; the interested reader can refer to [MD11,
Definition 7] for a complete definition of disturbed medians.
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that if g′ − y2 ≥ 3δ2 or g − g
′ ≥ 3δ
2
, then we can construct profiles like in the case above to
show that α ≥ 3δ
4
. Therefore, let us assume that this is not the case. Now, this implies that
if d1 = (y1 − 0) and d2 = (B − g), then















. So, if we
assume without loss of generality that d1 ≥ 3δ4 , then we can consider the profile L0 where
all the agents report 0 (note that by our assumption on d1, 0 /∈ A, because if so, then since
y1 is the minimum element in A, y1 should be equal to 0), and let p1 =M(L1). Given the
fact that p1 ≥ y1, this in turn implies that one can verify from the expressions in Lemma 16
that α ≥ maxRegret(p1, I)−OMVAC(I) ≥ 3δ4 , where I is the instance associated with the
profile L1. Hence, again, “the either part” of our lemma is true.
Case 2: there are at least 3 points in A that are greater than y2. In this case,
consider four consecutive points g1, g2, g3, g4 in A such that g1 ≥ y2 and g1 < g2 < g3 < g4.













Also, let us consider the largest j such that yj ≤ g1 (note that we have 2 ≤ j ≤ n), and let
us consider the following input profile L0yj, . . . , yj,︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−j agents
[`, r], g3, B, . . . , B︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−2 agents
 ,
where ` = (g1 + d12 − γ1), r = (g3 +
d3
2
+ γ2), γ1 + γ2 < (δ− (d12 + d2 +
d3
2
)), γ1 < γ2, γ1 < d12 ,
and γ2 < d32 .
Let p0 = M(L0) and let a and b be the agents who report [`, r] and g3, respectively, in
L0. Next, consider the profile L1 where the only difference from L0 is that agent a reports
` here instead of [`, r], and let p1 = M(L1). Now, given the fact that g1, g2, g3, g4 are
consecutive points in A and g1 is the unique closest point to ` in A, we know that g1 is the
most preferred alternative of agent a in the range ofM. Therefore, we have that
p1 = median(y1, . . . , yn+1, yj, . . . , yj, g1, g3, B, . . . B) = g1,
since g1 is the (n+ 1)-th largest number.
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Using a similar line of reasoning one can see that if L2 denotes the profile where agent a
reports r instead of [`, r] and every other agent reports as in L0, then
p2 =M(L2) = median(y1, . . . , yn+1, yj, . . . , yj, g4, g3, B, . . . B) = g3,
since here g3 is the (n+ 1)-th largest number.
Now, since p1 = g1 and p2 = g3, this implies that p0 = g2, for if otherwise agent a can
deviate from L0 by reporting g2 instead (it is easy to see that this reduces agent a’s
maximum regret), thus violating the fact thatM is minimax dominant. Given this, now
consider the profile L3 which is the same as L0 except for the fact that agent b reports
g4 instead of g3. Here p3 = M(L3) has to be equal to g3 because one can see from the
max. regret calculations associated with agent a that a has a lesser maximum regret for
g3 than for g2 (this is because of our choice of appropriate γ1 and γ2). So if p3 is not
equal to g3, then agent a can move from L3 to L4 where L4 is the same as L3 except for
agent a reporting g3 instead of [`, r] (and this would be beneficial for a since the output for
L4 = median(y1, . . . , yn+1, yj, . . . , yj, g3, g4, B, . . . B) = g3). However, now if p3 = g3, then
this implies that agent b can deviate from L0 (which, as discussed above, has an output
p0 = g2) to L3, thus again violating the fact thatM is minimax dominant. Hence, for this






Finally, combining all the cases above, we have our lemma.
Given the lemma above, the proof of our lower bound is straightforward. (Note that below
we ignore mechanisms which have less than six points in their range as one can easily show
that such mechanisms perform poorly.)
Theorem 23. Given a δ ∈ (0, B
6
], let M be a deterministic mechanism that has a finite
range (of size at least six), is anonymous, and one that implements α-OMVAC in minimax
dominant strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game. Then, for any ε > 0, α ≥ δ
2
− ε.
Proof. Consider the mechanismM and let A denote its range. From Lemma 22 we know
that either α ≥ 3δ
4
or there exists four consecutive points g1, g2, g3, g4 ∈ A such that
g1 < g2 < g3 < g4 and d12 + d2 +
d3
2
≥ δ, where, for i ∈ [3], di = gi+1 − gi. Since the former
case results in a bound that is bigger than the one in the statement of our theorem, below
we just consider the latter case where there exists g1, g2, g3, g4 satisfying the conditions
stated above. Also, sinceM is minimax dominant and anonymous, we can again make








≥ δ, we know that at least one of d1, d2 or d3 is at least δ2 . Also if
any of d1, d2, or d3 is at least δ, then it is easy to construct profiles so as to achieve our
bounds. Therefore, for the rest of the proof we assume that dc < δ, for all c ∈ [3]. So, given
this, let di ≥ δ2 for some i ∈ [3], and let us consider the largest j such that yj ≤ gi (again,
like in the proof of Lemma 22, j ≤ n). We have the following two cases, where k = bn
2
c.
Case 1: j ≥ n − k. Consider the profile L0 where k + 1 agents report gi and the
rest of the agents report gi+1. Let p0 =M(L0). Since p0 = median(y1, . . . , yn+1, gi, . . . , gi,
gi+1, . . . gi+1), and since j ≥ n−k, we have that p0 = gi. Next, consider the profile L1, where




instead of gi. Let p1 =M(L1). Now, if either p1 > gi or p1 ≤ gi−1 (if such a point exists in
A), it is easy to see that agent 1 will deviate to L0 since her maximum regret for the point
gi is lesser in either of the cases. This in turn implies that p1 = gi. Continuing this way,
one can reason along the same lines that for c ≤ k + 1 the profile Lc, where Lc is the same
as Lc−1 except for agent c reporting [gi, gi+1 − γ] instead of gi, the output pc associated
with Lc is equal to gi.
Given the observations above, consider the profile Lk+1 where the first k + 1 agents report
[gi, gi+1−γ] and the rest of the agents report gi+1. Now, one can calculate using Algorithm 9
(in Appendix B.2) that the minimax optimal solution popt ≥ gi+(2k+1)(gi+1−γ)2(k+1) . Also, we know
from above that pk+1 = M(Lk+1) = gi. And so, using the fact that di = gi+1 − gi ≥ δ2
and that popt − pk+1 ≥ (2k+1)(gi+1−gi−γ)2(k+1) we can now use the expressions from Lemma 16 to
see that maxRegret(pk+1, I) − OMVAC(I) ≥ (2k+1)(gi+1−gi−γ)2(k+1) , which for an appropriately
chosen value of n and γ is greater than or equal to δ
2
− ε for any ε > 0.
Case 2: j < n − k. We can handle this similarly as in the previous case. In particular,
consider the profile L0 where k+1 agents report gi and the rest of the agents report gi+1. Let
p0 =M(L0). Since p0 = median(y1, . . . , yn+1, gi, . . . , gi, gi+1, . . . gi+1), and since j < n− k,
we know that p0 = min(gi+1, yj+1) (as the (n+1)-th largest number will be either yj+1 or gi+1).
However, we know that yj+1 is in the range of A sinceM(yj+1, . . . , yj+1) = median(y1, . . . ,
yn+1, yj+1, . . . , yj+1) = yj+1, and also that gi and gi+1 are consecutive in A. Therefore,
yj+1 ≥ gi+1, and we have that p0 = gi+1. Next, consider the profile L1, where the only




instead of gi+1. Let p1 =M(L1). Now, if either p1 > gi+1 (if such a point exists in A) or
p1 ≤ gi, it is easy to see that agent (k + 2) will deviate to L0 since her maximum regret for
the point gi+1 is lesser in either of the cases. This in turn implies that p1 = gi+2. Continuing
this way one can reason along the same lines that for c ≥ k + 2 the profile Lc−k−1, where
Lc−k−1 is the same as Lc−k−2 except for agent c reporting [gi + γ, gi+1] instead of gi+1, the
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output pc associated with Lc is equal to gi+1.
Given the observations above, consider the profile Ln−k−1 where the last n− k − 1 agents
report [gi + γ, gi+1] and the rest of the agents report gi. Now, one can calculate using
Algorithm 9 (in Appendix B.2) that the minimax optimal solution popt = gi. Also, we know
from above that pn−k−1 =M(Ln−k−1) = gi+1. And so, using the fact that di = gi+1−gi ≥ δ2 ,
we can now use the expressions from Lemma 16 to see that maxRegret(pn−k−1, I) −
OMVAC(I) ≥ (2k−2)(gi+1−gi−γ)2k , which for an appropriately chosen value of n and γ is greater
than or equal to δ
2
− ε for any ε > 0.
Finally, combining the two cases above, we have our lower bound.
3.5 Implementing the Maximum Cost Objective
In this section we turn our attention to the objective of minimizing the maximum cost
(sometimes succinctly referred to as maxCost and written as MC) which is another well-
studied objective function in the context of the facility location problem. In the standard
setting where the reports are exact, the maximum cost associated with locating a facility
at p is defined as maxi∈[n] C(xi, p) and if we assume without loss of generality that the xis
are in sorted order, then one can easily see that the optimal solution to this objective is to
locate the facility at p = x1+xn
2
. However, unlike in the case of the average cost objective
that was considered in Section 3.4, one cannot design an optimal strategyproof mechanism
even when the reports are exact, and it is known that the best one can do in terms of
additive approximation is to achieve a bound of B
4
in the case of deterministic mechanisms
and B
6
in the case of randomized mechanisms [GT17, Theorems 5, 15].
Now, coming to our setting, unlike in the case of the average cost objective, calculating
the minimax optimal solution is straightforward in this case. In fact, given the candidate
locations [ai, bi] for all i, if L1, . . . , Ln and R1, . . . , Rn denote the sorted order of the points in
{ai}i∈[n] and {bi}i∈[n], respectively, then it is not too hard to show that the minimax optimal
solution is the point L1+R1+Ln+Rn
4
(a complete discussion on how to find the minimax optimal
solution when using the maximum cost objective is in Appendix B.4). Therefore, below we
directly move on to implementation using the solution concepts defined in Section 3.2.1.
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3.5.1 Implementation in very weakly dominant strategies
In the case of the maximum cost objective we again see that very weak dominance is too
strong a solution concept as even here it turns out that we cannot do any better than the
naive mechanism which always outputs the point B
2
as the solution. The following theorem,
which can be proved by proceeding exactly like in the proof of Theorem 18, formalizes this
statement.
Theorem 24. Given a δ ∈ (0, B], let M = (X,F ) be a deterministic mechanism that
implements α-OMVMC in very weakly dominant strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-
game. Then, α ≥ B
2
.
Given the negative result, we move on to implementation in minimax dominant strategies
in the hope of getting an analogous positive result as Theorem 21.
3.5.2 Implementation in minimax dominant strategies
When it comes to implementation in minimax dominant strategies, we again see that
even in the case of the maxCost objective function one can do a lot better under this
solution concept than under very weak dominance. But before we see the exact bounds
one can obtain here, recall that Theorem 19 rules out the existence of mechanisms that are
anonymous, minimax dominant, and onto. Hence, our focus will be on non-onto mechanisms.
We note that the ideas in the following section can be broadly described as being similar to
the ones in Section 3.4.3.1 since here, too, we focus on similar “grid-based” mechanisms.
3.5.2.1 Non-onto mechanisms








-OMVMC in minimax dominant strategies. The mechanism, which can be consid-
ered as an extension to the phantom-half mechanism introduced by Golomb and Tzamos
[GT17],10 is similar to the δ
2
-equispaced-median mechanism shown in Algorithm 2. Hence,
we only highlight the changes in the description below.
δ
2
-equispaced-phantom-half. Consider the mechanism described in Algorithm 2. We
need to make only two changes: i) instead of the definition of A used in Algorithm 2, we
10Given a profile of exact reports (x1, . . . , xn), the phantom-half mechanism returns the median of
xmin, xmax and B/2, where xmin = mini{xi} and xmax = maxi{xi}.
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define it to be the set {g1, . . . , gj, . . . , gm}, where gj = B2 , gi+1 − gi =
δ
2
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
g0 ≥ 0, and gm ≤ B. ii) instead of returning the median of the lis in line 21, we return the
median of the points `min, B2 , and `max, where `min = mini{`i} and `max = maxi{`i}.
Below, we show that the δ
2






-OMVMC in minimax dominant strategies.




-equispaced-phantom-half mechanism is anony-







-OMVMC in minimax dominant strategies for a
δ-uncertain-facility-location-game.
Proof. The proof that the δ
2
-equispaced-phantom-half mechanism is minimax dominant
is very similar to the proof of Lemma 20 where we show that the δ
2
-equispaced-median
mechanism is minimax dominant. Therefore, below we only show the approximation bound.
We begin by defining some notation and making a few observations. Let L0 = ([a1, b1], . . . ,
[an, bn]) be a profile of candidate locations of the agents and let L1, . . . , Ln and R1, . . . , Rn
be the sorted order of the ais and bis, respectively. Also, let `i be the `i associated with the
agent i in the mechanism (see Algorithm 2), `min = mini{`i}, and `max = maxi{`i}. From
the mechanism we know that `i ∈ [xi, yi], where xi and yi are as defined in the mechanism
(see lines 3–4 in Algorithm 2). Additionally, for two agents i and j, if ai ≤ aj, then it is
clear from the definition of xks (see line 3 in Algorithm 2) that xi ≤ xj. Similarly, it again
follows from the definition of yks that for two agent i and j, if bi ≤ bj, then yi ≤ yj.
Next, consider the agent associated with L1 (i.e., the agent who reports the smallest left
endpoint). Without loss of generality we can assume that this agent is agent 1. From the
discussion above we know that for every agent i > 1, we have that `i ≥ xi ≥ x1 (since their
left endpoints are at least L1). Therefore, `min = minj{`j} ≥ x1, and since x1 ≥ L1 − δ4
(this easily follows from the definition of xi and the fact that the points in A are placed at
a distance of δ
2
apart), we have that `min ≥ L1 − δ4 . Now, one can employ a similar line of
reasoning to see all of the following: `max ≤ Rn + δ4 , `min ≤ R1 +
δ
4
, and `max ≥ Ln − δ4 .
Given all the observations above, we are now ready to prove our bound. To do this, let us
consider the following cases. In each of these cases, we will show that the output p of the
δ
2




) from popt, where
from Proposition 44, which is in Appendix B.4, we know that popt = L1+R1+Ln+Rn4 .
Case 1: p = B
2
. In this case, we have,
|popt − p| = max
{
R1 +Rn + L1 + Ln
4
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Case 2: p = `min. In this case, we have,
|popt − p| = max
{
R1 +Rn + L1 + Ln
4





























































. (since δ ≤ 2B
3
)
Case 3: p = `max. This can be handled analogously as in Case 2.
Finally, for an instance I, since from all the cases above we have that |popt − p| ≤ (B4 +
3δ
8







(this can seen by using
Lemma 43, which is in Appendix B.4).
Given this result, it is natural to ask if we have a lower bound like the one in Section 3.4.3.1.
Unfortunately, the only answer we have is the obvious lower bound of B
4
that follows from
the result of Golomb and Tzamos [GT17, Theorem 15] who showed that under exact reports,





The standard assumption in mechanism design that the agents are precisely aware of their
complete preferences may not be realistic in many situations. Hence, we believe that there
is a need to look at models that account for partially informed agents and, at the same time,
design mechanisms that provide robust guarantees. In this chapter, we looked at such a
model in the context of the classic single-facility location problem, where an agent specifies
an interval instead of an exact location, and our focus was on designing robust mechanisms
that perform well with respect to all the possible underlying true locations of the agents.
Towards this end, we looked at two solution concepts, very weak dominance and minimax
dominance, and we showed that, with respect to both the objective functions we considered,
while it was not possible to achieve any good mechanism in the context of the former solution
concept, extensions to the classical optimal mechanisms—i.e., mechanisms that perform
optimally in the classical setting where the agents exactly know their locations—performed
significantly better under the latter, weaker, solution concept. Our results are summarized
in Table 3.1.
There are some immediate open questions in the context of the problem we considered like
looking at randomized mechanisms, providing tighter bounds, and potentially even finding
deterministic mechanisms that perform better than the ones we showed. More broadly, we
believe that it will be interesting to revisit the classic problems in mechanism design, see
if one can look at models which take into account partially informed agents, and design
mechanisms where one can explicitly relate the performance of the mechanism with the
quality of preference information.
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Chapter 4
Improving Welfare in One-Sided
Matching Using Simple Threshold
Queries
4.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters looked at the question of designing ‘robust’ algorithms, where,
broadly, by ‘robust’ we meant algorithms that when given access to incomplete preference
information performed well with respect to all the possible underlying complete preferences.
Crucially, the assumption in both the previous chapters was that the algorithm has to
work with given incomplete information. However, this might not always be required, for it
might be possible to ask the agents to refine their preferences further. In this chapter, we
look at such a setting in the context of one-sided matching problems. One-sided matching
problems model scenarios where there is a set of n agents who have preferences over a set
of m objects and the goal is to assign each agent to at most one object. Such problems are
ubiquitous. For instance, the case where the objects are houses represents the well-studied
housing allocation problem (e.g., see [HZ79; AS98; Abr+04]) or, when agents have initial
endowments, the housing market problem (e.g., see [SS74; RP77; AS99]). Other examples
include assigning faculty members to school committees, workers to tasks, etc.
Most of the literature on one-sided matching problems typically assume that the agents have
an acceptable set of objects and that they submit a preference order over the acceptable set.
Given this, the standard objective is to come up with an assignment of agent to objects
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object 1 object 2 object 3
agent 1 0.9 0.1 0
agent 2 0.9 0.1 0
agent 3 0.51 0.49 0
Table 4.1: Example which illustrates how there is a loss in welfare due to not accounting
for preference intensities.
(henceforth, matching) such that it satisfies some notion of economic efficiency like, e.g.,
Pareto optimality or rank-maximality. Informally, a matching is Pareto optimal if there is
no other matching where all the agents are assigned to an object that they like at least as
much as the one they are assigned to currently and if there is at least one agent who strictly
prefers the new assignment. A matching is rank-maximal if it maximizes the number of
agents who are matched to their first choice object, and, subject to that, it maximizes the
number of agents matched to their second choice object, and so on.
Although matchings that satisfy such notions are better than arbitrary matchings, their
main drawback is that they do not take into account agents’ preference intensities. To
illustrate this, consider the simple example in Table 4.1 where there are three agents and
three objects. The agents all have the same ordinal preferences, but have different preference
intensities. For instance, agent 3 only has a slight preference for object 1 over object 2 (0.51
vs 0.49), whereas agents 1 and 2 both prefer object 1 much more than object 2 (0.9 vs 0.1).
In this example, if we were concerned about Pareto optimality or rank-maximality, then it
is easy to see that any matching satisfies both these notions. However, it is also clear that
any matching that matches agent 3 to object 3 is worse in terms of overall welfare, since
agent 3 experiences a much larger loss in utility when matched to object 3 instead of object
2, whereas for agents 1 and 2 this difference is very small.
The observation that there might be a loss in welfare due to not capturing preference
intensities (henceforth, cardinal utilities) is not new, and in particular, this has been a much
debated issue surrounding various school-choice mechanisms (e.g., see [ACY11; ACY15]).1
This has also lead to, for instance, proposals for new school choice mechanisms that ask
agents to provide some extra information along with their ordinal preferences [ACY15].
Our work here is partially motivated by this line of work, but takes a more computational
and algorithmic approach to this issue that is similar to the flurry of work that looks
at distortion—which is essentially the cost of using only ordinal information—in various
1School-choice is the problem of allocating students to schools. This is essentially a one-sided matching
problem, except that here the schools usually have, what are called, priorities—which is an ordering over
students that is used only when the school is over-demanded (see, e.g., [ACY11] for formal definitions).
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settings (e.g., see [PR06; Bou+15; AS16; AZ17; GKM17; AA18]).
In particular, given a one-sided matching instance (which is the set of agents, objects, and
the agents’ preferences), we are still interested in computing matchings that satisfy some
notion of economic efficiency, say, X, but at the same time our aim is to account for the
agents’ cardinal utilities. We do this by aiming to design algorithms that always return
a matching that satisfies X and at the same time achieves a good approximation to the
optimal welfare among all matchings that satisfy X—i.e., the maximum utilitarian social
welfare achievable among matchings that satisfy X. Now, of course, one way to achieve this
is to just ask agents directly for their cardinal utilities, since once we have them we can
compute the matching with the best welfare among ones that satisfy X. However, as one
can imagine, asking agents for their cardinal utilities is cognitively non-trivial, since even
attributing values to objects is not easy in many scenarios. Therefore, here our focus is to
achieve a middle-ground between completely ordinal and completely cardinal elicitation,
and to do this, we use threshold queries which ask an agent if their value for an object is at
least some real number v. Our goal is to ask each agent a small number of such queries
and then use it to pick a matching that achieves a good approximation as described above.
Although the general idea of using queries to elicit some information regarding cardinal
utilities is not new and has even been considered in the context of one-sided matching in
a recent paper [Ama+21], there are some differences. The main difference between our
approach here and the one by Amanatidis et al. [Ama+21] is that the focus in their paper
is to come up with algorithms that have low distortion, whereas our focus is on algorithms
that, for a particular notion of economic efficiency X, always produce a matching that
satisfies X and has a good approximation to the optimal welfare among all matchings that
satisfy X. We believe that while achieving low distortion might be a good objective in
certain settings, it is too reliant on cardinal preferences—the presence of which is already
an assumption. Hence, comparing different algorithms solely based on this value (i.e., the
distortion they achieve) does not seem ideal. Our approach, on the other hand, is less reliant
on cardinal information, using it only to pick a matching from the set of matchings that
satisfy some property X, which in turn is dependent only on the ordinal information that
is arguably more robust. Moreover, the query model used by Amanatidis et al. [Ama+21]
is much stronger than the one we employ. Ours just asks for a binary answer to whether
the value of an item is greater than some real number v, whereas in their model a query
asks an agent to reveal their utility for the object, which in turn is cognitively much more
demanding. These differences mean that there are no direct overlaps between our results
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Table 4.2: Summary of our results. For X, where X is one of the properties in the set
{Pareto optimal, rank-maximal, max-cardinality rank-maximal, fair}, an upper bound (UB)
of α indicates that there is a deterministic algorithm that always produces a matching that
satisfies X and achieves an α-approximation to the optimal welfare among matchings that
satisfy X. A lower bound (LB) of β indicates that there is no deterministic algorithm that
produces a matching that satisfies X and achieves a β-approximation to the optimal welfare
among matchings that satisfy X.
4.1.1 Our contributions
We consider the following four well-studied types of matchings that satisfy a specific notion
of economic efficiency: i) Pareto optimal matchings, ii) rank-maximal matchings, iii)
max-cardinality rank-maximal matchings, and iv) fair matchings. As mentioned above,
for each of these types, our goal is to find deterministic algorithms that always output a
matching of the corresponding type and one that achieves a good approximation to the
optimal welfare among all matchings of that type. Towards this end, we consider two kinds
of cardinal utilities, namely, unit-sum and unit-range valuations, and show the following
results, which are summarized in Table 4.2.
• We first look at adaptive algorithms—i.e., algorithms that are able to change their
queries depending on how agents answer its previous queries—and show how for each
of the notions mentioned above and for any ε > 0, there is a deterministic algorithm





, and returns a matching
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that satisfies this notion and also achieves a (1 + ε)-approximation to the optimal
welfare among all matchings that satisfy this notion when the agents have unit-sum
or unit-range valuations.
• While the previous result achieves the best possible approximation one can hope
for—and in particular it results in an O(1)-approximation with just O(log2 n) queries
per agent—we believe that the fact it is adaptive is not ideal because of the following
reasons: i) Adaptive algorithms may not be practical in many settings since it involves
waiting for the agents to respond, and potentially having them respond multiple times.
ii) For every agent, the algorithm mentioned above potentially asks multiple queries
with respect to the same object and as this number increases, one could argue that it
defeats the real purpose of such algorithms—since responding to them entails that
the agents are somewhat sure about their cardinal utilities.
As a result, we focus on non-adaptive algorithms, which address the first issue
mentioned above, and in order to address the second one, we consider a very special
type of non-adaptive algorithm—one which is allowed to ask at most one query per
(agent, object) pair. We believe that this is the most practical setting to consider for
this problem, since this means every agent is asked to provide just one extra bit of
information per object.2
For this setting, we show how for each of the notions considered, there is a deterministic
algorithm that returns a matching that satisfies this notion and also achieves an
O(n2/3)-approximation to the optimal welfare among all matchings that satisfy this
notion when the agents have unit-sum valuations. We also derive a similar result for
the unit-range case, showing an algorithm that achieves an O(
√
n)-approximation.
Note that these bounds are as opposed to a Θ(n2) and Θ(n) approximation that is
achievable when using only ordinal preferences and when the agents have unit-sum
and unit-range valuations, respectively.
• Finally, we also show that, for all the notions considered, any deterministic algorithm
that uses at most one query per (agent, object) pair can only achieve an approximation
factor of Ω(
√
n), both for the case when agents have unit-sum or unit-range valuations.
Note that for the unit-range case, this bound in turn is asymptotically tight.
2Also, deploying this seems easier, since instead of the current system which presumably just asks the
agents to list their preferences, now all that needs to be done is to have a checkbox next to it, indicating
whether their answer is a “Yes” or “No” w.r.t. a certain threshold query.
77
4.1.2 Related work
One-sided matching scenarios are ubiquitous and have been well-studied, especially as the
housing allocation or housing market problem both in economics (e.g., see [SS74; HZ79;
RP77; AS98; AS99; SÜ10]) and in theoretical computer science and computational economics
(e.g., see [Abr+04; Irv04; Abr+06; FFZ14; Ama+21]). Unlike here where we assume that the
agents have underlying cardinal utilities that are consistent with their ordinal preferences,
most of this literature assumes that the agents only have ordinal preferences, and their
goal is usually to find matchings that satisfy some notion of economic efficiency like,
e.g., Pareto optimal matchings [SS74; Abr+04], rank-maximal matchings [Irv04; Irv+06],
max-cardinality rank-maximal matchings [MM05; Abr+06], and fair matchings [MM05;
Hua+13].
As mentioned in the Introduction, part of the motivation for our work is derived from work
on the school choice problem that talks about the loss in welfare due to not taking the
preference intensities into account (e.g., [ACY11; ACY15]). Our concern here is on similar
lines, but we take a more computational approach to the problem which is reminiscent of the
vast body of work on distortion (e.g., see [PR06; Bou+15; AS16; AZ17; GKM17; AA18]).
However, unlike this body of work which aims to calculate the worst-case loss in welfare due
to only having ordinal preferences, we assume that, in addition to their ordinal preferences,
it is also possible to obtain some information about the agents’ cardinal utilities. This in
turn is similar to the approach taken by Abramowitz, Anshelevich, and Zhu [AAZ19] in the
context of voting and more closely to the ones by Amanatidis et al. [Ama+20; Ama+21] in
the context of voting and one-sided matching, respectively. In the work by Abramowitz,
Anshelevich, and Zhu [AAZ19] it assumed that in addition to the ordinal preferences there
is also some information regarding how many agents prefer candidate P over Q above a
certain threshold, whereas in the work by Amanatidis et al. [Ama+20; Ama+21], and as is
the case here, it is assumed that the one can use some specific type of query in order to get
more information regarding the cardinal utilities.
Finally, our work is also related to the work that studies the communication complexity
of voting protocols [Man+19; MSW20], to the work on participatory budgeting which
compares different elicitation methods based on the distortion achieved (e.g., see [Goe+19;
Ben+20]), and is more broadly in line with the growing body of work that explicitly aims
to make mechanisms or algorithms more robust, by either making use of coarse preference
information [CMA12; CMA14; ML19] or by making sure that the algorithms designed
produce solutions that work “well” (in the approximation sense) even under slightly modified
inputs [SYE13; Bre+17; ML18; MV18; CSS19].
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4.2 Preliminaries
For k ∈ Z+, let [k] denote the set {1, . . . , k}. We use N , where |N | = n, to denote the set
of agents {a1, . . . , an}, and use H, where |H| = n, to denote the set of objects {h1, . . . , hn}.
We refer to ai as agent i and hj as object j. Every agent ai is assumed to have a weak
order Pi over a subset of objects Ai ⊆ H. For an agent ai, Ai indicates the set of objects
ai is willing to be matched to and we refer to Ai as the acceptable set of ai and assume
that |Ai| ≥ 1. We use P = (P1, . . . , Pn) to refer to the weak orders of all the agents in N
and refer to P as the preference profile of the agents. For an agent ai, and for two objects
hj, hk ∈ Ai, we use hj i hk to denote that ai strictly prefers hj over hk, and use hj i hk
to indicate that hj is either strictly preferred or considered to be equivalent to hk. We refer
to I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)) as an instance, which encodes all the information about
the agents, objects, and the agents’ preferences, and use I to denote the set of all possible
instances.
Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)), we use GI = (N ∪ H, E) to denote
the bipartite graph where there as an edge (ai, hj) ∈ E if hj ∈ Ai. We refer to GI as
the graph induced by I and refer to e = (ai, hj) ∈ E as a rank-k edge if |Uij| = k − 1,
where Uij = {h` ∈ Ai | h` i hj}. We also use rank(ai, hj) to denote the k such that
(ai, hj) is a rank-k edge and refer to an object hj as ai’s rank-k (or k-th choice) object if
rank(ai, hj) = k.
Although the model described thus far is the standard model in one-sided matching, here
we additionally assume that each agent ai has a cardinal utility function vi : H → [0, 1],
which is consistent with the preference order Pi (meaning, h1 i h2 ⇔ vi(h1) ≥ vi(h2));
we assume that if h /∈ Ai, then vi(h) = 0. In this work we consider two specific kinds
of (normalized) valuation functions which are defined below, and use v = (v1, . . . , vn) to
denote the valuation profile of agents and VI to denote the set of all possible valuation
profiles that are consistent with the given preference profile in I.
1. Unit-sum valuations: Agents are said to have unit-sum valuations if for each agent i,
vi is such that
∑
h∈Ai vi(h) = 1.
2. Unit-range valuations: Agents have unit-range valuations if for each agent i, there
exists hj, hk ∈ Ai such that hj i hk, and maxh∈Ai vi(h) = 1 and minh∈Ai vi(h) = 0.
In words, the most preferred objects have value 1, the least preferred objects have
value 0, and every other acceptable object has value between 0 and 1.
Note that information about the cardinal utilities is not part of an instance I. Also, note
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that although the “internal utilities” of the agents may not be normalized, we have to
assume some normalization in order to only use threshold queries. Given this, both unit-sum
and unit-range arise from two natural ways to normalize agents’ “internal utilities”. More
precisely, if ui : H → R≥0 is the “internal utility” of an agent, then, for all h ∈i A, the








For an instance I, we are interested in matchings that assign agents to objects, and a
matching of agents to objects is a bijection µ : N → H and, for c ∈ N ∪H, we refer to µ(c)
as c’s partner in µ or as c’s allocation in µ. Alternatively, a matching is also defined as a
collection of edges µ in GI such that each vertex is part of at most one edge in µ. We use
MGI to denote the set of all possible matchings in GI . Although for a given instance there
are several possible matchings, we are interested in matchings that satisfy some notion of
economic efficiency; these are defined next.
4.2.1 Notions of economic efficiency
We consider the following well-studied notions: Pareto optimal matchings [SS74; Abr+04],
rank-maximal matchings [Irv04; Irv+06], max-cardinality rank-maximal matchings [MM05;
Abr+06], and fair matchings [MM05; Hua+13]. The latter three are different ways to
strengthen Pareto optimality and are together referred in the rest of this chapter as
signature-based matchings.
Definition 10 (Pareto optimal matchings). Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . ,
Pn)), a matching µ ∈MGI is Pareto optimal (PO) w.r.t. I if
∀µ′ ∈MGI : (∃ai ∈ N , µ′(ai) i µ(ai))⇒ (∃aj ∈ N , µ′(aj) ≺j µ(aj)) .
In words, a matching µ is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching µ′ such that every
agent weakly-prefers their allocation in µ′ over their allocation in µ and at least one agent
(strictly) prefers their allocation in µ′ over their allocation in µ.
Definition 11 (Signature-based matchings). Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . ,
Pn)), and a matching µ ∈MGI , let si denote the number of agents that are matched to a
rank-i edge in µ. Then, µ is
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• rank-maximal if µ maximizes the number of agents who are matched to a rank-1
edge and, subject to that, it maximizes the number of agents who are matched to
rank-2 edges, and so on. Formally, if we associate an n-tuple (s1, . . . , sn) with every
matching inMGI , then µ is the matching that has lexicographically the best n-tuple
(s1, . . . , sn) associated with it.
• max-cardinality rank-maximal if µ is a maximum cardinality matching and,
subject to that, is also rank-maximal. Formally, if we associate an (n + 1)-tuple
(
∑n
i=1 si, s1, . . . , sn) with every matching inMGI , then µ is the matching that has
lexicographically the best (n+ 1)-tuple (
∑n
i=1 si, s1, . . . , sn) associated with it.
• fair if µ is a maximum cardinality matching and, subject to that, minimizes the
number of agents who are matched to a rank-n edge and, subject to that, minimizes
the number of agents who are matched to a rank-(n− 1) edge, and so on. Formally,
if we associate an (n+ 1)-tuple (
∑n
i=1 si,−sn,−sn−1, . . . ,−s1) with every matching
in MGI , then µ is the matching that has lexicographically the best (n + 1)-tuple
(
∑n
i=1 si,−sn,−sn−1, . . . ,−s1) associated with it.
For each type of signature-based matching defined above and a matching of that type, we
refer to the corresponding tuple, as defined above, to be the matching’s signature. That is,
for instance, for a max-cardinality rank-maximal matching µ, signature of µ refers to the
(n + 1)-tuple (
∑n
i=1 si, s1, . . . , sn). The example below illustrates the difference between
Pareto optimal, rank-maximal, and fair matchings for an instance.
Example 1. Consider an instance with 7 agents and 7 objects, where the preferences of
the agents are as defined in the table below. Here each column corresponds to the strict
preferences of an agent and if the column corresponding to agent, say, ai is h1, h2, h3, then
this implies that ai prefers h1 the most, h2 second most, and so on. For this instance, the
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
h1 h2 h1 h3 h1 h1 h1
h4 h5 h3 h6 h4 h2 h2
h3 h6 h5 h4 h5
h7
matching (of size 6) that corresponds to each agent being matched to the object (if any)
coloured blue in its column is an example of a Pareto optimal matching. Similarly, the
matching (of size 5, with signature (3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)) where each agent is matched to the
object (if any) coloured red is an example of a rank-maximal matching, and the matching
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(of size 7, with signature (7, 0, 0,−1, 0,−5,−1)) where each is matched to the object (if
any) coloured yellow is an example of a fair matching.
It is well-known (see [Irv04; Irv+06; MM05; Hua+13; Mic07]) that signature-based match-
ings can be reduced to an instance of the following problem, which we refer to as priority-p
matchings, for a given p = (p1, · · · , pn).
Definition 12. Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)) and a priority vector
p = (p1, . . . , pn), where ∀i ∈ [n], pi ∈ Z≥0 and ∃j, k ∈ [n] such that pj 6= pk, a matching
µ ∈MGI is said to be a priority-p matching if µ is a matching of maximum weight inMGI ,
where a rank-r edge in GI is assigned the weight pr.
In particular, given an instance I, we can show that,3
• when pj = n2(n−j+1) for all j ∈ [n], a matching is a priority-p matching if and only if
it is rank-maximal matching w.r.t. I.
• when pj = n2n + n2(n−j) for all j ∈ [n], a matching is a priority-p matching if and
only if it is a max-cardinality rank-maximal matching w.r.t. I.
• when pj = 4n2n − 2nj−1 for all j ∈ [n], a matching is a priority-p matching if and
only if it is a fair matching w.r.t. I.
Although priorty-p matchings can potentially be defined for several values of p, here we
are interested in the three cases described above. Additionally, for ease of exposition,
we also sometimes use priority-p, where pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n] to refer to Pareto optimal
matchings. Note that this is purely for notational convenience (priority-p matching as
defined in Definition 12 is not defined when pi = pj for all i, j ∈ [n]), since the algorithms we
discuss in the context of Pareto optimal matchings are extensions to the ones for priority-p
matchings. Throughout, we use P to denote the priority vectors of interest. That is,
P = {(n2n, . . . , n2(n−j+1), . . . , n2), (n2n + n2(n−1), . . . , n2n + n2(n−j), . . . , n2n + n), (4n2n − 2,
. . . , 4n2n − 2nj−1, . . . , 4n2n − 2nn−1)}.
3The proof of this can be found in Claim 22 in Appendix C.1. Note that such observations have also
been made in previous works (e.g., see [Irv04; Irv+06; MM05; Hua+13; Mic07]), although the value of pjs
used may be different.
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4.2.2 Going beyond completely ordinal or completely cardinal al-
gorithms
Given an instance I, we are interested in deterministic algorithms A that always output a
matching that satisfies one of the economic notions defined in the previous section. However,
even when restricted to such matchings, as the example in the Introduction illustrates, there
are potentially many choices, and there might be a loss in welfare due to not accounting
for the cardinal utilities of the agents. Therefore, ideally we want our algorithm to have
small worst-case loss in welfare. Formally, for an instance I, consider the set of matchings
S ⊆ MGI such that S is the set of all Pareto optimal/rank-maximal/max-cardinality
rank-maximal/fair matchings in GI . Next, for a matching µ ∈ S, v ∈ VI , and for an edge
e = (ai, hj) ∈ µ, let value(e) = vi(hj) and SW(µ | v) =
∑
e∈µ value(e), the social welfare of
µ given the valuations v. (For notational convenience, when v is clear from the context, we
just write SW(µ) instead of SW(µ | v).) Given this, consider a deterministic algorithm A
where, for all I ∈ I, A(I) ∈ S and let L(A), which we refer to as the worst-case welfare
loss of A, be defined as below.
L(A) = max
I∈I







As mentioned above, we want algorithms A that have as small a value of L(A) as possible.
To achieve this, on the one extreme we have completely ordinal algorithms—which are
algorithms that only consider the ordinal preferences. We argue below that that any
deterministic ordinal algorithm has a very poor worst-case loss in welfare, in particular Ω(n2)
when agents have unit-sum valuations. The proof of this result appears in Appendix C.3.1.
(The corresponding result showing a bound of Ω(n) for unit-range valuations can be found
as Theorem 46 in Appendix C.3.1.)
Theorem 26. Let X denote one of the properties in the set {Pareto-optimal, rank-maximal,
max-cardinality rank-maximal, and fair}. Let A be a deterministic ordinal algorithm that
always produces a matching that satisfies property X. If there are n agents with unit-sum
valuation functions, then L(A) ∈ Ω(n2). Moreover, this bound is asymptotically tight.
At the other extreme, when we have access to all the cardinal utilities, we show (see
Theorem 27) in the next section how, for all the notions considered here, computing the
welfare-optimal matching reduces to the max-weight matching problem. Although this is
ideal, as mentioned in the Introduction, asking agents for cardinal utilities might not be
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reasonable in many situations, as this is a cognitively involved task. Therefore, in this
chapter, we aim for a middle-ground between completely ordinal and completely cardinal
algorithms. We do this by trying to get at least some information regarding the cardinal
preferences by asking the agents certain queries. In particular, we are interested in the
following type of query, which we refer to as binary threshold query.
Definition 13 (binary threshold query). For an agent ai, object hj, and a real number
tk ∈ [0, 1], a binary threshold query, denoted Q(ai, hj, tk), asks agent ai to return 1
(alternatively, asks them to say “Yes”) if vi(hj) ≥ tk, and 0 (alternatively, asks them to say
“No”) otherwise.
Given an instance I and answers to a certain number of binary threshold queries, our aim
is to design deterministic algorithms A that minimize the worst-case welfare loss L(A) and,
for all I ∈ I, produces a matching in S (i.e., A(I) ∈ S), where S is the set of all Pareto
optimal/rank-maximal/max-cardinality rank-maximal/fair matchings in GI .
Remark: Throughout this chapter, we say that, for an α ≥ 1, an algorithm A achieves an
α-approximation to the optimal social welfare among Pareto-optimal/rank-maximal/max-
cardinality rank-maximal/fair matchings if L(A) ≤ α. Also, note that although the ratio
defined in (4.1) might seem very similar to the notion of distortion that is widely used
in computational social choice literature (e.g., see [PR06; AS16]), it is important to note
that it is different. Here we are interested in algorithms that produce a matching with a
certain property (like Pareto optimality, rank-maximality, etc.) and that has social welfare
as close to the optimal welfare achievable with a matching that satisfies the same property
of interest, whereas in the context of distortion there is no such restriction. That said, it is
also worth noting that in the context of one-sided matching, an algorithm that achieves an
α-approximation to the optimal social welfare among Pareto-optimal matchings also has a
distortion of α since a welfare-optimal matching is also Pareto optimal.
4.2.3 Finding welfare-optimal priority-p matchings when utilities
are known
Before we consider the main question of this chapter, a natural question that arises is on
how to compute the welfare-optimal Pareto optimal or welfare-optimal priority-p matchings
for the priority vectors of interest, when the agents’ utilities are known. Given an instance
I = (N ,H,P) and valuation functions of the agents v = (v1, . . . , vn), where vi : H → [0, 1],
the welfare-optimal priority-p problem is to find a matching of maximum welfare among
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Input: an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)), priorities p = (p1, . . . , pn), where p ∈ P,
and v = (v1, . . . , vn), where vi : H → [0, 1]
Output: returns a welfare-optimal priority-p matching w.r.t. I
1: GI = (N ∪H, E)← graph induced by I
2: for e = (ai, hj) ∈ E do
3: r ← rank(ai, hj)
4: we ← pr + vi(hj)
5: end for
6: µ← max-weight matching in GI with weights {we}e∈E
7: return µ
Algorithm 3: returns a welfare-optimal priority-p matching.
the set of priority-p matchings. Below, we show how for all the priority vectors of interest,
computing this reduces to an instance of the max-weight matching problem on GI .
To see this, first note that finding the welfare-optimal Pareto optimal matching directly
reduces to the max-weight matching problem on GI , where the weight of an edge (ai, hj) is
vi(hj). Therefore, below we show how even the question of computing the welfare-optimal
priority-p matchings for p ∈ P reduces to the max-weight matching problem on GI .
Theorem 27. Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)), a vector of priorities
p = (p1, . . . , pn), where p ∈ P, and v = (v1, . . . , vn), where vi : H → [0, 1], Algorithm 3
returns a welfare-optimal priority-p matching w.r.t. I.
Proof. Let µ be the matching that is returned by Algorithm 3. First, we argue that µ is
a priority-p matching w.r.t. I. To do this, fix a p ∈ P, and let us suppose that µ is not
a priority-p matching, but is a max-weight matching in GI with weights {we}e∈E , where
for e = (ai, hj) and r(e) = rank(ai, hj), we = pr(e) + vi(hj) (see line 4 in Algorithm 3). Let
µ′ be a priority-p matching w.r.t. I, which by definition means that it is the max-weight
matching in GI with weights {w′e}e∈E , where w′e = pr(e). Also, for a matching µ1 ∈ MGI ,
let W [µ1] and W ′[µ1] denote the sum of the edge weights in µ1 when using weights {we}e∈E
and {w′e}e∈E , respectively.
Next, note that for any matching µ1 ∈MGI , W ′[µ1] ≤ W [µ1]. Additionally, note that, since
pj ≥ n2 for all j ∈ [n], W ′[µ′] −W ′[µ] ≥ n2. Finally, observe that, W [µ] =
∑
e∈µw(e) =∑
e∈µ pr(e) + vi(h) ≤ W ′[µ] +n < W ′[µ′] ≤ W [µ′], where the first inequality follows from the
fact that vi(·) ∈ [0, 1] and the second inequality follows since W ′[µ′]−W ′[µ] ≥ n2. However,
note that W [µ] < W [µ′] is a contradiction since µ is the max-weight matching in GI with
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weights {we}e∈E .
Given that µ is a priority-p matching, the fact that it is welfare-optimal follows since we
are computing the max-weight matching in GI and any priority-p matching µ′ ∈MGI .
4.3 Improving Welfare using Threshold Queries
In this section we look at the main question considered in this chapter, which is broadly:
how can one improve social welfare in one-sided matching problems by asking only a small
number of queries regarding cardinal utilities. As mentioned previously, we are interested in
binary threshold queries, Q(ai, hj, tk), which asks an agent ai if a particular object hj is
of value at least tk. Towards this end, we begin by considering adaptive algorithms—i.e.,
algorithms that are allowed to change its queries based on the agents’ responses to its
previous queries—and show how, when considering each of the four notions (i.e., Pareto
optimal, rank-maximal, max-cardinality rank-maximal, and fair matchings) of interest, one
can obtain a (1 + ε)-approximation to the optimal welfare among all matchings that satisfy
that notion. Following this, we look at non-adaptive algorithms, which we believe are the
more interesting and practical ones for this setting. In particular, we restrict ourselves to
algorithms that can ask at most one query per (agent, object) pair and show upper and
lower bounds on the approximation achievable. Unless explicitly specified, the results in
this section work with respect to both unit-sum and unit-range valuations.
4.3.1 Adaptive algorithm to achieve (1 + ε)-approximation
The idea in Algorithm 4 is simple. For a specific choice of c, it associates a partition of
objects with respect to every agent, where, for k ∈ [c], an object is in Eik if agent i’s value
for the object is within the interval Bk = [tk, tk−1), where tk = ( 22+ε)
k, t0 = 1, and the right
endpoint interval is closed when k = 1. Following this, for every edge e = (ai, hj) in GI , it
assigns a weight we = pr + tk, where r = rank(ai, hj), hj ∈ Eik, and tk is the left endpoint
of the interval Bk, and computes the max-weight matching on the resulting weighted graph.





, this results in an (1 + ε)-approximation algorithm
that uses O(c log n) queries per agent. In particular, this means that one can achieve a
2-approximation using O(log2 n) queries per agent.
Theorem 28. Given an ε > 0, an instance I = (N ,H,P), and a priority vector p =
(p1, . . . , pn), Algorithm 4 is an adaptive algorithm that asks O(c log n) queries per agent,
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Input: an ε > 0, an instance I = (N ,H,P), and a priority vector p = (p1, . . . , pn)
Output: returns a PO matching when pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n] and a priority-p matching when
p ∈ P






3: ti ← ( 22+ε)
i, for i ∈ [c]
4: for ai ∈ N do
5: for k ∈ [c] do
6: Eik ← {(ai, hj) ∈ E | Q(ai, hj , tk) = 1 and, if k ≥ 2,Q(ai, hj , tk−1) = 0}
7: for e = (ai, hj) ∈ Eik do
8: r ← rank(ai, hj)
9: value′(e)← tk




14: µ← max-weight matching in GI with weights {we}e∈E
15: if pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n] then
16: µ ← with µ (from line 14) as the initial endowment, run modified top-trading cycles




Algorithm 4: returns a PO matching that achieves a (1 + ε)-approximation to the optimal
social welfare among PO matchings or a priority-p matching that achieves a (1 + ε)-






, and returns a
i) Pareto optimal matching µ that achieves a (1+ε)-approximation to the optimal welfare
among all Pareto optimal matchings when pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
ii) priority-p matching µ that achieves a (1 + ε)-approximation to the optimal welfare
among all priority-p matchings when p ∈ P.
Proof. We first argue that Algorithm 4 adaptively asks O(c log n) queries per agent. To
see this, note that for each agent ai and any k ∈ [c], creating the set Eik takes O(log |Ai|)
queries. This is so because we know ai’s weak order over Ai, the set of acceptable objects
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of ai, and because we are using an adaptive algorithm, we can see the results of one query
before we ask the next. Therefore, we can perform binary search to determine the least
preferred object hjk such that vi(hjk) ∈ [tk, tk−1), where ti = ( 22+ε)
i, t0 = 1, and the right
endpoint interval is closed when k = 1 (note that there could multiple such objects since
we allow ties, but we can still do this since we have the weak order). Additionally, since,
for all k ∈ [c], tk < tk−1, it is easy to see that we can start from k = 1 and proceed to k = c
and form the sets Eik = {h ∈ H | h  hjk and, if k ≥ 2, h ≺ hjk−1}. Therefore, since we
create c sets per agent, Algorithm 4 asks O(c log n) queries per agent.
Next, we need to argue that the matching returned is Pareto optimal when pi = 0 for all
i ∈ [n] and is a priority-p matching when p ∈ P. To see this, note that in the former case,
the matching returned (see line 16 in Algorithm 4) is one that is returned by the modified
top-trading cycles (TTC) algorithm by Saban and Sethuraman [SS13, Algorithm 1, Rule
2]. Therefore, we know that it is PO [SS13, Theorem 1]. As for the case when p ∈ P, note
that the matching returned is the max-weight matching in GI with weights {we}e∈E , where
we = pr + value′(e) (see line 10). Now, since for any e ∈ E , value′(e) ∈ [0, 1], we know from
Theorem 27 that such a matching is a priority-p matching.
Finally, in order to show that the returned matching achieves a (1 + ε)-approximation to
optimal welfare among all Pareto optimal/priority-p matchings, let µ∗ be the matching that
maximizes the total welfare when true edge-weights (which in turn are the true utilities
of the agents) are known. That is, µ∗ is the max-weight matching in GI with weights
(w∗e)e∈E , where, for e = (ai, hj) ∈ E , w∗e = pr + vi(hj). By Theorem 27 we know that µ∗ is
the welfare-optimal priority-p matching when p ∈ P and it is the welfare optimal Pareto
optimal matching when pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. So, now, if µ is the matching computed by
Algorithm 4, then we need to show that SW(µ∗) ≤ (1 + ε) · SW(µ).
To see this, let us partition the edges in µ∗ into sets H and L such that H = {(ai, hj) ∈
µ∗ | vi(hj) ≥ ε2n2} and L = µ
∗ \ H. Next, note that we have chosen the value of c such
that tc ≥ ε2n2 . This in turn implies that for any k ∈ [c] and e ∈ Eik, the value assigned
to e = (ai, hj) ∈ H in the algorithm (i.e, value′(e) assigned in line 9 in Algorithm 4) is
at least tk
tk−1








· SW(µ′), where µ′ is the matching computed in
line 14 and the last inequality follows from the fact that H ⊆ E , and µ′ is the max-weight
matching in GI (see line 14).

















Next, note that for the case when p ∈ P, µ′ = µ, and since µ′ is a priority-p matching, we
have that SW(µ′) = SW(µ) ≥ 1
n
, where the inequality follows since in a priority-p matching
at least one of the agents is matched to a rank-1 object (see Claim 23 in Appendix C.1 for
a proof) and the valuations are either unit-sum or unit-range. Therefore, using this along






· SW(µ′) + n · ε
2n2
SW(µ′)
≤ 1 + ε.
For the case when pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n], note that µ is the matching that is returned by
the modified TTC algorithm by Saban and Sethuraman [SS13, Algorithm 1, Rule 2] on
initial endowments µ′. Therefore, since this matching is individually rational and PO [SS13,







· SW(µ′) + n · ε
2n2
SW(µ)
≤ 1 + ε.
where the last inequality follows from the fact that SW(µ) ≥ 1
n
, since in a Pareto optimal
matching at least one of the agents is matched to a rank-1 object (see Claim 23 in
Appendix C.1 for a proof) and the valuations are either unit-sum or unit-range.
Remark: As stated previously, an algorithm that produces a PO matching and also
achieves an α-approximation to the optimal welfare among all PO matchings has a distortion
of α, since a welfare-optimal matching is also PO. This in turn implies that, although
the objectives here and in the paper by Amanatidis et al. [Ama+21] are different, the
distortion guarantees implied by the algorithm above is similar to the one provided by
the λ-ThresholdStepFunction algorithm in their paper (which, though, even works for
unrestricted valuations, unlike the case here). Moreover, while the algorithms share some
similarities, we use a weaker query model and, most importantly, for an appropriate choice
of p, our algorithm produces a Pareto optimal or a priority-p matching.
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4.3.2 Non-adaptive algorithms: asking one query per (agent, ob-
ject) pair
In this section we turn our attention to non-adaptive algorithms, in particular looking at
algorithms that can only ask one query per (agent, object) pair and cannot change these
queries depending on the responses to previous ones. As mentioned in the Introduction, we
believe that, at least in some contexts, this is the more interesting and practical setting to
consider, since such an algorithm does not have to wait for the agents to respond and also
does not require an agent to answer multiple queries with respect to the same object—doing
which would in turn entail that the agent is somewhat sure about their cardinal utilities.
Below, we present two algorithms for when agents have unit-sum valuations, first in the
context of priority-p matchings and second for Pareto optimal matchings. The latter is an
extension of the former and since their proofs are similar, we present only the proof for
Pareto optimal matchings in the main body, relegating the one for priority-p matchings to
Appendix C.2. Informally, the main idea in the algorithm for Pareto optimal matchings
is to first carefully choose a set of values {tk}k ∈ [n] and then ask every agent ai if an
object hj of value at least tr, where r = rank(ai, hj). In particular, we set t1 = 1n1/3 and
ti =
1
min{i,n1/3}·n2/3 , for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Next, we draw a bipartite graph where there is an
edge between an agent ai and object hj, if the agent answered “Yes” w.r.t. this object; this
edge is assigned a weight tr. Following this, we find the max-weight matching in this graph.
Note that not all the agents/objects may have been matched. Therefore, we compute what
we refer to as an auxiliary matching, where the auxiliary matching is a matching that
maximizes the number of agents who are matched with an edge of rank at most b 3
√
n/2c in
the case when the max-weight matching in the previous step has no edge of rank-1 (which
happens when every agent responds “NO” to the query w.r.t. their rank-1 object), and is
the matching that maximizes the number of agents who are matched with a rank-1 edge
otherwise. Finally, we combine the max-weight matching computed in the first step with the
auxiliary matching (by adding unmatched pairs from the auxiliary one to the max-weight
one), arbitrarily match any leftover pairs, and run modified TTC algorithm by Saban and
Sethuraman [SS13, Algorithm 1, Rule 2] with the resulting matching as initial endowment.
In the theorem below, we show that this achieves an O(n2/3)-approximation to the optimal
social welfare among PO matchings.
Theorem 29. Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)), Algorithm 6 asks one non-
adaptive query per (agent, object) pair and returns a Pareto optimal matching that achieves
an O(n2/3)-approximation to the optimal welfare among all Pareto optimal matchings for
the case when agents have unit-sum valuations.
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Input: an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)) and priorities p = (p1, . . . , pn)
Output: a priority-p matching when p ∈ P
1: GI = (N ∪H, E)← graph induced by I
2: t1 ← 1n1/3
3: ti ← 1min{i,n1/3}·n2/3 , for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}
4: for e = (ai, hj) ∈ N ×H do
5: r ← rank(ai, hj)
6: if Q(ai, hj , tr) then
7: we ← pr + tr
8: else
9: we ← pr
10: end if
11: end for
12: µ← max-weight matching in GI , where weights are (we)e∈E
13: return µ
Algorithm 5: returns a priority-p matching that achieves an O(n2/3)-approximation to
the optimal social welfare among priority-p matchings for the case when the agents have
unit-sum valuations.
Before we prove this, we introduce the following notations and terminologies which will
be useful. Let µ∗ denote the matching that achieves optimal welfare among all Pareto
optimal matchings when the agents have unit-sum valuations. Let Hi denote the set of
agents who are matched to their i-th choice in µ∗ and have value at least ti for their partner
in µ∗. Similarly, let Li denote the set of agents who are matched to their i-th choice
in µ∗ and have value less than ti for their partner in µ∗. Additionally, let H = ∪ni=1Hi,
L = ∪ni=1Li, and, for some S ⊆ N , µ∗S ⊆ µ∗ be the set of edges (ai, hj) such that ai ∈ S
and (ai, hj) ∈ µ∗. Now, if SW(µS) denotes the sum of values of the edges in µS (calculated






Next, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 30. Let µMM be the matching that is computed in line 2 in Algorithm 6. Then,
SW(µ∗H) ≤ n2/3 · SW(µMM).
Proof. Note that µ∗H ⊆ E and for every e = (ai, h`j) ∈ µ∗H , where h`j is a `-th choice of
agent ai, the weight t` that is assigned to this edge in GI is at least 1n2/3 · vi(h
`
j) (and is
at most vi(h`j)). This is so because t1 =
1
n1/3
, ti = 1min{i,n1/3}·n2/3 for i ≥ 2, and vi(h
`
j) ≤ 1` ,
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Input: an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn))
Output: a Pareto optimal matching
1: µ′MM ← matching returned by Algorithm 5 on I and p = (0, . . . , 0)
2: µMM ← µ′MM \ {e ∈ µMM | we = 0} . remove edges with weight 0 from µ′MM
3: µ1MM = {(ai, hj) | (ai, hj) ∈ µMM and rank(ai, hj) = 1}
4: if |µ1MM | == 0 then
5: µ′aux ← matching in GI that maximizes the number of agents who are matched with an




7: µ′aux ← matching in GI where as many agents as possible to a rank-1 edge
8: end if
9: µaux ← µ′aux \ {(a, o) | (a, o) ∈ µ′aux and either a or o is matched in µMM}
10: µrest ← arbitrarily match the acceptable (agent, object) pairs that are not matched in
µMM ∪ µaux
11: µ ← with µMM ∪ µaux ∪ µrest as the initial endowment, run modified top-trading cycles
(TTC) algorithm by Saban and Sethuraman [SS13, Algorithm 1, Rule 2] and return the
resulting matching.
12: return µ
Algorithm 6: returns a PO matching achieves an O(n2/3)-approximation to the optimal
social welfare among PO matchings for the case when the agents have unit-sum valuations.
since the valuations are unit-sum and h`j is in the `-th choice of agent i. Combining these
two observations, we have that SW(µ∗H) =
∑
(ai,hj)∈µ∗H
vi(hj) ≤ n2/3 · SW(µMM), where the
last inequality follows by using the fact that µMM (computed in line 2) is the max-weight
matching on the graph GI , and as discussed above µ∗H ⊆ E and the edge weights in GI are
off by a factor of at most n2/3.
Equipped with this lemma, we can now prove our theorem.
Proof of Theorem 29. First, note that Algorithm 6 returns a matching µ that is Pareto
optimal since it is the matching returned by running modified TTC algorithm by Saban
and Sethuraman [SS13, Algorithm 1, Rule 2] on some initial endowments [SS13, Theorem
1]. Next, let µMM be the matching computed in line 2 in Algorithm 6, and let µ1MM ⊆ µMM
be set of edges of rank-1 in µMM . We will proceed by considering the following two cases




Case 1: |µ1MM | ≥ 1. For this case, let µ′aux be the matching in GI where as many
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agents as possible to a rank-1 edge (see line 7 in Algorithm 6) and let µaux = µ′aux \
{(a, o) | (a, o) ∈ µ′aux and either a or o is matched in µMM}. Below, we will argue that






, where X ′i is the set of edges of rank-i in µ′aux.







Proof. Consider the set of edges in X ′1, and let Xaux be the edges in X ′1 that belong to µaux
(i.e., Xaux = X ′1 ∩ µaux). By our definition of µaux, for each (ai, hj) ∈ X ′1 \Xaux, at least
one of ai or hj is matched in µMM . Therefore,
SW(µMM) + SW(µaux) ≥
|X ′1 \Xaux|
2




















unique edges in µMM and each of them have weight at least tn; the second
inequality follows because each edge in Xaux is of value at least 1n (since Xaux = X
′
1 ∩ µaux,
the valuations are unit-sum, and the agents are matched to their first choice in µaux and so
have value at least 1
n
).
Additionally, note that since |µ1MM | ≥ 1, SW(µMM) ≥ t1. Hence, combining the two













≤ |L1| · t1 + (n− |L1|) · t2
≤ |X ′1| · t1 + n · t2, (4.3)
where the first inequality uses the facts that, by the definition of Li, every agent in µ∗Li
has value less than ti for their partner and that ti ≥ tj for i ≤ j and i, j ∈ [n], and the
final inequality follows since µ′aux is a matching in GI where as many agents as possible is
matched to a rank-1 edge.
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SW(µMM) + SW(µaux) + SW(µrest)
≤ n











≤ n2/3 + 2n2/3 + n2/3. (4.4)
In the set of inequalities above, the first one follows from using Lemma 30 and (4.3); the
second inequality follows from Claim 4; the last inequality follows from our choice of t1 and
t2.
Case 2: |µ1MM | = 0. For this case, let k = b 3
√
n/2c and µ′aux be the matching in GI where
as many agents as possible to an edge of rank at most k (see line 5 in Algorithm 6) and let
µaux = µ
′
aux \ {(a, o) | (a, o) ∈ µ′aux and either a or o is matched in µMM}. Below, we will
argue that SW(µMM) + SW(µaux) ≥ |X
′|
2n
, where X ′ = ∪ki=1X ′i and X ′i is the set of edges of
rank-i in µ′aux.




Proof. Since |µ1MM | = 0, every agent values their first choice object at a value less than t1
(since otherwise |µ1MM | ≥ 1). This implies that, since their valuations are unit-sum, for
j ∈ [k], their value for a rank-j object is at least 1
2n
(see Claim 21 in Appendix C.1 for a
proof). Next, like in the proof of Claim 4, consider Xaux = µaux ∩X ′. Since for every edge
(ai, hj) ∈ X ′ \Xaux, at least one of ai or hj is matched in µMM , and every edge in µMM
has weight at least tn, we have,
SW(µMM) + SW(µaux) ≥
|X ′ \Xaux|
2


























































SW(µMM) + SW(µaux) + SW(µrest)
≤


















≤ n2/3 + 2n2/3 + 8n2/3. (4.6)
In the set of inequalities above, the first one follows from using Lemma 30 and (4.5); the sec-






(see Claim 24 in Appendix C.1 for a proof).
Finally, combining (4.4) and (4.6), and using the fact that the modified TTC algorithm by
Saban and Sethuraman [SS13, Algorithm 1, Rule 2] is individually rational [SS13, Theorem
2] (which in turn implies SW (µ) ≥ SW (µ′)), gives us our theorem.
Next, we state the following result for priority-p matchings, whose proof, as mentioned
previously, is similar the proof above and hence appears in Appendix C.2.1.
Theorem 31. Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)) and a vector of priorities
p = (p1, . . . , pn), where p ∈ P, Algorithm 5 asks one non-adaptive query per (agent, object)
and returns a priority-p matching that achieves an O(n2/3)-approximation to the optimal
welfare among all priority-p matchings for the case when agents have unit-sum valuations.
Finally, we also consider the case when agents have unit-range valuations and show how one
can obtain an O(
√
n)-approximation to the optimal social welfare among Pareto optimal
and priority-p matchings. Since the algorithms and analyses for these are somewhat similar
to the ones above, we present these results in Appendix C.3.2.1.
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4.4 Lower Bounds
Here we turn our attention to lower bounds for the case when an algorithm can ask at
most one query per (agent, object) pair—i.e., for the setting considered in Section 4.3.2.
We show that, for the unit-sum and unit-range cases, any deterministic algorithm A that
asks at most one query per (agent, object) pair and produces a Pareto-optimal/rank-
maximal/max-cardinality rank-maximal/fair matching has a worst-case welfare loss of
Ω(
√
n), i.e., L(A) ∈ Ω(
√
n).
Theorem 32. Let X denote one of the properties in the set {Pareto-optimal, rank-maximal,
max-cardinality rank-maximal, and fair}. Let A be a non-adaptive deterministic algorithm
that always produces a matching that satisfies property X and asks at most one query









and 0 ≤ r ≤ 4. Next, let us construct an
instance I with the set of agents N , where |N | = n and the set of object H, where |H| = n.
We partition the set of agents into sets B1, . . . , Bk+1 such that |Bk+1| = r and |Bi| = 5 for
all i ∈ [k]. We will refer to each Bi, where i ∈ [k], as a block. Given this, the preferences of
the agents are as defined below, where hj  H \ {hj} implies that all the objects in the set
H \ {hj} are less preferred than hj and are preferred in some arbitrary linear order (which
is the same for all the agents).
∀i ∈ [k], agents in Bi have the following preferences : h1  hi+1  H \ {h1, hi+1}
agents in Bk+1 have the following preferences : h1  hn−1  H \ {h1, hn−1}
Next, since A is a non-adaptive deterministic algorithm that asks at most one query per
(agent, object) pair, we can think of A to consist of two components—an outcome function
f which for an instance I ∈ I outputs a matching in MGI , and a |N | × |H| matrix T ,
where Tij ∈ [0, 1] represents the threshold asked to agent ai w.r.t. the object h such that
rank(ai, h) = j (i.e., if A asks the query Q(ai, hji , t), where rank(ai, h
j
i ) = j, then Tij = t).
Note that, for all i ∈ [n], depending on the values of Ti1 and Ti2, we can classify ai as
belonging to one of the following four types.
Type-1 : Ti1 ∈ [0,
1
2
), Ti2 ∈ [0,
1√
n
] Type-2 : Ti1 ∈ [
1
2




Type-3 : Ti1 ∈ [0,
1√
n
), Ti2 ∈ (
1√
n
, 1] Type-4 : Ti1 ∈ [
1√
n





Also, note that, for i ∈ [k], since each block Bi has 5 agents, at least two of them will
be classified as the same type (where types are as defined above). For each block Bi and
j ∈ [4], we say that Bi is a Type-j block if there are at least two agents such that both are
of Type-j and for every 1 ≤ k < j, there is at most one agent of Type-k. We use nj to
denote the number of Type-j blocks, and hence have that
∑
j∈[4] nj = k. Additionally, for a
Type-j block Bi, we let a2i−1 and a2i to denote the two agents who are of Type-j in Bi (if
there are more than two such agents, consider any two of them and denote them as a2i−1
and a2i) and say that a2i−1 and a2i are the special agents in Bi.
As a final step before proving the theorem, we need to define a set of valuation profiles that
are consistent with the preferences mentioned above. Our objective will be to show that
there is at least one valuation profile in this set which achieves the desired bound on L(A).
So, to do this, let us first define the following unit-sum utility functions,4
u0 = (c
2




1 − c2ε, . . . , c21 − c2ε)
u1 = (1− c1, c1, 0, . . . , 0) u2 = (1/2 + ε, 1/2− ε, 0, . . . , 0)
u3 = (1/2− c1 − ε, c1 + ε, c2, . . . , c2) u4 = (1/4 + ε, 1/4− ε, c2, . . . , c2)
u5 = (1− c21, c21, 0 . . . , 0) u6 = (1− c1 + ε, c1 − ε, 0, . . . , 0)
u7 = (c1 − c21, c21, c3, . . . , c3) u8 = (3c1/4, c1/4, c3, . . . , c3),
where uj = (x1, x2, x3 . . . , x3) implies that they value their most preferred object at x1,
second most preferred object at x2, and every other object at x3, ε > 0 is a very small real
number (ε < 1/n4 will suffice), c1 = 1√n , c2 =
1
2(n−2) , and c3 =
1−c1
n−2 . Given this, consider
the following set of valuation profiles VI , all of which are consistent with the preferences in
I and where each of them is defined the following way.
i) for i ∈ [k], j ∈ [4], and special agents a2i−1 and a2i in Bi, where Bi is a Type-j block,
let one of the agents have utility function u2j−1 and the other have u2j.
ii) let the agents in N \ {a1, . . . , a2k} have utility function u0.
Note that the only difference between valuation profiles in VI is w.r.t. the utility functions
of the special agents. Additionally, note that for each v ∈ VI and for each Type-j block
Bi, the utility functions, u2j−1 and u2j, of the special agents have been defined in such a
way that they will respond identically to the queries in T . This can be seen by considering
Table 4.3 which shows how for all j ∈ [4], the special agents of a Type-j block will respond
4Note that in each of these valuations, objects 3 to n have been given the same value. This is purely
for ease of exposition. To ensure that no two objects have the same value, we can just perturb the values
slightly.
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Response to Q(·, ·, Ti1) Response to Q(·, ·, Ti2)
special agents in a Type-1 block
(assigned u1 and u2)
Yes Yes
special agents in a Type-2 block
(assigned u3 and u4)
No Yes
special agents in a Type-3 block
(assigned u5 and u6)
Yes No
special agents in a Type-4 block
(assigned u7 and u8)
No No
Table 4.3: Responses of the special agents in a Type-j block to queries Q(·, ·, Ti1) or
Q(·, ·, Ti2)
to queries Q(·, ·, Ti1) or Q(·, ·, Ti2), and by observing that utility functions u2j−1 and u2j
have the same values for all objects except the two most preferred ones.
Now, equipped with all of the above, let us first argue about the welfare-optimal matching
that satisfies property X. To do this, consider any v ∈ VI and consider the matching µ∗
of size n where in each Type-j block Bi, the special agent with utility function u2j gets
hi+1 (so they all get their second most preferred object), if |Bk+1| > 0, then one of the
agents in Bk+1 gets hn−1, and the rest of the objects are allocated arbitrarily. From the way
the preferences of the agents are defined, it is easy to verify that such a matching satisfies
property X. Also, if Z = n− 2
∑
j∈[4] nj, then from the definition of utility functions u2j
for all j ∈ [4], and since the utility of matching h1 and all other objects to some agent is at
least (c21 + ε/2) and (c21 − c2ε), respectively, we have that,







≥ (c21 + ε/2) + (n1 + n2 + n3 + n4)
c1
4






where the last inequality follows since n = 5k+ r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 4, implies k =
∑
j∈[4] nj =
bn/5c, and n ≥ 18.
Finally, consider A and let µ be the matching returned by A for the instance I when agents
are asked queries in T . Next, we adversarially pick a v ∈ VI the following way:
i) for i ∈ [k], if Bi is a Type-j block for some j ∈ [4] and if µ(a2i−1) = hi+1, then
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consider valuation profile in VI where a2i−1 has utility function u2j−1
ii) for i ∈ [k], if Bi is a Type-j block for some j ∈ [4] and if µ(a2i) = hi+1, then consider
valuation profile in VI where a2i has utility function u2j−1
Given such a v ∈ VI , we can now calculate SW(µ). And for this, observe that from the
definition of utility functions u2j−1 for j ∈ [4], and since the utility of matching h1 and all
other objects to some agent is at most 1 and c21, respectively, we have that,
SW(µ) ≤ 1 + c1n1 + (c1 + ε)n2 + c21n3 + c21n4 + c21Z





n1 + (1/4− ε)n2 +
c1
4
n3 + (c1 − ε)n4
)






SW(µ∗). (using (4.7) and (4.8)) (4.9)






, or in other words that, L(A) ∈ Ω(
√
n).
Finally, we also consider the unit-range case and show that any deterministic algorithm
that asks at most one query per (agent, object) pair and produces a Pareto-optimal/rank-
maximal/max-cardinality rank-maximal/fair matching has L(A) ∈ Ω(
√
n). The proof of
this appears in C.3.2.2 and is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 32, with the main
difference being in the way utility functions u0, u1, . . . , u8 in the proof are defined.
4.5 Discussion
The focus of this chapter was on one-sided matching problems. While the usual assumption
in such problems is that agents only submit ordinal preferences, it is not hard to imagine
scenarios where agents might have some cardinal preferences which, for instance, indicate
that they like object h1 much more than object h2. Although ignoring this information
can lead to a lose in welfare, asking the agents for their cardinal utilities is not ideal, since
determining their exact utilities can be a cognitively-involved task. Therefore, in this
chapter we investigated the benefit of eliciting a small amount of extra information about
agents’ cardinal utilities. In particular, we designed algorithms that used simple threshold
queries and returned a matching satisfying some desirable matching property, while also
achieving a good approximation to the optimal welfare among all matchings satisfying
that property. Overall, our results show how even asking agents for just one bit of extra
information per object can improve welfare.
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There are a number of future research directions that this work can take. First, the model
in this chapter assumes that each agent needs to be matched to at most one object and that
each object can be matched to at most one agent. However, there are several situations
where more than one agent can be matched to the same object, like when assigning students
to courses or schools. While our results do not directly hold when each object hj has a
capacity constraint cj , only minimal modifications are needed. In particular, every time we
construct a graph in any of the algorithms, all that needs to be done is to create cj copies for
the node that corresponds to object hj . Other open algorithmic problems include addressing
the gap between the upper and lower bounds for the non-adaptive algorithms, expanding
the set of properties of interest to include, for example, popular matchings [Abr+07], or
asking similar questions in the context of two-sided matching problems.
More broadly, a particularly interesting direction is to better understand the implications
of deploying such an approach in practice. As mentioned in the introduction, we believe
that in many settings non-adaptive algorithms that only ask the agents for a few number of
queries with respect to an object might be the most practical approach to pursue, since it
involves minimal communication overhead. Moreover, deploying something like that seems
easier since the only change that needs to be made to the existing system which asks for
ordinal preferences is to add checkboxes with respect to an object and the corresponding
threshold queries. Nevertheless, there are still challenges to make this truly useful. A
careful reader would have noticed that the thresholds used in our algorithms are very
specific values (like 1/n1/3), which may not be easy to answer. While one potential way to
mitigate some of this difficulty is by multiplying all the threshold values by a large enough
constant so as to make them easier to comprehend, it’s not clear if that would be enough.
Therefore, it might be useful to have studies to better understand the kinds of queries that
are easier to answer and the types of interface-design that can best support queries, as well
as better understand what matching properties are deemed to be most important by users
and designers of systems.
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Part II




Algorithmic Stability in Fair Allocation
of Indivisible Goods
5.1 Introduction
Until now all the chapters in this thesis dealt with situations where agents submit incomplete
preferences. However, there are many scenarios where it is assumed, and in fact expected,
that the agents provide complete preferences. For example, the assumption that agents
have complete cardinal preferences is crucial in the rent-division setting [Gal+17] and is
typical in the vast literature on fair allocation of both divisible [BT96b] and indivisible
goods [Lip+04]. While one could argue that assuming cardinal preferences is reasonable
in such contexts, there is still the question on how to deal with agents who may not be
completely aware of their preferences. In this chapter we deal with this broad question.
Informally, we look at how to account for agents who, when asked to provide cardinal
preferences, and owing to the fact that they are not precisely aware of their preferences,
may report their preferences inaccurately.
We study this question in the context of fair allocation of indivisible goods where there are
m indivisible goods that need to be fairly (for some notion of fairness) divided amongst
n ≥ 2 agents. Each agent is assumed to have a valuation function which assigns a value for
each good and typically it is assumed that the valuation functions are additive—meaning
that the value of a set of goods is the sum of values of the individual goods in the set. A
popular algorithm for this problem is the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution which













(5.1b) Instance where agent A makes minor
mistakes
EF1 [Car+16]. Informally, in an allocation that satisfies EF1 an agent i does not envy agent
j after she removes some good from j’s bundle, whereas Pareto optimality of an allocation
implies that there is no other allocation where every agent receives at least as much utility
and at least one of the agents strictly more. Given our current state of knowledge on fair
and efficient allocations, the MNW solution essentially provides the best-known guarantees.
However, as we will soon see, there is at least one aspect with respect to which it is lacking.
The issue we will discuss is not specific to MNW but is something that can be raised
with respect to different algorithms that assume access to cardinal preferences in different
settings. Nevertheless, we use MNW here since our motivation to look at this issue stemmed
from observing examples on Spliddit (www.spliddit.org), a popular fair division website
which uses the MNW solution [GP15].
To illustrate our concern, consider an example with two agents (A and B) and four goods
(g1, . . . , g4). As mentioned above, the agents have additive valuations and their values for
the goods are in Table 5.1a. Spliddit uses the MNW solution to compute an EF1 and PO
allocation for this instance, and it returns one where agent A receives {g2, g4} and agent B
receives {g1, g3}. What if, however, agent A made a minor ‘mistake’ while reporting the
values and instead reported the values in Table 5.1b? Note that the two valuations are
almost identical, with the value of each good being off by at most 2. Therefore, intuitively,
it looks like we would, ideally, like to have similar outputs—and more so since the allocation
for the original instance satisfies EF1 and PO even with respect to this new instance.
However, does the MNW solution do this? No, and in fact the allocation returned in this
case is one where agent A gets g4 alone and agent B gets the rest. This in turn implies
that agent A is losing roughly 38% of their utility for the ‘mistake’, which seems highly
undesirable.
The example described above is certainly not one-off, and in fact we will show later how
there are far worse examples for different fair division algorithms. More broadly, we believe
that this is an issue that can arise in many problems where the inputs are assumed to be
cardinal values. After all, it is not hard to imagine scenarios where many of us may find it
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hard to convert our preferences to precise numerical values. Now, of course, it is easy to
see that if we insist on resolving this issue completely—meaning, if we insist that the agent
making the ‘mistake’ should not experience any change in their outcome—then it cannot
be done in any interesting way as long as we allow the ‘mistakes’ to be arbitrary and also
insist that the algorithm be deterministic.1 However, it is possible to impose some structure
on the ‘mistakes’ made by agents. For example, in many settings, it might be reasonable to
assume that agents are able to, at a minimum, maintain the underlying ordinal structure
of their preferences. That is, if an agent considers good g to be the r-th highest valued
good according to their true preference, then this information is also maintained in the
‘mistake’. Note that this is indeed the case in the example above, and so, more broadly, this
is the setting we consider. Our goal in this chapter is to try and address the issue that we
observe in the example, and intuitively we want to design algorithms where an agent does
not experience a large change in their utility as long as their report is only off by a little.
Before we make this more concrete, a reader who is familiar with the algorithmic game
theory (AGT) literature might have the following question: “Why not just consider ordinal
algorithms?” After all, these algorithms will have the property mentioned above when the
underlying ordinal information is maintained, and moreover there is a body of literature
that focuses on designing algorithms that only use ordinal information and still provide good
guarantees with respect to the underlying cardinal values (e.g., see [Bou+15; AS16; AZ17;
GKM17; AA18]). Additionally, and more specifically in the context of fair allocations, there
is also a line of work that considers ordinal algorithms [BEL10; BKK14; Azi+15; SAH17].
While this is certainly a reasonable approach, there are a few reasons why this is inadequate:
i) Constraining algorithms to use only ordinal information might be too restrictive. In fact,
this is indeed the case here since we show that there are no ordinal algorithms that are
EF1 and even approximately PO. Additionally, assuming that the agents only have ordinal
preferences might be too pessimistic in certain situations. ii) There are systems like Spliddit
that are used in practice and which explicitly elicit cardinal preferences, and so we believe
that the approach here will be useful in such settings.
Given this, we believe that there is need for a new notion to address this issue. We term this
stability, and informally our notion of stability captures the idea that the utility experienced
by an agent should not change much as long as they make “small” or “innocuous” mistakes
when reporting their preferences.2 Although the general idea of algorithmic stability is
certainly not new (see Section 5.3 for a discussion), to best of our knowledge, the notion
1Although there is work on randomized fair allocations (e.g., [BM01; Bud+13]), as pointed out by
Caragiannis et al. [Car+16], randomization is not appropriate for many practical fair division settings
where the outcomes are just used once.
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of stability we introduce here (formally defined in Section 5.2.1) has not been previously
considered. Therefore, we introduce this notion in the context of problems where cardinal
preferences are elicited, and explicitly advocate for it to be considered during algorithm or
mechanism design. This in turn constitutes what we consider as the main contribution of
this chapter. We believe that if the algorithms for fair division—and in fact any problem
where cardinal preferences are elicited—are to be truly useful in practice they need to have
some guarantees on stability, and so towards this end we consider the problem of designing
stable algorithms in the context of fair allocation of indivisible goods among two agents.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We begin by formally defining the notion
of stability and show how one cannot hope for stable algorithms that are EF1 and even
approximately PO. As a result, we propose two relaxations, namely, approximate-stability
and weak-approximate-stability, and show how existing algorithms that are fair and efficient
perform poorly even in terms of these relaxations. This implies that one has to design new
algorithms, and towards this end we present a simple, albeit exponential, algorithm for two
agents that is approximately-stable and that guarantees pairwise maximin share (PMMS)
and PO allocation; the algorithm is based on a general characterization result for PMMS
allocations which we believe might be of independent interest. Finally, we show how a small
change to the existing two-agent fair division algorithms can get us weak-approximate-
stability along with the properties that these algorithms otherwise satisfy.
5.2 Preliminaries
Let [n] = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents and G = {g1, . . . , gm} denote the set of
indivisible goods that needs to divided among these agents. Throughout, we assume that
every agent i ∈ [n] has an additive valuation function vi : 2G → Z≥0,3 where V denotes the
set of all additive valuation functions, vi(∅) = 0, and additivity implies that for a S ⊆ G
(which we often refer to as a bundle), vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi({g}). For ease of notation, we often
2In the AGT literature, the term stability is usually used in the context of stable algorithms in two-sided
matching [GS62]. In fact, this is also the case in Chapter 2 where we talk about stability in two-sided
matching. Additionally, the same term is used in many different contexts in the computer science literature
broadly (e.g., in learning theory, or when talking about, say, stable sorting algorithms). Our choice of the
term stability here stems from the usage of this term in learning theory (see Section 5.3 for an extended
discussion) and therefore should not be confused with the notion of stability in two-sided matching.
3We assume valuations are integers to model practical deployment of fair division algorithms (e.g.,
adjusted winner protocol, Spliddit). All the results hold even if we assume that the valuations are
non-negative real numbers.
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omit {g} and instead just write it as vi(g). We also assume throughout that ∀i ∈ [n],
vi(G) = T for some T ∈ Z+, and that ∀g ∈ G, vi(g) > 0. Although the assumption that
agents have positive value for a good may not be valid in certain situations, in Section 5.2.2
we argue why this is essential in order to obtain anything interesting in context of our
problem. Finally, for S ⊆ G and k ∈ [n], we use Πk(S) to denote the set of ordered
partitions of S into k bundles, and for an allocation A ∈ Πn(G), where A = (A1, . . . , An),
use Ai to denote the bundle allocated to agent i.
We are interested in deterministic algorithms M : Vn → Πn(G) that produce fair and
efficient (i.e., Pareto optimal) allocations. For i ∈ [n] and a profile of valuation functions
(vi, v−i) ∈ Vn, we use vi(M(vi, v−i)) to denote the utility that i obtains from the allocation
returned byM. Pareto optimality and the fairness notions considered are defined below.
Definition 14 (β-Pareto optimality (β-PO)). Given a β ≥ 1, an allocation A ∈ Πn(G) is
β-Pareto optimal if
∀A′ ∈ Πn(G) : (∃i ∈ [n], vi(A′i) > β · vi(Ai))⇒ (∃j ∈ [n], vj(A′i) < vj(Aj)) .
In words, an allocation is β-Pareto-optimal if no agent can be made strictly better-off by
a factor of β without making another agent strictly worse-off; Pareto optimality refers to
the special case when β = 1. For allocations A,A′, we say that A′ β-Pareto dominates A if
every agent receives at least as much utility in A′ as in A and at least one agent is strictly
better-off by a factor of β in A′.
We consider several notions of fairness, namely, pairwise maximin share (PMMS), envy-
freeness up to least positively valued good (EFX), and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1).
Among these, the main notion we talk about here (and design algorithms for) is PMMS,
which is the strongest and which implies the other two notions. Informally, an allocation A
is said to be a PMMS allocation if every agent i is guaranteed to get a bundle Ai that she
values more than the bundle she receives when she plays cut-choose with any other agent j
(i.e., she partitions the combined bundle of her allocation and the allocation Aj of j and
receives the one she values less).
Definition 15 (pairwise maximin share (PMMS)). An allocation A ∈ Πn(G) is a pairwise
maximin share (PMMS) allocation if
∀i,∀j ∈ [n] : vi(Ai) ≥ max
B∈Π2(Ai∪Aj)
min{vi(B1), vi(B2)}.
Next, we define EFX and EF1, which as mentioned above are weaker than PMMS.
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Definition 16 (envy free up to any positively valued good (EFX)). An allocation A ∈ Πn(G)
is envy-free up to any positively valued good (EFX) if
∀i, ∀j ∈ [n],∀g ∈ Aj with vi(g) > 0 : vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
In words, an allocation is said to be EFX if agent i is no longer envious after removing any
positively valued good from agent j’s bundle.
Definition 17 (envy free up to one good (EF1)). An allocation A ∈ Πn(G) is envy-free up
to one good (EF1) if
∀i, ∀j ∈ [n],∃g ∈ Aj : vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {g}).
In words, an allocation is said to be EF1 if agent i is no longer envious after removing some
good from agent j’s bundle.
In addition to the requirement that the algorithms be fair and efficient, we would also
ideally like it to be stable. We define the notion of stability (and its relaxations) in the
next section.
5.2.1 Stability
At a high-level, our notion of stability captures the idea that an agent should not experience
a large change in utility as long as they make “small” or “innocuous” mistakes while
reporting their preferences. Naturally, a more formal definition requires us to first define
what constitutes a ‘mistake’ and what we mean by “small” or “innocuous” mistakes in the
context of fair division. So, below, for an i ∈ [n], vi ∈ V , and α > 0, we define what we refer
to as α-neighbours of vi. According to this definition, the closer α is to zero, the “smaller”
is the ‘mistake’, since smaller values of α indicate that agent i’s report v′i (which in turn is
the ‘mistake’) is closer to their true valuation function vi.
Definition 18 (α-neighbours of vi (α-N(vi))). For i ∈ [n], T ∈ Z+, α > 0, and vi ∈ V,




′(g) = T (i.e., vi(G) = v′i(G)),
• ∀g,∀g′ ∈ G, v(g) ≥ v(g′) ⇔ v′(g) ≥ v′(g′) (i.e., the ordinal information over the
singletons is maintained), and
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• ‖v′i − vi‖1 =
∑
g∈G |v′(g)− v(g)| ≤ α.4
Throughout, we often refer to the valuation function vi of agent i as its true valuation
function or true report and, for some α > 0, v′i ∈ α-N(vi) as its mistake or misreport. Note
that although true valuation function, true report, and misreport are terms one often finds
in the mechanism design literature which considers strategic agents, we emphasize that here
we are not talking about strategic agents, but about agents who are just unsophisticated in
the sense that they are unable to accurately convert their preferences into cardinal values.
Also, although we write α > 0, it should be understood that in the context of our results
here, since the valuation functions of the agents are integral, the only valid values of α are
when it is an integer. We use this notation for ease of exposition and because all our results
hold even if we instead use real-valued valuations.
Now that we know what constitutes a mistake, we can define our notion of stability.
Definition 19 (α-stable algorithm). For α > 0, an algorithmM is said to be α-stable if
∀i ∈ [n],∀vi, ∀v−i, and ∀v′i ∈ α-N(vi),
vi (M(vi, v−i)) = vi (M(v′i, v−i)) . (5.1)
In words, for an α > 0, an algorithm is said to be α-stable if for every agent i ∈ [n] with
valuation function vi and all possible reports of the other agents, the utility agent i obtains
is the same when reporting vi and v′i.Given the definition above, we have the following for
what it means for an algorithm to be stable.
Definition 20 (stable algorithm). An algorithmM is stable if it is α-stable for all α > 0.
Although the “for all” in the definition above might seem like a strong requirement at first
glance, it is not, for one can easily show that the following observation holds.
Observation 1. An algorithmM is stable if and only if there exists an α > 0 such that
M is α-stable.
Proof. The forward part (i.e., the ‘if’ part) is obvious since by definition an algorithm is
stable if it is α-stable for all α > 0. To see the ‘only if’ part, let us assume that M is
α-stable for some α > 0. Next, for an arbitrary α′ 6= α, let us consider an arbitrary agent
4We present our results using the L1-norm, although qualitatively they do not change if we use, say,
the L∞-norm.
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i1 ∈ [n], an arbitrary vi1 , an arbitrary v′i1 ∈ α
′-N(vi1), and arbitrary reports of the other
agents denoted by v−i1 .
First, note that for any α′ < α, we have that
v′i1 ∈ α
′-N(vi1)⇒ v′i1 ∈ α-N(vi1),
which in turn implies thatM is α′-stable since it is α-stable.
Next, let us consider an α′ > α. Now, observe that we can construct a (finite) series of
valuations functions vi2 , . . . , vin , where for all j ∈ [n], vij+1 ∈ α-N(vij ) and where vin+1 = v′i1 .
This along with the fact thatM is α-stable implies that, for all j ∈ [n],
vi1(M(vij , v−i1)) = vi1(M(vij+1 , v−i1)).
So, using the equalities above, we have,
vi1(M(vi1 , v−i1)) = vi1(M(vin+1 , v−i1)) = vi1(M(v′i1 , v−i1)),
thus proving thatM is α′-stable.
It is important to note that the definition for an α-stable algorithm is only saying that
the utility agent i obtains (and not the allocation itself) when moving from vi to v′i is
the same. Additionally, although the notion of stability in general may look too strong,
it is important to note that there are several algorithms (e.g., the well-known EF1 draft
mechanism [Car+16]) that satisfy this definition. In particular, one can immediately see
from the definition of stability that every ordinal fair division algorithm—i.e., an algorithm
that produces the same output for input profiles (v1, . . . , vn) and (v′1, . . . , v′n) as long as
∀g, g′ ∈ G, vi(g) ≥ vi(g′)⇔ v′i(g) ≥ v′i(g′)—is stable.
However, in general, and as we will see in Section 5.4.2, the equality in (5.1) can be too
strong a requirement. Therefore, in the next section we propose two relaxations to the
strong requirement of stability.
5.2.1.1 Approximate notions of stability
We first introduce the weaker relaxation which we refer to as weak-approximate-stability.
Informally, weak-approximate-stability basically says that the utility that an agent experi-
ences as a result of reporting a neighbouring instance is not too far away from the what
would have been achieved if the reports were exact.
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Definition 21 ((ε, α)-weakly-approximately-stable algorithm). For an α > 0 and ε ≥ 1,








Although the definition above might seem like a natural relaxation of the notion of stability,
as it will become clear soon, it is a bit weak. Therefore, below we introduce the stronger
notion which we refer to as approximate-stability. However, before this, we introduce the
following, which, for a given valuation function v, defines the set, equiv(v), of valuation
functions v′ such that the ordinal information over the bundles is the same in both v and v′.
Definition 22 (equiv(v)). For a valuation function v : 2G → Z≥0, equiv(v) refers to the
set of all valuation functions v′ such that for all S1, S2 ⊆ G,
v(S1) ≥ v(S2)⇔ v′(S1) ≥ v′(S2).
In words, equiv(v) refers to set all of valuation functions v′ such that v and v′ induce the
same weak order over the set of all bundles (i.e., over the set 2G). Throughout, for an i ∈ [n],
we say that two instances (or profiles) (vi, v−i) and (v′i, v−i) are equivalent if v′i ∈ equiv(vi).
Also, we say that vi and v′i are ordinally equivalent if v′i ∈ equiv(vi).
Equipped with this notion, we can now define approximate-stability. Informally, an algorithm
is approximately-stable if it is weakly-approximately-stable and if with respect to every
instance that is equivalent to the true reports, it is stable.
Definition 23 ((ε, α)-approximately-stable algorithm). For an α > 0 and ε ≥ 1, an
algorithmM is said to be (ε, α)-approximately-stable if ∀i ∈ [n],∀vi, ∀v−i,
• ∀v′i ∈ equiv(vi), vi (M(vi, v−i)) = vi (M(v′i, v−i)), and
• M is (ε, α)-weakly-approximately-stable.
Note that when ε = 1 the definitions for both the relaxations (i.e., weak-approximate-stability
and approximate-stability) collapse to the one for α-stable algorithms. Also, throughout, we
say that an algorithm is ε-approximately-stable for α ≤ K if it is (ε, α)-approximately-stable
for all α ∈ (0, K] (similarly for ε-weakly-stable).
Although the definition of approximate-stability might be seem a bit contrived at first
glance, it is important to note that this is not the case. The requirement that the algorithm
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be stable on equivalent instances is natural because of the following observation which states
that with respect to all the notions that we talk about here any algorithm that satisfies
such a notion can always output the same allocation for two instances that are equivalent.5
Observation 2. Let P be a property that is one of EF1, EFX, PMMS, or PO. For all
i ∈ [n], if an allocation (A1, . . . , An) satisfies property P with respect to the profile (vi, v−i),
then (A1, . . . , An) also satisfies property P with respect to the profile (v′i, v−i), where
v′i ∈ equiv(vi).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary agent i ∈ [n], and recall from Definition 22 that for any
v′i ∈ equiv(vi), and for any two sets S1, S2 ⊆ G, v′i(S1) ≥ v′i(S2) if and only vi(S1) ≥ vi(S2).
Given this, the observation follows by using the definitions of the stated properties.
5.2.2 Some Q & A on assumptions and definitions
Why the assumption of positive values for the goods? To see why we make this
assumption, consider the fair division instance in Table 5.2a. Next, consider an arbitrary
algorithmM that is EF1 and PO, and let us assume w.l.o.g. that the allocation returned
by the algorithm is ({g2}, {g1}). Now, let us consider the instance in Table 5.2b. Note that
sinceM returns an allocation that is PO and EF1, therefore the output with respect to








(5.2b) Instance where agent A makes a mistake
Given this, consider a scenario where the valuation function mentioned in Table 5.2a is
the true valuation (v1) of agent A. When reporting correctly, she receives the good g2.
Table 5.2b shows agent A’s misreport (v′1), where α = 2 and in which case she receives the







= 0, and both of these are not informative or useful.
Is there any direct connection by the notion of stability and strategyproofness?
At first glance, the definition of stable algorithms (or its relaxations defined in Section 5.2.1.1)
5Note that Observation 2 is only valid for the exact versions of these notions and not for their
approximate counterparts.
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might seem very similar to the definition for (approximately) strategyproof algorithms (i.e.,
algorithms where truthful reporting is an (approximately) weakly-dominant strategy for all
the agents). Although there is indeed some similarity, it is important to note that these
are different notions and neither does one imply the other. For instance, there is a stable
algorithm that is EF1 (one can easily see that the well-known EF1 draft algorithm [Car+16,
Sec. 3] is stable), but there is no strategyproof algorithm that is EF1 [Ama+17, App. 4.6].
5.3 Related Work
Now that we have defined our notion, we can better discuss related work. There are several
lines of research that are related to the topic of this chapter. Some of the connections we
discuss are in very different contexts and are by themselves very active areas of research.
In such cases we only provide some pointers to the relevant literature.
Connections to algorithmic stability, differential privacy, and algorithmic fair-
ness. Algorithmic stability captures the idea of stability by employing the principle that
the output of an algorithm should not “change much” when a “small change” is made to
the input. To the best of our knowledge, notions of stability have not been considered in
the computational social choice/algorithmic game theory literature. However, the compu-
tational learning theory literature has considered various notions of stability and has, for
instance, used them to draw connections between the stability of a learning algorithm and
its ability to generalize (e.g., [BE02; Sha+10]). Although the notion of stability here is
based on the same principle, it is defined differently from the ones in this literature. Here
we are concerned about the change in utility than an agent experiences when she perturbs
her input and deem an algorithm to be approximately-stable if this change is small.
Algorithmic stability can in turn be connected to differential privacy [Dwo+06; Dwo06].
Informally, differential privacy (DP) requires that the probability of an outcome does not
“change much” on “small changes” to the input. Therefore, essentially, DP can be considered
as a notion of algorithmic stability, albeit a very strong one as compared to the ones studied
in the learning theory literature (see the discussion in [Dwo+15, Sec. 1.4]) and the one we
consider. In particular, if we were considering randomized algorithms, it is indeed the case
that an ε-differentially private algorithm is exp(ε)-stable, just like how an ε-differentially
private algorithm is a (exp(ε)− 1)-dominant strategy mechanism [MT07]. Nevertheless, we
believe that the notion we introduce here is independently useful, and is different from DP
in a few ways. First, the motivation is completely different. We believe that our notion may
be important even in situations where privacy is not a concern. Second, in this chapter
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we are only concerned with deterministic algorithms and one can easily see that DP is
too strong a notion for this case as there are no deterministic and differentially private
algorithms that have a range of at least two.
Finally, the literature on algorithmic (individual-based) fairness captures the idea of fairness
by employing the principle that “similar agents” should be “treated similarly” [Dwo+12].
Although this notion is employed in contexts where one is talking about two different
individuals, note that one way to think of our stability requirement is to think of it as a
fairness requirement where two agents are considered similar if and only if they have similar
inputs (i.e., say, if one’s input is a perturbation of the other’s). Therefore, thinking this
way, algorithmic fairness can be considered as a generalization of stability, and just like DP
it is much stronger and only applicable in randomized settings. In fact, algorithmic fairness
can be seen as a generalization of DP (see the discussion in [Dwo+12, Sec. 2.3]) and so our
argument above as to why our notion is useful is relevant even in this case.
Connections to robust algorithm and mechanism design. Informally, an algorithm
is said to be robust if it “performs-well” even under “slightly different” inputs or if the
underlying model is different from the one the designer has access to. This notion has
received considerable amount of attention in the algorithmic game theory and social choice
literature. For instance—and although this line of work does not explicitly term their
algorithms as “(approximately) robust”—the flurry of work that takes the implicit utilitarian
view considers scenarios where the agents have underlying cardinal preferences but only
provide ordinal preferences to the designer. The goal of the designer in these settings is to
then use these ordinal preferences in order obtain an algorithm or mechanism that “performs
well” (in the approximation sense, with respect to some objective function) with respect
to all the possible underlying cardinal preferences (e.g., [Bou+15; AS16; AZ17; GKM17;
AA18]). Additionally, and more explicitly, robust algorithm design has been considered,
for instance, in the context of voting (e.g., [SYE13; Bre+17]) and the stable marriage
problem [ML18; MV18; CSS19], and robust mechanism design has been considered in the
context of auctions [CMA12; CMA14; CMA15] and facility location [ML19]. Although,
intuitively, the concepts of robustness and stability might seem quite similar, it is important
to note that they are different. Stability requires that the outcome of an algorithm does
not “change much” if one of the agents slightly modifies its input. Therefore, the emphasis
here is to make sure that the outcomes are not very different as long as there is a small
change to the input associated with one of the agents. Robustness, on the other hand,
requires the outcome of an algorithm to remain “good” (in the approximation sense) even if
the underlying inputs are different from what the algorithm had access to. Therefore, in
this case the emphasis is on making sure that the same output (i.e., one that is computed
with the input the algorithm has access to) is not-too-bad with respect to a set of possible
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underlying true inputs (but ones the algorithm does not have access to). More broadly, one
can think of robustness as a feature that a designer aspires to to ensure that the outcome
of their algorithm is not-too-bad even if the model assumed, or the input they have access
to, is slightly inaccurate, whereas stability in the context that we use here is more of a
feature that is in service of unsophisticated agents who are prone to making mistakes when
converting their preferences to cardinal values.
Related work on fair division of indivisible goods. The problem of fairly allocating
indivisible goods has received considerable attention, with several works proposing different
notions of fairness [Lip+04; Bud11; Car+16] and computing allocations that satisfy these
notions, sometimes along with some efficiency requirements [Car+16; BKV18; PR18;
CGH19]. Our focus in this chapter is also on the problem of computing fair and efficient
allocations, but in contrast to previous work our focus is on coming up with algorithms
that are also (approximately) stable. While many of these papers address the general case
of n ≥ 2 agents, the results here are restricted to the case of two agents.
Although a restricted case, the two agent case is an important one and has been explicitly
considered in several previous works [BKK12; Ram13; BKK14; VK14; Azi15; PR18]. Among
these, the work that is most relevant to our results here is that of Ramaekers [Ram13].
In particular, and although the results here we derived independently, Ramaekers’s paper
contains two results that are similar to the ones we have here—first, a slightly weaker version
of the n = 2 case of Theorem 34, and second, a slightly weaker version of Theorem 35. The
exact differences are outlined in Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 since we need to introduce a few
more notions to make them clear.
In addition to the papers mentioned above—all of which adopt the model as in this chapter
where the assumption is that the agents have cardinal preferences—there is also work that
considers the case when agents have ordinal preferences [BEL10; BKK14; Azi+15; SAH17].
Although this line of work is related in that ordinal algorithms are stable, it is also quite
different since usually the goal in these papers is to compute fair allocations if they exist or
study the complexity of computing notions like possibly-fair or necessarily-fair allocations.
5.4 Approximate-Stability in Fair Allocation of Indivis-
ible Goods
Our aim is to design (approximately) stable algorithms for allocating a set of indivisible









(5.3b) Instance where agent A makes a mistake
optimal (PO) allocations. However, before we try to design new algorithms, the first
question that arises is: How do the existing algorithms fare? How stable are they? We
address this below.
5.4.1 How (approximately) stable are the existing algorithms?
We consider the following well-studied algorithms that guarantee PO and at least EF1.
(We refer the reader to Appendix D.1 for brief descriptions of these algorithms.)
i) Adjusted winner protocol [BT96a; BT96b]; returns an EF1 and PO allocation for two
agents.
ii) Leximin solution [PR18]; returns a PMMS and PO allocation for two agents.
iii) Maximum Nash Welfare solution [Car+16]; returns an EF1 and PO allocation for
any number of agents.
iv) Fisher-market based algorithm [BKV18]; returns an EF1 and PO allocation for any
number of agents.
All the algorithms mentioned above perform poorly even in terms of the weaker relaxation
of stability, i.e., weak-approximate-stability. To see this, consider the instance in Table 5.3a,
and note that the allocation that is output by any of these algorithms is agent A getting g1
and agent B getting g2. Next, consider the instance in Table 5.3b. In this case, if we use
any of these algorithms, then the allocation that is output is agent A getting g2 and agent
B getting g1.
Given this, let the values mentioned in Table 5.3a constitute the true valuation function
(v1) of agent A. When reporting these, she receives the good g1. Table 5.3b shows agent
A’s misreport (v′1) in which case she receives the good g2. Recall from the definition




T−1 , or in other words, all the four algorithms mentioned above are









































(5.4b) Instance where agent B makes a mistake
5.4.2 Are there fair and efficient algorithms that are stable?
The observation that previously studied algorithms perform poorly even in terms of the
weaker relaxation of stability implies that we need to look for new algorithms. So, now, a
natural question that arises here is: Is there any hope at all for algorithms that are fair,
PO, and stable? Note that without the requirement of PO the answer to this question is a
“Yes”—at least when the fairness notion that is being considered is EF1, since it is easy to
observe that the well-known draft algorithm (where agents take turns picking their favourite
good among the remaining goods) that is EF1 [Car+16, Sec. 3] is stable. However, if we
require PO, then we show that the answer to the question above is a “No,” in that there
are no stable algorithms that always return an EF1 and even approximately-PO allocation.
Theorem 33. LetM be an algorithm that is stable and always returns an EF1 allocation.
Then, for any β in [1, T−3
2
],M cannot be β-PO.
Proof. Consider the instance in Table 5.4a which represents agents’ true valuation functions.
For simplicity we assume that T mod 9 ≡ 0. Next, since the agents are symmetric and it
is easy to verify that in every EF1 allocation each of the agents have to get exactly two
goods, let us assume w.l.o.g. that agent A receives g1. Given this, now consider the instance
in Table 5.4b where agent B makes a mistake. Let us denote agent B’s true utility function
as v, misreport as v′ ∈ 4T
3
-N(v), and (S1, S2) and (S ′1, S ′2) as outcomes for the instances in
Tables 5.4a, 5.4b, respectively. From our discussion above, we know that v(S2) = 4T9 , since
agent B gets two goods from the set {g2, g3, g4}.
Since M is stable, we know that v(S2) = v(S ′2). Now, it is easy to see that this is only
possible if the set S ′2 has exactly two goods from {g2, g3, g4}. So, let us assume w.l.o.g. that
S ′2 = {g2, g3}. If this is the case, then note that the allocation ({g2, g3, g4}, {g1}) Pareto





, which in turn proves our
theorem.
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Given this result and our observation in Section 5.4.1 that previously studied algorithms
perform poorly even in terms of weak-approximate-stability, it is clear that the best one
can hope for is to design new algorithms that are fair, efficient, and approximately-stable.
In Section 5.4.4 we show that this is possible. However, before we do that, in the next
section we first present a necessary and sufficient condition for PMMS allocations when
there are n ≥ 2 agents.
5.4.3 A necessary and sufficient condition for existence of PMMS
allocations
The general characterization result for PMMS allocations presented here will be useful in
the next section to design an approximately-stable algorithm that produces a PMMS and
PO allocation for the case of two agents. Additionally, we also believe that the result might
potentially be of independent interest.
For an agent ` ∈ [n], a set Q ⊆ G, and a set S ⊆ Q, the result uses a notion of rank of S,
denoted by rQ` (S), and defined as the number of subsets of Q that have value at most v`(S).
More formally,
rQ` (S) =
∣∣{P | P ⊆ Q, v`(P ) ≤ v`(S)}∣∣. (5.3)
The notion of rank has been previously considered in the fair division literature by Ramaekers
[Ram13]. In particular, according to our notation, they talk about rG` (S) in the context of
fair division among two agents who have a strict preference orders over the subsets of G,
and one of their results is a weaker (since they assume a strict order over subsets of G which
is not assumed here) version of the n = 2 case of the theorem below [Ram13, Thm. 1(2)].
Theorem 34. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and n ≥ 2 agents with additive
valuation functions, an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is a pairwise maximin share allocation










Before we present a formal argument to prove this theorem, we present a brief overview.
Overall, the proof uses some observations about the ranking function. In particular, for a
set Q and S ⊆ Q, one key observation is that the rank of S is high enough (more precisely,
greater than 2|Q|−1) if and only if the value of this set is at least half that of Q. Once we
have this, then the proof essentially follows by combining it with a few other observations
about the ranking function and some simple counting arguments.
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More formally, we first state the following claims about the ranking function. The proofs of
these directly follow from the way the ranking function is defined.
Claim 6. Let Q ⊆ G and i ∈ [n] be some agent. Then,
i) for A ⊆ Q,B ⊆ Q, vi(A) < vi(B)⇔ rQi (A) < r
Q
i (B)
ii) rQi (A) < r
Q
i (B)⇔ rGi (A) < rGi (B).
Proof. To prove the first part, consider the sets HA = {P | P ⊆ Q, vi(P ) ≤ vi(A)} and
HB = {P | P ⊆ Q, vi(P ) ≤ vi(B)}. First, observe that vi(A) < vi(B) if and only if
|HA| < |HB|. Also, from the definition of the ranking function we know that |HA| < |HB|
if and only if rQi (A) < r
Q
i (B). Combining these we have our claim.
To prove the second part, observe that from the first part we know that rQi (A) < r
Q
i (B)
if and only if vi(A) < vi(B). Next, again using the first part with Q = G, we have that
vi(A) < vi(B) if and only if rGi (A) < r
G
i (B). Combining these we have our claim.
Claim 7. Let Q ⊆ G, i ∈ [n] be some agent, ` ∈ Z≥0, and T` = {P | P ⊆ Q, rQi (P ) ≤ `}.
Then,
i) for S ⊆ Q, if rQi (S) = `, then |T`| = `
ii) |T`| ≤ `.
Proof. To prove the first part, consider the set H = {P | P ⊆ Q, vi(P ) ≤ vi(S)}. First,
note that from Claim 6(i) we can see that H = T`. Next, from the definition of rQi (S), we
know that |H| = `. Also, every element in H will have a rank at most ` (since for each
such set S ′, vi(S ′) ≤ vi(S)) and every element outside of H will have a rank larger than `
(since for each such set S ′, vi(S ′) > vi(S)). Hence, i) follows.
To prove the second part, consider the largest `′ ≤ ` such that there exists some S ⊆ Q
with rQi (S) = `′. Now, from i) we know that the number of subsets of Q with rank at most
`′ is exactly `′ and hence from our choice of `′ the statement follows.
Claim 8. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be an allocation, and i, j ∈ [n] be some agents. If
Kij = Ai ∪ Aj, then
r
Kij
i (Ai) > 2









. Since ` > 2|Kij |−1, we know from Claim 7(i) that there exists S and
Sc = Kij \ S, such that r
Kij
i (S) ≤ r
Kij
i (Ai) and r
Kij
i (S
c) ≤ rKiji (Ai). This in turn implies
that using Claim 6(i) we have that vi(S) ≤ vi(Ai) < vi(Kij)2 and vi(S
c) ≤ vi(Ai) < vi(Kij)2 ,
which is impossible since the valuation functions are additive.
(⇐) Let A be an allocation such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Kij)2 , but r
Kij
i (Ai) ≤ 2|Kij |−1. Now, consider
the set H1 = {P | P ⊆ Kij, r
Kij
i (P ) > r
Kij
i (Ai)}. From Claim 7(i) and using the fact that
r
Kij
i (Ai) ≤ 2|Kij |−1 we know that |H1| ≥ 2|Kij |−1. Also, note that every set in H1 has, by
Claim 6(i), value greater than vi(Ai), which in turn implies that Aj /∈ H1. Next, consider
H2 = {P c | P ∈ H1, P c = Kij \ P}, where additivity implies that every set in H2 has value
less than vi(A1). Note that |H1| + |H2| ≥ 2|Kij | and Ai is neither in H1 nor H2, which is
impossible.
Equipped with the claims above, we are now ready to prove our theorem.
Proof of Theorem 34. (⇒) Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that A is a PMMS
allocation and that there exists i, j such that min{rKiji (Ai), r
Kij
j (Aj)} < 2|Kij |−1. W.l.o.g.,





i (Ai)}. Since r
Kij
i (Ai) < 2
|Kij |−1, we know from Claim 7(ii) that |H| > 2|Kij |−1 (since
there are 2|Kij | subsets of Kij). This implies that there is a set S and its complement
Sc = Kij \ S such that, r
Kij





c)}, which in turn using Claim 6(i)
implies that vi(Ai) < min{vi(S), vi(Sc)}. However, note that this contradicts the fact that
i has an MMS partition w.r.t. j in A.
(⇐) Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists an agent i such that
i does not have an MMS partition w.r.t. j, but min{rKiji (Ai), r
Kij
j (Aj)} ≥ 2|Kij |−1. This
implies that vi(Ai) <
vi(Kij)
2
, which in turn using Claim 8 and the fact that min{rKiji (Ai),
r
Kij
j (Aj)} ≥ 2|Kij |−1, implies that r
Kij
i (Ai) = 2
|Kij |−1. Next, since i does not perceive
(Ai, Aj) to be an MMS partition w.r.t. j, there must exist a partition (A′i, A′j) such that
A′i ∪ A′j = Kij and min{vi(A′i), vi(A′j)} > vi(Ai). This implies that, using Claim 6(i), we
have that rKiji (A′i) > r
Kij






i (Ai), or in other words that a set (i.e., A′i)
and its complement (i.e., A′j = Kij \A′i) both have rank greater than r
Kij
i (Ai). Now, if this is
case, then one can see that, since rKiji (Ai) = 2|Kij |−1, this implies there exists a set S ⊆ Kij
and its complement Sc = Kij \ S such that r
Kij
i (S) ≤ r
Kij
i (Ai) and r
Kij
i (S
c) ≤ rKiji (Ai).
119
However, this is impossible because we can now use Claim 8 to see that both vi(S) and
vi(S
c) have value less than vi(Kij)
2
, which in turn contradicts the fact that vi is an additive
valuation function.
In the next section we use this result to show an approximately-stable algorithm that is
PMMS and PO when there are two agents.
5.4.4 rank-leximin: An approximately-stable PMMS and PO al-
gorithm for two agents
The idea of our algorithm is simple. Instead of the well-known Leximin algorithm where one
aims to maximize the minimum utility any agents gets, then the second minimum utility,
and so on, our approach, which we refer to as the rank-leximin algorithm (Algorithm 7),
is to do a leximin-like allocation, but based on the ranks of the bundles that the agents
receive. Here for an agent i and a bundle B ⊆ G, by rank we mean rGi (B), as defined in
(5.3). That is, the rank-leximin algorithm maximizes the minimum rank of the bundle
that any agent gets, then it maximizes the second minimum rank, then the third minimum
rank, and so on. Note that this in turn induces a comparison operator ≺ between two
partitions and this is formally specified as rank-leximinCMP in Algorithm 7. Although the
original leximin solution also returns a PMMS and PO allocation for two agents, recall
that we observed in Section 5.4.1 that it does not provide any guarantee even in terms of
weak-approximate-stability, even when α = 4. Rank-leximin on the other hand is PMMS
and PO for two agents and, as we will show, is also (2 + 12α
T
)-approximately-stable for all
α ∈ (0, T
3
]. Additionally, it also returns an allocation that is PMMS and PO for any number
of agents as long as they report ordinally equivalent valuation functions (see Definition 22).
Remark: Given the characterization result for PMMS allocations, one can come up with
several algorithms that satisfy PMMS and PO. However, we consider rank-leximin here
since it is a natural counterpart to the well-known leximin algorithm [PR18]. Additionally,
it turns out that contrary to our initial belief the idea of rank-leximin is not new. Ramaekers
[Ram13] considered it in the context of algorithms for two-agent fair division that satisfy
Pareto-optimality, anonymity, the unanimity bound, and preference monotonicity (see
[Ram13, Sec. 3] for definitions), where the unanimity bound is a notion that one can show
is equivalent to the notion of Maximin share (MMS) that is used in the computational fair
division literature. So, with caveat that Ramaekers [Ram13] assumes that the agents have
a strict preference orders over the subsets of G (which is not assumed here), the result of
Ramaekers [Ram13, Thm. 2] already proves that rank-leximin is PMMS and PO for two
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Procedure: rank-leximinCMP(P, T )
Input: two partitions P, T ∈ Πn(G)
Output: returns true if P ≺ T , i.e., if P is before T in the rank-leximin sorted order
1: RP ← agents sorted in non-decreasing order of the rank of their bundles in P , i.e., based
on rGi (Pi), with ties broken in some arbitrary but consistent way throughout
2: RT ← similar ordering as in RP above, but based on rGi (Ti)
3: for each ` ∈ [n] do
4: i← R`P . `-th agent in RP
5: j ← R`T . `-th agent in RT
6: if rGi (Pi) 6= r
G
j (Tj) then







Input: for each agent i ∈ [n], their valuation function vi : 2G → R≥0
Output: an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) that is PMMS and PO
11: L ← perform a rank-Lexmin sort on Πn(G) based on the rank-leximinCMP operator defined
above
12: return A = (A1, . . . , An) that is the last element in L
Algorithm 7: rank-leximin algorithm
agents (MMS is equivalent to PMMS in the case of two agents), which is the result we
show in Theorem 35. However, we still include our proof because of the indifference issue
mentioned above, and since it almost follows directly from Theorem 34.
Below we first show that the rank-leximin algorithm always returns an allocation that is
PMMS and PO for the case of two agents. The fact that it is PO can be seen by using some
of the properties that we proved about the ranking function in the previous section, while
the other property follows from combining Theorem 34 along with a simple pigeonhole
argument. Following this, we also show that rank-leximin always returns a PMMS and PO
allocation when there are n ≥ 2 agents with ordinally equivalent valuation functions. The
proof of this is slightly more involved and it proceeds by first showing how rank-leximin
returns such an allocation when all the agents have identical valuation functions. Once we
have this, then the theorem follows by repeated application of Observation 2.
Theorem 35. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive
valuation functions, the rank-leximin algorithm (Algorithm 7) returns an allocation that is
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PMMS and PO.
Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be the allocation that is returned by the rank-leximin algorithm
(Algorithm 7). Below we will first show that A is PO and subsequently argue why it is
PMMS.
Suppose A is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists another allocation A′ such that for
all i ∈ [n], vi(A′i) ≥ vi(Ai), and the inequality is strict for at least one of the agents, say
j. This in turn implies that using Claim 6 we have that for all i ∈ [n], rGi (A′i) ≥ rGi (Ai)
and rGj (A′j) > r
G
j (Aj). However, this implies that from the procedure rank-leximinCMP in
Algorithm 7 we have that A ≺ A′, and this in turn directly contradicts the fact that A was
the allocation that was returned.
To show that A is PMMS, consider agent 1 and all the sets S such that rG1 (S) ≥ 2m−1.
From Claim 7 we know that there are at least 2m−1 + 1 such sets. Therefore, if Sc = G \ S,
then there is at least one S such that rG2 (Sc) ≥ 2m−1. This implies (S, Sc) is an allocation
such that min{rG1 (S), rG2 (Sc)} ≥ 2m−1. Now since rank-leximin maximizes the minimum
rank that any agent receives, we have that min{rG1 (A1), rG2 (A2)} ≥ 2m−1, and so now we
can use Theorem 34 to see that A is a PMMS allocation.
Theorem 36. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and n ≥ 2 agents with additive
valuation functions, the rank-leximin algorithm (Algorithm 7) returns an allocation A that
is PMMS and PO if all the agents report ordinally equivalent valuation functions.
Proof. To prove this we first show how rank-Leximin always returns a PMMS and PO
allocation (A1, . . . , An) for agents with identical valuation functions. Once we have that,
then the theorem follows by repeated application of Observation 2 and by observing that
the rank-leximin algorithm produces the same output for two instances that are equivalent.
First, note that we already know from the proof of Theorem 35 that it is PO with respect to
any instance with n agents. So we just need to argue that it produces a PMMS allocation
when the reports are identical. To see this, recall from Theorem 34 that we need to show
that for all i, j ∈ [n], min{rQi (Ai), r
Q
j (Aj)} ≥ 2k−1, where Q = Ai ∪ Aj and k = |Q|.
Suppose this was not the case and there exists agents i, j such that rQi (Ai) < 2k−1. Now,
let us consider the set H = {S | S ⊆ Q and rQj (S) > r
Q
i (Ai)}. Since r
Q
i (Ai) < 2
k−1, we
know from Claim 7(ii) that |H| > 2k−1 (since there are 2k subsets of Q in total). This in




are greater than rQi (Ai). So, now, consider these sets S and Sc, and ask agent i to pick
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the one she values the most. Let us assume without loss of generality that this is S. Note
that since the valuations are additive and hence vi(S) ≥ 12vi(Q) > vi(Ai), we know from
Claim 8 that rQi (S) ≥ 2k−1 > r
Q

















where the implication follows from the fact that i and j have identical valuation functions
and so for any S ⊆ G and A ⊆ S, we have rSi (A) = rSj (A).
The observation above implies that we can use Claim 6(ii) to see that,
min{rGi (S), rGi (Sc)} > min{rGi (Ai), rGi (Aj)}
⇒min{rGi (S), rGj (Sc)} > min{rGi (Ai), rGj (Aj)},
where the implication again follows from the fact that i and j have identical valuation
functions.
Now, consider the allocation A′ = (A1, . . . , Ai−1, S, Ai+1, . . . , Aj−1, Sc, Aj+1, . . . , An). From
the discussion above we know that A ≺ A′ according to the rank-LeximinCMP operator in
Algorithm 7. However, this contradicts the fact that A was the allocation that was returned
by the rank-Leximin algorithm.
Now that we know rank-leximin produces a PMMS and PO allocation, we will move on to
see how approximately-stable it is in the next section. However, before that we make the
following remark.
Remark: The rank-leximin algorithm takes exponential time. Note that this is not
surprising since finding PMMS allocations is NP-hard even for two identical agents—one







-approximately-stable for α ≤ T
3
Before we show how approximately-stable rank-leximin is, we prove the following claims
which will be useful in order to prove our result.
Claim 9. Let v be an additive utility function and for some α > 0, let v′ ∈ α-N(v). Then,
for any S1, S2 ⊆ G,
i) |v(S1)− v′(S1)| ≤ α2
123
ii) if v(S1) > v(S2) and v′(S1) ≤ v′(S2), then v(S1)− v(S2) ≤ α.
Proof. To prove the first part, suppose |v(S1)− v′(S1)| > α2 . Let S
c
1 = G \ S1. Since v, v′
are additive, we know that v(S1) + v(Sc1) = T (and similarly for v′), and so this in turn
















= |v(S1)− v′(S1)|+ |v′(Sc1)− v(Sc1)|
> α,
which is a contradiction since v′ ∈ α-N(v).
To prove the second part, observe that from the first part we have,







= v′(S1)− v′(S2) + α
≤ α,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that v′(S1) ≤ v′(S2).
Claim 10. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive
valuation functions, let (A1, A2) be a PMMS allocation. If for an agent i ∈ [2], k = |Aj| ≥ 2,
where j 6= i, then
i) vi(Ai) ≥ vi(M ji ), where M
j
i is the maximum valued good of agent i in the bundle Aj
ii) vi(Aj) − vi(Ai) ≤ vi(mji ), where m
j
i is the minimum valued good of agent i in the
bundle Aj
iii) vi(Ai) ≥ k−12k−1T .
Proof. To prove the first part, let us assume that vi(Ai) < vi(M ji ). Since k ≥ 2, we have
another good g ∈ Aj such that g 6= M ji . So, now, consider the allocation (Ai ∪ {g}, {M
j
i }).
Note that using additivity we have that min{vi(Ai ∪ {g}), vi(M ji )} > vi(Ai), which in turn
contradicts the fact that (Ai, Aj) is a PMMS allocation.
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To prove the second part, let us assume that vi(Aj)− vi(Ai) > vi(mji ). Next, consider the
allocation (Ai ∪ {mji}, Aj \ {m
j
i}). Note that using additivity we have that min{vi(Ai ∪
{mji}), vi(Aj \ {m
j
i})} > vi(Ai), which in turn contradicts the fact that (Ai, Aj) is a PMMS
allocation.
To prove the third part, observe that from the second part we know that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)−
vi(m
j
i ). Also, if k = |Aj|, then we can use the fact that the valuation functions are additive
to see that vi(mji ) ≤
vi(Aj)
k
. So, using these, we have,
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)− vi(mji ) ≥ vi(Aj)−
vi(Aj)
k






where the last inequality follows from the fact that vi(Ai) + vi(Aj) = T .
Finally, rearranging the term above we have our claim.
Claim 11. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive
valuation functions, let (A1, A2) be the allocation that is returned by the rank-leximin
algorithm for this instance. If k1 = rG1 (A1) and k2 = r
G
2 (A2), then min{k1, k2} ≥ 2m−1 and
max{k1, k2} > 2m−1.
Proof. Since rank-leximin produces a PMMS allocation (Theorem 35), we know from
Theorem 34 that min{k1, k2} ≥ 2m−1. Also, if max{k1, k2} ≤ 2m−1, then using Claim 8
we have that v1(A1) < T2 and v2(A2) <
T
2
. However, this in turn contradicts the fact that
rank-leximin is Pareto-optimal (Theorem 35) since swapping the bundles improves the
utilities of both the agents.
Equipped with the claims above, we can now prove the approximate-stability bound for
rank-leximin. The proof here proceeds by first arguing about how rank-leximin is stable
with respect to equivalent instances. This is followed by showing upper and lower bounds
on how weakly-approximately-stable it is, which in turn involves looking at several different
cases and using several properties (some of them proved above and some that we will
introduce as we go along) about the allocation returned by the rank-leximin algorithm.
Theorem 37. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive







Proof. Let us consider two agents with valuation functions v1, v2. Since the rank-leximin is
symmetric, we can assume w.l.o.g. that agent 1 is the one making a mistake. Throughout,
let us denote this misreport by v′1. Also, let rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), and rank-
leximin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2). Next, let us introduce the following notation that we will use
throughout. For some arbitrary valuations y1, y2, if an allocation (C1, C2) precedes an
allocation (B1, B2) in the rank-leximin order with respect to (y1, y2) (i.e., according to the
rank-leximinCMP function in Algorithm 7), then we denote this by (B1, B2) y1,y2 (C1, C2).
In the case they are equivalent according to the rank-leximin operator, then we denote
it by (B1, B2) ≡y1,y2 (C1, C2). Additionally, we use (B1, B2) y1,y2 (C1, C2) to denote that
(C1, C2) either precedes or is equivalent to (B1, B2).
Equipped with the notations above, we now prove our theorem. To do this, first recall
from the definition of approximate-stability (see Definition 23) that we first need to show
that if v′1 ∈ equiv(v1), then v1(A1) = v1(S1). To see why this is true, consider the rank-
leximinCMP function in Algorithm 7 and observe that since v′1 ∈ equiv(v1), v1, v′1 have
the same bundle rankings, and hence for any two partitions P, T ∈ πn(G), P ≺v1,v2 T (i.e.,
P appears before T in the rank-leximin order) if and only if P ≺v′1,v2 T . This in turn
along with the fact that rank-leximin uses a deterministic tie-breaking rule implies that
rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2) = rank-leximin(v′1, v2), thus showing that it is stable with
respect to equivalent instances.
Having shown the above, let us move to the second part where we show how weakly-
approxmiately-stable rank-leximin is. For the rest of this proof, let v′1 ∈ α-N(vi), for some
α ∈ (0, T
3
]. Also, for i ∈ [2], let the ranking function associated with valuation functions vi
and v′1 be r
G
i (·) and r
′G
1 (·), respectively. Throughout, in order to keep the notations simple,
we use r1(·), r′1(·), and r2(·) to refer to rG1 (·), r
′G
1 (·), and rG2 (·), respectively.
In order to prove the bound on weak-approximate-stability, we show two lemmas. The first
one shows an upper bound of 2 for the ratio v1(S1)
v1(A1)





Lemma 38. For α > 0, if v′1 ∈ α-N(v1), rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), and rank-




Proof. To prove this, let us consider the following three cases. Note that since rank-leximin
returns a PMMS allocation (Theorem 35) we know from Theorem 34 that these are the
only three cases. Also, note that the bound is trivially true when v1(A1)− v1(S1) ≥ 0. So
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below we directly consider the case when v1(S1) > v1(A1).
Case 1. r1(A1) > 2m−1: Since r1(A1) > 2m−1, we know using Claim 8 that v1(A1) ≥ T2 .




Case 2. r1(A1) = 2m−1 and |S1| = 1: First, observe that since |S1| = 1 and v1(A1) < v1(S1),






Now, in order to upper-bound (5.5), consider the following two cases.
i) |A2| ≥ 2: Let k = |A2|. Since k ≥ 2, we know from Claim 10 that v1(A1) ≥ k−12k−1T .









ii) |A2| = 1: Since |A2| = 1 and from above we know that S1 ⊆ A2, we have that S1 = A2.
This in turn implies that rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2) and rank-leximin(v′1, v2) =
(A2, A1). Next, consider the following observations.
a) r1(A1) = 2m−1 (recall that this is the case we are considering)
b) r2(A2) = 2m−1 + 1 (since |A2| = 1, we know that r2(A2) ≤ 2m−1 + 1, because
valuation functions are additive and so any singleton set can have rank at most
2m−1 + 1. However, r2(A2) ≥ 2m−1 + 1, using Claim 11.)
c) r′1(A1) = 2m−1 (since |A1| = m − 1, we know that r′1(A1) ≥ 2m−1. However,
r′1(A1) < 2
m−1 + 1, for if not then (A1, A2) v′1,v2 (A2, A1), thus contradicting
the fact that rank-leximin(v′1, v2) = (A2, A1))
d) r1(A2) = 2m−1 + 1 (since |A2| = 1 ⇒ r1(A2) ≤ 2m−1 + 1, and r1(A2) > r1(A1)
since we are considering the case when v1(S1) = v1(A2) > v1(A1))
e) r2(A1) = 2m−1 (since |A1| = m − 1 ⇒ r2(A1) ≥ 2m−1, and r2(A1) < 2m−1 + 1,
for if not then (A2, A1) v1,v2 (A1, A2), thus contradicting the fact that rank-
leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2))
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f) r′1(A2) = 2m−1 + 1 (since |A2| = 1⇒ r′1(A2) ≤ 2m−1 + 1, and r2(A1) = 2m−1 ⇒
r′1(A2) ≥ 2m−1 + 1 using Claim 11)
Now, combining all the observations above, we can see that (A1, A2) ≡v1,v2 (A2, A1)
and (A1, A2) ≡v′1,v2 (A2, A1). However, note that this in turn is a contradiction because
the rank-leximin algorithm breaks ties deterministically and so it couldn’t have been
the case that rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2) and rank-leximin(v′1, v2) = (A2, A1).
Hence, this case is impossible.
Case 3. r1(A1) = 2m−1 and |S1| ≥ 2: First, note that since v1(S1) > v1(A1), r1(A1) =
2m−1, and rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), we have that, for all g ∈ S1, v1(S1 \ {g}) ≤
v1(A1). Why? Suppose if not, then consider the allocation (S1 \ {g}), S2 ∪ {g}), and
observe that (S1 \ {g}), S2 ∪ {g}) v1,v2 (A1, A2), which in turn contradicts the fact that
rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2). So, now, by adding up all the inequalities with respect all
g ∈ S1, we have that
(|S1| − 1) · v1(S1) ≤ |S1| · v1(A1).






Finally, combining (5.4), (5.6), and (5.7), we have our lemma.
Next, we show a lower bound for v1(S1)
v1(A1)
.
Lemma 39. For α ∈ (0, T
3
], if v′1 ∈ α-N(v1), rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2), and rank-







Proof. Since we are trying to show a lower bound for v1(S1)
v1(A1)
, below we consider the case
when v1(A1) > v1(S1), since otherwise it is trivially lower-bounded by 1. Also, note we can





. Therefore, throughout this proof, we have v1(S2) > T2 .
Next, let us consider the following cases. Note that, by using Claim 11 with respect to the
allocation (S1, S2), these are the only three cases.
128
Case 1. r′1(S1) > 2m−1: Since r′1(S1) > 2m−1, we know from Claim 8 that v′1(S1) ≥ T2 . Also,
since v′1 ∈ α-N(v1), from Claim 9(i) we have that v′1(S1)− v1(S1) ≤ |v′1(S1)− v1(S1)| ≤ α2 .



















where the last inequality follows from the fact that α ∈ (0, T
3
].
Case 2. r′1(S1) = 2m−1 and min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r1(A1): Since min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} =
r1(A1) and rank-leximin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2), we have that v′1(A1) ≤ v′1(S1), for if not,
then it is easy to see that (A1, A2) (v′1,v2) (S1, S2), thus contradicting the fact that
rank-leximin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2). Also, since v1(A1) > v1(S1) and from above we have
v′1(A1) ≤ v′1(S1), from Claim 9(ii) we have know that v1(A1)− v1(S1) ≤ α. So, now, let us
consider the following two cases.
i) |S2| = 1: First, note that since |S2| = 1 and v1(A1) > v1(S1), we have that S2 ⊆ A1.











where the last inequality follows from the fact that α ∈ (0, T
3
].




















where the last inequality follows from the fact that α ∈ (0, T
3
].
Case 3. r′1(S1) = 2m−1 and min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r2(A2): First, note that we can directly
consider the case when min{r1(A1), r2(A2)} = r2(A2) = 2m−1, for if not then we either
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have v′1(A1) ≤ v′1(S1), which can be handled as in Case 2, or we have that v′1(A1) > v′1(S1),
which is impossible since this would imply min{r′1(A1), r2(A2)} > 2m−1 = r′1(S1) =
min{r′1(S1), r2(S2)}, thus contradicting the fact that rank-leximin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2). Addi-
tionally, since we are considering the case when r2(A2) = 2m−1, we have from Claim 11 that
r1(A1) ≥ 2m−1 + 1, which in turn implies, using Claim 8, that v1(A1) ≥ T2 .
Given the observations above, let us now consider the following cases.
i) |S2| ≥ 2 and |S1 ∩ A1| ≥ 1: Let k = |S2| and let X ⊂ G such that r1(X) = 2m−1.
Since rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2) and ∀g ∈ G, and ∀i ∈ [2], vi(g) > 0, we have that
r1(A1\{g}) ≤ 2m−1, for if not then min{r1(A1\{g}), r2(A2∪{g})} > 2m−1 = r2(A2) =
min{r1(A1), r2(A2)}, thus contradicting the fact that rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2).
So, next, let us consider a good g ∈ S1 ∩ A1. Using the observations above, we have,
v1(A1) ≤ v1(X) + v1(g)
(
since r1(A1 \ {g}) ≤ 2m−1
)
≤ v1(X) + v1(S1) (since v1(g) ≤ v1(S1))
≤ 2v1(S1) + α. (5.11)
The last inequality is true because either v1(S1) ≥ v1(X), or, if not, then it is easy
to see that, since r′1(S1) = 2m−1 and r1(S1) < r1(X1) = 2m−1, there exists an H ⊂ G
such that v1(H) ≥ v1(X) > v1(S1) and v′1(H) ≤ v′1(S1). This in turn implies, we can
use Claim 9(ii), to see that v1(H)− v1(S) ≤ α.




















where the last inequality follows from the fact that α ∈ (0, T
3
].
ii) |S2| ≥ 2 and |S1 ∩ A1| = 0: Let k = |S2|. First, note that since |S1 ∩ A1| = 0, we

























where the last inequality follows from the fact that k ≥ 2 and α ∈ (0, T
3
].
iii) |S2| = 1: First, note that since |S2| = 1, r2(S2) ≤ 2m−1 + 1, as additivity implies that
any singleton set can have rank at most 2m−1 + 1. Also, recall that we are considering
the case when r′1(S1) = r2(A2) = 2m−1. Now, since rank-lexmin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2),
we need to have v′1(S1) ≥ v′1(A1), for if not, then the fact that r2(A2) = 2m−1 and
v′1(A1) > v
′
1(S1) implies that (A1, A2) v1,v2 (S1, S2) and (A1, A2) v′1,v2 (S1, S2).
However, this is impossible since the rank-leximin algorithm uses a deterministic tie-
breaking rule and hence if this is case, then rank-leximin(v1, v2) and rank-leximin(v′1, v2)
cannot be different. Therefore, we have that v′1(S1) ≥ v′1(A1), which in turn can again
be handled as in Case 2.






Since rank-leximin is stable with respect to equivalent instances, and combining the lemmas
above we have that it is (2 + 12α
T




Note that for α ∈ (0, T
3
], our approximate-stability bound is independent of the choice of T ,
whereas for all the previously studied algorithms that we had considered in Section 5.4.1 it
was dependent on T , and in fact was equal to (T−1) even when α = 4. Additionally, none of
those algorithms are stable on equivalent instances either (i.e., the bound of (T−1) was with
respect to weak-approximate-stability and not the stronger notion of approximate-stability).
Finally, it is interesting to note that although our model assumes that the misreport v′
always maintains the ordinal information (over the singletons) of the true valuation v (see
the second condition in Definition 18), the proof above does not use this fact. This implies
that rank-leximin is stronger than what the theorem indicates since it is (2 + 12α
T
)-stable
for all α ≤ T
3
and for all possible misreports that are within an L1 distance of α from the
original valuation.6
6Seeing this, one might wonder “why have the condition of maintaining the ordinal information over the
singletons (i.e., the second condition in Definition 18) then?” The reason is, recall that our original goal
was look for stable algorithms, and so this condition was a natural one to impose since, as mentioned in the
introduction, one cannot hope for stable algorithms without assuming anything about the kind of mistakes
the agents might commit. However, as mentioned in Section 5.4.2, even with this assumption designing
stable algorithms turned out to be impossible, and hence we relaxed the strong requirement of stability to
approximate-stability. And under this relaxed definition, the condition turns out to be not as crucial.
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Input: for each agent i ∈ [2], their valuation function vi
Output: an allocation A = (A1, A2) that satisfies the same properties asM
1: gmax1 ← arg maxg∈G v1(g) . in case of tie, pick the one with the lowest index
2: if v1(gmax1 ) >
T
2 then . Phase1
3: return A = ({gmax1 },G \ {gmax1 })
4: end if
5: returnM(v1, v2). . Phase 2
Algorithm 8: Framework for modified-M
5.5 Weak-Approximate-Stability in Fair Allocation of
Indivisible Goods
In this section we consider weak-approximate-stability, the weaker notion of approximate
stability defined in Definition 21 and we show how a very simple change to the existing
algorithms can ensure more stability. In particular, we show that any algorithm that returns
a PMMS and PO allocation for two agents can be made (4 + 6α
T
)-weakly-approximately-
stable for α ≤ T
3
. The main idea needed to achieve this is to modify the algorithm that
produces a PMMS and PO allocation and convert it into a two-phase procedure where the
first phase only handles instances where agent 1 has a good of value greater than T
2
. In the
case of such instances, we just output the allocation where agent 1 gets the highly-valued
good and all the other goods are given to agent 2. Below, in Algorithm 8, we formally
describe the framework and subsequently show how this very minor change leads to better
stability overall.
Theorem 40. Given an instance with m indivisible goods and two agents with additive
valuation functions, let M be an algorithm that returns a PMMS and PO allocation.
Then, for α ≤ T
3
, modified-M, which refers to the change as described in Algorithm 8, is
(4 + 6α
T
)-weakly-approximately-stable, and returns an allocation that is PMMS and PO.
Proof. We begin by arguing that ifM produces a PMMS and PO allocation then so does
modified-M. To see this, note that we just need to show that the output in Phase 1 is
PMMS and PO, since otherwise modified-M returns the same outcome asM. The fact
that it is PMMS is in turn easy to see because agent 1 is envy-free (since they get a good
of value greater than T
2
) and the other agent gets m− 1 goods. As for PO, note that agent
1 gets only one good with value greater than T
2
, so they cannot be made better-off without
making agent 2 worse-off.
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To show the bound on weak-approximate-stability, let us consider two agents with utility
functions v1, v2. Next, for some α ∈ (0, T3 ], we denote the misreport by agent i ∈ [2] as
v′i, and let (−i) denote the agent (i+ 1) mod 2. Also, let rank-leximin(v1, v2) = (A1, A2),
and, depending on which agent i ∈ [2] is misreporting, let rank-leximin(v′1, v2) = (S1, S2)
or rank-leximin(v1, v′2) = (S1, S2). We refer to (v1, v2) as the true report, and, depending
on which agent i ∈ [2] is misreporting, refer to (v′1, v2) or (v1, v′2) as the misreport. Given
an instance, we say that the instance is in ‘Phase 1’ if agent 1 has a good of value greater
than T
2
(this corresponds to the ‘if’ statement in Algorithm 8). Otherwise, we say that the
instance is in ‘Phase 2.’ Also, throughout, for i ∈ [2], we use gmaxi to denote the highest
valued good in G according to agent i (if there are multiple goods with the highest value,
pick the one with the lowest index). Recall that, since v′i ∈ α-N(vi), gmaxi is the same in vi
and v′i.
Equipped with the notations above, let us now consider the following cases. Note that since
the allocation returned is identical whenever an instance is in Phase 1, we only need to
analyze these cases.
Case 1. True report is in Phase 1, misreport is in Phase 2: First, since there is a
change in phase due to misreporting and the choice of phase only depends on agent 1’s
valuation function, note that agent 1 is the one misreporting. Given this, below we derive
an upper and lower bound for the ratio v1(S1)
v1(A1)
.









Next, to lower bound the ratio, let us consider the following two cases.
i) |S2| = 1: Since |S2| = 1, we have that v′1(S1) ≥ v′1(G \ {gmax1 }). Also, since (v′1, v2) in



















where the last inequality follows since α ∈ (0, T
3
].


















where the last inequality follows from the facts that k ≥ 2 and α ∈ (0, T
3
].
Case 2. True report is in Phase 2, misreport is in Phase 1: Similar to the previous
case, here again we have that agent 1 is the one misreporting. Also, since (v′1, v2) in Phase
1, we have that S1 = {gmax1 } and v′1(gmax1 ) > T2 . Just like in the previous case, we again
upper and lower bound the ratio v1(S1)
v1(A1)
.
For the upper bound, first note that since (v1, v2) is in Phase 2, we have v1(gmax1 ) ≤ T2 .
Next, note that we only need to consider the case when gmax1 ∈ A2 ,since otherwise the ratio
is upper-bounded by 1. Also, if |A2| = 1, then note that v1(A1) ≥ T − v1(gmax1 ) ≥ T2 , and
so if this is the case then again the ratio is upper-bounded by 1. Finally, if k = |A2| ≥ 2,
















For the lower bound, since v′1(gmax1 ) >
T
2
and α ∈ (0, T
3


















Case 3. True report is in Phase 2, misreport is in Phase 2: Let i ∈ [2] be the agent
who is misreporting. First, for the lower bound, we can proceed exactly as in Cases 1(i)
and 1(ii) above. For the upper bound, let us consider the three cases.
i) i = 1 and |A2| = 1: Since |A2| = 1, we know that v1(A1) ≥ v1(G \ {gmaxi }). Also,




T − v(gmax1 )
≤ 2. (5.19)
ii) i = 2 and |A1| = 1: First, note that v2(A2) ≥ T2 , for, if otherwise, when the agents
report (v1, v2), (A2, A1) Pareto dominates (A1, A2), which is a contradiction. This is
because, since |A1| = 1 and we are in Phase 2, v1(A1) ≤ T2 , and so the allocations
















Finally, combining all the observations, (5.14)–(5.21), from above we have our theorem.
Note that the simple framework presented in Algorithm 8 can be used with respect to any
algorithmM that is fair and efficient, and so one can derive, perhaps better bounds, when
considering modified versions of specific algorithms (likes the ones in Section 5.4.1) that
provide a PMMS, EFX, or EF1 guarantee. Therefore, although the overall change that is
required to any algorithm is minor, the observation is important if we care about having
algorithms that are more stable, since without this recall that we observed in Section 5.4.1
that all the four previously studied algorithms are (T − 1)-weakly-approximately-stable
even when α = 4.
5.6 Discussion
The problem considered here was born as a result of an example we came across on the fair
division website, Spliddit [GP15], where it seemed like arguably innocuous mistakes by an
agent had significant ramifications on their utility for the outcome. Thus, the question arose
as to whether such consequences were avoidable, or more broadly if we could have more
stable algorithms in the context of fair allocations. In this chapter we focused on algorithmic
stability in fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among two agents, and towards
this end, we introduced a notion of stability and showed how it is impossible to achieve exact
stability along with even a weak notion of fairness like EF1 and even approximate efficiency.
This raised the question of how to relax the strong requirement of stability, and here we
proposed two relaxations, namely, approximate-stability and weak-approximate-stability,
and showed how the previously studied algorithms in fair division that are fair and efficient
perform poorly with respect to these relaxations. This lead to looking for new algorithms,
and here we proposed an approximately-stable algorithm (rank-leximin) that guarantees
a pairwise maximin share and Pareto optimal allocation, and presented a simple general
framework for any fair algorithm to achieve weak-approximate stability. Along the way, we
also provided a characterization result for pairwise maximin share allocations and showed
how (in addition to the two-agent case) such allocations always exist as long as the agents
report ordinally equivalent valuation functions. Overall, while the results demonstrate how
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one can do better in the context of two-agent fair allocations, our main contribution is in
introducing the notion of stability and its relaxations, and in explicitly advocating for it to
be used in the design of algorithms or mechanisms that elicit cardinal preferences.
Moving forward, we believe that there is a lot of scope for future work. Especially when
given the observation that humans may often find it hard to attribute exact numerical
values to their preferences, we believe that some notion of stability should be considered
when designing algorithms or mechanisms in settings where cardinal values are elicited. This
opens up the possibility of asking similar questions like the ones we have in other settings
where such issues may perhaps be more crucial. Additionally, specific to the problem
considered here, there are several unanswered questions. For instance, the most obvious
one is about the case when there are more than two agents. A careful reader would have
noticed that all the algorithms we talked about here heavily relied on the fact that there
were only two agents, and therefore none of them work when there are more. As another
example—this one in the context of two-agent fair allocations—one question that could be
interesting is to see if there are polynomial-time algorithms that are approximately-stable
and can guarantee EF1/EFX and PO. Given the fact that polynomial time EF1 and PO
algorithms exist for two agents, we believe that it would interesting to see if we can also
additionally guarantee approximate-stability, or prove otherwise—in which case it would
demonstrate a clear separation between unstable and approximately-stable algorithms. The
rank-leximin algorithm presented here is approximately-stable and provides the stated
guarantees in terms of fairness and efficiency, but it is exponential, and we could not answer





The focus of this thesis was on collective decision-making settings where the agents inter-
acting with the concerned decision-making procedure do not provide complete or accurate
preference information. In particular, we looked at four settings, each of them highlighting
different aspects of working with incomplete or inaccurate preference information. We
provide a brief summary of our contributions below and connect them with the goals
mentioned in Chapter 1.
The first two technical chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) of the thesis dealt with the question
of designing robust algorithms or mechanisms in settings where agents have incomplete
preferences. Here by robust we meant algorithms or mechanisms that produce solutions
that are good (for specific definitions of good) with respect to all the possible underlying
complete preferences. Chapter 2 dealt with what can perhaps be considered as the most
basic setting when designing robust algorithms in the presence of incomplete preferences.
Here we looked at a version of the two-sided matching problem where agents are allowed
to submit weak orders and the objective was to design algorithms that find matchings
that minimize the maximum number of blocking pairs with respect to all the possible
underlying linear orders. To this end, we provided some approximation algorithms and
some hardness of approximation results in different settings for this problem. Although the
issue of incomplete information had been previously studied in the context of this problem,
the usual approach had been to work with extremes—i.e., to look at matchings that have
no blocking pairs with at least one, or all, of the underlying linear orders. Our work here
can be considered as an extension to this line of work, since here we moved away from
these extremes and tried to find a middle-ground when it comes to working with incomplete
preference information.
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Continuing with theme of designing robust algorithms or mechanisms, in Chapter 3 we
looked at a version of the facility location problem which allowed us to focus on incentive
issues that arise when working with incomplete preference information. In contrast to the
standard model for this problem, here we introduced a model where the agents only provide
coarse preference information to the mechanism—in particular, agents only indicate that
their preferred location for the facility lies in some interval. This in turn raised the question
on what solution concepts to consider for such a setting, and here we looked at two natural
solution concepts, namely, very weak dominance and minimax dominance. The first one
was previously considered in the context of auction design and the other introduced here.
Following this, we designed mechanisms that, under each of the two solution concepts,
approximately implement the optimal minimax value with respect to two commonly studied
objective functions, and also showed some corresponding lower bounds.
In Chapter 4 we looked at a different aspect when it comes to working with incomplete
preference information. While Chapters 2 and 3 considered the case where algorithms just
use the given incomplete information, here we considered a scenario where the algorithm can
query the agents to get more information. Although, as mentioned in the chapter, there has
been other work that have considered similar settings, our work here complemented these by
looking at a different choice of objective to optimize for and by considering an alternative
type of query the algorithm could use. This line of inquiry was, in turn, motivated by some
applications in the context of school choice—the problem of assigning students to public
schools. In particular, in this chapter, we considered one-sided matching problems where
the objective is to find an assignment of agents to objects that satisfies some desirable
property like Pareto optimality. While most work on this problem assumes that agents
only have ordinal preferences, here we considered a setting where agents may have some
underlying cardinal utilities. We first argued why not taking these into account can result
in significant loss in welfare and subsequently designed algorithms that can query the agents
using threshold queries about their cardinal utilities. Overall, our results showed how even
asking the agents for one bit of extra information per object can result in better social
welfare.
Finally, motivated by some observations on a popular fair division website, in Chapter 5
we considered a scenario where the agents are unsophisticated in the sense that they are
prone to making mistakes while reporting their preferences. In particular, we considered
the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among two agents, and introduced
a notion of algorithmic stability which, informally, states that the utility experienced by
an agent should not change much as long as they make of “small” or “innocuous” mistakes
while reporting their preferences. We first showed that it impossible for algorithms to
be fair, Pareto optimal, and stable. Following this, we focused on two relaxations of
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stability, namely, approximate-stability and weak-approximate-stability, and showed how
the rank-leximin algorithm satisfies the maximin share fairness property, is Pareto optimal,
and approximately-stable. Following this, we also presented a simple framework to modify
existing fair and Pareto optimal algorithms in order to ensure that they also achieve weak-
approximate-stability. Although the results in this chapter work only for the limited case of
two agent fair allocation, we believe that our main contribution here was in highlighting the
issue of stability and in explicitly advocating for it be considered in the design of algorithms,
especially ones which ask the agents for cardinal preference information.
6.1 Future Directions
In Chapters 2–5 we discussed future work in the context of specific questions considered
in those chapters. Here we talk about some broad directions that could potentially be
interesting.
Beyond worst-case analysis. All the results in this thesis are with respect to absolute
worst-case notions where we try to find a desirable outcome (e.g., a matching with the least
number of blocking pairs, or one with maximum welfare) and the bounds presented are with
respect to all possible instances and all possible underlying complete information that is
consistent with the given partial information. While we believe that this is a reasonable first
step, it might be the case that these worst-cases almost never occur in most applications
we care about. Hence, it would be interesting to see if one can get better algorithms by
assuming certain structure—ones which are ideally motivated from real applications—on
the kinds of input an algorithm will face. For instance, suppose there is reason to believe
that agents’ preferences will be correlated. In this case, one question that might potentially
be interesting is to see if we can define a suitable parameter to describes how correlated
they are and then come up with algorithms that achieve better bounds for different values
of this parameter. More broadly, it would be interesting to see if, based on some properties,
we can classify “plausible inputs” (i.e., the kinds of input an algorithm is likely to encounter
in an application) into certain classes and then see if it is possible to design class-specific
algorithms that do well on instances from the corresponding class.
Combining theoretical analysis with experiments. The focus of this thesis was on
theoretical analysis of different settings. While such analysis is useful in proving that the
algorithms presented guarantee certain outcomes, there might still be challenges in realising
these guarantees if one we were to actually deploy these in some application. For instance,
while the theoretical analysis from Chapter 4 says that one can improve welfare by even just
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asking one bit of extra information per object, the algorithms presented there ask for very
specific threshold queries which might perhaps be hard to answer in practice. Therefore, it
would be interesting to study, for example, what kind of queries are easier to answer and
the types of interface-design that can best support queries. More broadly, we believe that
it would be interesting to start with a theoretical model and analysis, run experiments to
see the challenges in deploying these, or the challenges in realising these guarantees, and
then tweak the model and analysis based on such observations.
Randomization. All the results in this thesis are on deterministic algorithms or mecha-
nisms. Since all the problems considered here were ones that were not previously studied,
it was natural as a first step to understand the limits of determinism, as determinism can
in fact be a hard constraint in many applications. However, there might be settings where
randomization is allowed and where in fact it might be beneficial in terms of getting better
outcomes. Therefore, it would be interesting to extend all the results here to this case, and
in the process perhaps get much better bounds than the ones presented here.
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Omitted material from Chapter 2
A.1 Missing proofs from Section 2.3.3
Lemma 7. Let I1 denote some instance and I2 denote the instance returned by the procedure
proposeWith(A, I1), where the set A represents the proposing side. If there exists a matching
of size t in I1 that is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there exists a matching
of size t in I2 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
Proof. In order to prove this, we need a few claims. However, before that let us introduce
the following terminology. When the procedure proposeWith(A, I1) is executed, for every
run of the while loop in line 2 with respect to an agent a, we can track the instance that
is currently being used. That is, initially we have the instance I1 and this is referred to
as the instance that is “currently being used” by the agent a1, where a1 is the first agent
with respect whom the while loop is executed. Now, after the first run of the while loop
(w.r.t. a1) we have an updated instance (because of some delete operations that happened
in lines 3–10), say, Icurr. Therefore, the next time the while loop is run with respect to
some agent a2, this is the instance that is “currently being used” with respect to a2. We
use this terminology in the following claim.
Claim 12. Let a ∈ A be an agent who is assigned to be ‘free’ in proposeWith(A, I1), Icurr
denote the instance that is currently being used with respect to a, and I ′1 be the instance
obtained by running lines 3–10 with respect to agent a. If there exists a matching of size t
in Icurr that is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there exists a matching of
size t in I ′1 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
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Proof. First, note that every time the procedure proposeWith() is called with the set A,
the agents in this set do not have any ties. This is because, when proposeWith() is called
with the set of women W for the first time in line 18, all ties are already broken due to the
first call of proposeWith() with the set of men in line 17. Therefore, in all the arguments
below we do not need to concern ourselves with issues that can arise as a result of the
agents in A having ties.
Now, to prove this claim we consider the following two cases separately.
1. when b, the first agent in a’s list, is either engaged to p, but prefers a to p, or is not
engaged currently
2. when b is engaged to p ∈ A and finds p and a incomparable
Case 1: In this case the only change that happens to the instance Icurr are due to deletions
of the form (c, b) where a b c. Let the resulting instance be I ′1. So, in order to prove
that I ′1 has a matching of size t that is internally super-stable with respect to I, we just
need to prove that there exists a matching of size t in Icurr that is internally super-stable
matching with respect to I and does not have any matches of the form (c, b). Now, let us
suppose that’s not the case and that in every matching µ of size t in Icurr that is internally
super-stable with respect to I there exists such a pair. This in turn implies that a is
unmatched in µ, for if otherwise (a, b) will form an obvious-blocking pair. Hence, we can
form the matching µ′ = (µ \ (c, b)) ∪ (a, b). Note that µ′ is internally-stable with respect to
I as this does not introduce any new super-blocking pair (since b is the first agent on a’s
list and b does not block any other agent in µ′ as he prefers the new partner over his old
partner c) and has the same size as µ. This in turn is a contradiction and hence we have
that I ′1 has a matching of size t that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
Case 2: In this case, the only change that happens to the instance Icurr is the deletion
of (a, b). Let the resulting instance be I ′1. So, in order to prove that I ′1 has a matching
of size t that is internally super-stable with respect to I, we just need to prove that there
exists a matching of size t in Icurr that is internally super-stable matching with respect to
I and does not have any matches of the form (a, b). Suppose that’s not the case and that
every matching µ of size t in Icurr that is internally super-stable matching with respect
to I has (a, b). This in turn implies that p is unmatched in µ, for if otherwise (p, b)
will form a super-blocking pair (since b is the first agent on p’s list and b finds p and a
incomparable). Hence, we can now form the matching µ′ = (µ \ (a, b)) ∪ (p, b), which is
internally super-stable with respect to I as this does not introduce any new super-blocking
pair (since i) b is the first agent on p’s list and ii) b does not block any other agent in µ′ as
it finds a and b incomparable and so if he blocks someone now he also blocked them when
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(a, b) was present, thus contradicting the fact that µ was internally super-stable) and has
the same size as µ. This in turn is a contradiction and hence, again, we have that I ′1 has a
matching of size t that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
Next, we have the following claim whose proof is very similar to Case 2 in the proof of
Claim 12.
Claim 13. Let m be a man, w be the first woman on m’s list, I3 be some instance obtained
after line 11, and I4 be the instance obtained after deleting each (m′, w) in line 14. If there
exists a matching of size t in I3 that is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there
exists a matching of size t in I4 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
Given the two claims above, we are now ready to prove Lemma 7. First, starting with I1
and by repeatedly using Claim 12 with respect to each free agent a ∈ A, we can see that
the instance I ′1 that we obtain at the end of the while loop (i.e., line 11) has a matching
of size t that is internally super-stable matching with respect to the initial instance I.
Second, starting with I ′1 and by repeatedly using Claim 13 with respect to each man, we
can see that the instance I2 that is returned from the procedure proposeWith(A, I1) has a
matching of size t that is internally super-stable with respect to the instance I. This in
turn proves our lemma.
Lemma 8. Let I1 denote some instance that does not contain any ties, (m1, w1), (m2, w2),
. . . , (mr, wr) be a rotation that is exposed in I1, and I2 be the instance that is obtained by
deleting the entries (mi, wi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r} from I1. If there exists a matching of size
t in I1 that is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there exists a matching of size
t in I2 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
Proof. Let µ be a matching of size t in I1 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
We will consider the following two cases separately and show that in each case there exists
a matching of size t in I2 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
1. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, (mi, wi) ∈ µ
2. there exists some j ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that (mj, wj) /∈ µ
Case 1: Consider the matching µ′ that is obtained by removing (mi, wi) and instead adding
(mi, wi+1) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r} (here i+ 1 is done modulo r). Now, it is easy to see that
this does not lead to any new internal super-blocking pairs with respect to I. Hence, µ′ is
internally super-stable with respect to I, has the same size as µ (as every agent matched in
µ is also matched in µ′), and all the matched pairs in µ′ are in I2.
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Case 2: First, note that if (mi, wi) /∈ µ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, then we are done as the
only deleted entries in I2 are (mi, wi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. So this implies that we can,
without loss of generality, consider the smallest k ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that (mj, wj) /∈ µ for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, but (mk+1, wk+1) ∈ µ (since there is at least one j such that (mj, wj) /∈ µ,
this can always be done because we can re-index the rotation so that the first element
(m1, w1) of the rotation is not in µ). Let I ′2 be the instance that is formed by deleting
the entries (mi, wi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}. Below, we will show that I ′2 satisfies the
conditions of the lemma, i.e., we show that I ′2 has a matching of size t that is internally
super-stable with respect to I. And so once we have that, we can just repeat this argument
until we get to the instance I2.
To see why I ′2 satisfies the conditions of the lemma, notice that mk needs to be unmatched
in µ, for if otherwise then (mk, wk+1) will be an obvious blocking-pair. This in turn implies
that we can construct another matching µ′ such that µ′ = (µ \ (mk+1, wk+1)) ∪ (mk, wk+1),
both of them have the same size, and all the matched pairs in µ′ are in I ′2. Also, one can
see that this does not lead to any new super-blocking pairs since i) wk+1 improved and so
will not be part of any new super-blocking pair and ii) mk does not form a super-blocking
pair as it is matched to the agent who is second in his list and wk who is first in his list, if
matched in µ, has to be matched to someone better (as mk is the last agent in wk’s list).
Lemma 9. If I1 is an instance that does not contain any exposed rotation, then the list of
every man in I1 has only one woman and vice versa.
Proof. First, note that, throughout, an agent a is in b’s list if and only if b is in a’s list.
Second, we prove the following claim.
Claim 14. Let I2 be some initial instance, I3 be the instance that is obtained after running
the procedure proposeWith() with the men’s side proposing, and I4 be the instance that is
obtained after running the procedure proposeWith() with the women’s side proposing. For
any two agents a and b in I4, if a is the only agent in b’s list, then b is the only agent in a’s
list.
Proof. To prove our claim let us consider the following two cases in the instance I3.
1. there exists a woman w1 such that m1 is the only man on w1’s list, but m1 has at
least one other woman other than w1 in his list
2. there exists a man m1 such that w1 is the only woman on m1’s list, but w1 has at
least one other man other than m1 in her list
158
Case 1: Since we are looking at I3, note that w1 must be the first woman on m1’s list, for
if otherwise there is some other man, say, mk who is not engaged (because w1 has only m1
in her list). However, we know that this is not possible and so w1 is the first woman on
m1’s list. Therefore, now, when we run the procedure proposeWith() with the women’s
side proposing, w1 will propose to m1 and as a result m1 will delete all other women from
his list. And so, in I4, w1 is the only agent in m1’s list and vice versa.
Case 2: For this case, let us suppose that even after running the procedure proposeWith()
with the women’s side proposing, w1 still has at least one other man other than m1 in her
list (if not, then we are already done). Let this man be m2. This in turn implies that in
the engagement relation that results, at least one of the women, say, wk, is not engaged
(because m1 has only w1 in his list). However, we know that this is not possible as this
would imply that the engagement relation has an obvious blocking pair (mk, wk), where mk
is the last agent on wk’s list (and we know this cannot happen since we are just running
the same proposal-rejection sequence as in the Gale-Shapley algorithm).
Given the observations above, let us assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists
an instance I1 such that it does not have any exposed rotation but has at least one agent
who has a list of size greater than one. Using Claim 14 and the fact that an agent a is in
b’s list if and only if b is in a’s list, we can assume without loss of generality that there
exists a man m1 such that he has at least two women in his list. Let w1 and w2 be the
first and second woman, respectively, in m1’s list. Since I1 is obtained after running the
procedure proposeWith() twice, once each with the men’s and women’s side proposing, from
Claim 14 we know that m2, who is the last man on w2’s list, too has at least two women in
his list as otherwise w2 would also have just one man m2 in her list. Let w3 be the second
woman in m2’s list. Now, we can see that we can just inductively keep on applying the
above argument and form the following pairs ρ = (m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3), . . . , (mr, wr)
for some r ∈ {2, . . . , n}, where mi is the last man on wi’s list and wi+1 is the second
woman on mi’s list. However, note that ρ is an exposed rotation, and hence we have a
contradiction.
A.2 An example of a “bad” weakly-stable matching in
the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences
Consider the instance I as shown in Figure A.1, where ties appear only on the women’s
side. Furthermore, we define the following:
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Men
m1 : w1 WF\{1} WB1  . . . WBz
m2 : w1  w2  [. . .]
m3 : w2  w3 WF\{2,3} WS









mb0 : w1 WB1\{b0}  wb0 WS\B1 WF\{1}
...
mb1−1 : w1 WB1\{b1−1}  wb1−1 WS\B1 WF\{1}
mb1 : w1 WB2\{b1}  wb1 WS\B2 WF\{1}
...
mb2−1 : w1 WB2\{b2−1}  wb2−1 WS\B2 WF\{1}
...
mbz−1 : w1 WBz\{bz−1}  wbz−1 WS\Bz WF\{1}
...
mbz−1 : w1 WBz\{bz−1}  wbz−1 WS\Bz WF\{1}
Women
w1 : m2  m1  [. . .]
w2 : m2  m1  [. . .]
w3 : m1  m3  [. . .]




: m1  mn
2
 [. . .]




wb1−1 : MS\B1  m1  mb1−1 MF\{1} M
T
B1\{b1−1}












wbz−1 : MS\B1  m1  mbz−1 MF\{1} M
T
B1\{bz−1}
Figure A.1: The instance I that is used to illustrate that there can be weakly-stable matchings
with O(n2
√
δ) super-blocking pairs even in the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences








, z = n
2y
(for simplicity we assume that y and z are integers; we
can appropriately modify the proof if that is not the case)
• bj = n2 + jy + 1,∀j ∈ [0, . . . , z]
• Bi = {bi−1, . . . , bi − 1},∀i ∈ [1, . . . , z], F = {1, . . . , n2}, S = {
n
2
+ 1, . . . , n}
• WX (MX) : for some set X, place all the women (men) with index in X in the
increasing order of their indices
• W TX (MTX) : for some set X, place all the women (men) with index in X as tied
• [. . .] : place all the remaining alternatives in some strict order.
First thing is to see that the optimal solutionMopt associated with the instance is
Mopt = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), . . . , (mn, wn)} ,
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where (m2, w1) is the only super-blocking pair (and it is an obvious blocking pair). Also, it
can be verified that the total amount of missing information in I is at most δ.
Now, consider the matchingM, where
M =
{





(mb0 , wb0+1), (mb0+1, wb0+2), . . . , (mb1−2, wb1−1), (mb1−1, wb0),
(mb1 , wb1+1), (mb1+1, wb1+2), . . . , (mb2−2, wb2−1), (mb2−1, wb1), . . . ,
. . . , (mbz−1 , wbz−1+1), (mbz−1+1, wbz−1+2), . . . , (mbz−2, wbz−1), (mbz−1, wbz−1)
}
.
It is easy to check thatM is weakly-stable. Also, it can be verified that it has O(n2
√
δ)
super-blocking pairs (this is because with respect to each block Bj one can see thatM has
O (|Bj|2) super-blocking pairs).
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Appendix B
Omitted material from Chapter 3
B.1 Revelation principle for minimax dominant strate-
gies
Below we show that in the setting under consideration the revelation principle holds with
respect to minimax dominant strategies.
Lemma 41. LetM be a mechanism that implements a social choice function f in minimax
dominant strategies. Then, there exists a direct mechanism M′ that implements f and
where for every agent i reporting her candidate locations Ki is a minimax dominant strategy.
Proof. Let (s1, . . . , sn) be the minimax dominant strategy in M such that f(K1, . . . ,
Kn) = F (s1(K1), . . . , sn(Kn)), where F (·) is the outcome function associated with M.
Next, let us define the outcome function, F ′, associated withM′ as
F ′(K1, . . . , Kn) = F (s1(K1), . . . , sn(Kn)). (B.1)













i), s−i(K−i))− C(`i, F (σi(`i), s−i(K−i))). (B.2)
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Additionally, if `i is the true location of agent i, then, again, using the fact that (s1, . . . , sn)
is a minimax dominant strategy, we have that ∀s′i ∈ Σi,∀K−i,




C(`i, F (σi(`i), s−i(K−i)) = C(`i, F (si(`i), s−i(K−i)),
and using this in (B.2) we have that ∀K ′i, ∀K−i,
max
`i∈Ki





i), s−i(K−i)))− C(`i, F (si(`i), s−i(K−i))). (B.4)




′(Ki, K−i))− C(`i, F ′(`i, K−i)) ≤ max
`i∈Ki
C(`i, F
′(K ′i, K−i))− C(`i, F ′(`i, K−i)),
or in other words that reporting the candidate locations Ki is a minimax dominant strategy
inM′.
B.2 Minimax optimal solution for avgCost
Given the candidate locations Ki = [ai, bi] for all i, where, for some δ ∈ [0, B], bi−ai ≤ δ, in
this section we are concerned with computing the minimax optimal solution popt such that
popt = arg minp∈[0,B] maxI∈I
(
S(I, p)−minp′∈[0,B] S(I, p′)
)
, where I = [a1, b1]× . . .× [an, bn]
and S is the average cost function. Note that from the discussion in Section 3.4 we know that
for any I ∈ I, minp′∈[0,B] S(I, p′) = S(I, pI), where pI is the median of the points in the vector
I. Therefore, we can rewrite the definition of popt as popt = arg minp∈[0,B] maxI∈I S(I, p)−
S(I, pI). Next, we introduce the following notation.
Notation: Consider the left endpoints associated with all the agents, i.e., the set {ai}i∈[n].
We denote the sorted order of these points as L1, . . . , Ln (throughout, by sorted order we
mean sorted in non-decreasing order). Similarly, we denote the sorted order of the right
endpoints, i.e., the points in the set {bi}i∈[n], as R1, . . . , Rn. Additionally, for i ∈ [n], we use
Mi to denote the mean of Li and Ri (i.e., Mi = Li+Ri2 ). Throughout, for I = K1× . . .×Kn,
we refer to an element of I as an “input” and whenever we refer to an input I ∈ I, where
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I = (`1, . . . , `n), we assume without loss of generality that the lis are in sorted order
(because the agents can always be re-indexed). Also, given a point p, let I1(p) ⊆ I be the
set of all inputs I1 = (`1, . . . , `n) such that `k+1 ≥ p. Similarly, let I2(p) ⊆ I be the set of
all inputs I2 = (`′1, . . . , `′n) such that `′k+1 < p. Often when the point p is clear from the
context, we write I1 and I2 to refer to I1(p) and I2(p), respectively.
Armed with the notation defined above, we can now prove the following lemma (which
is also stated in Section 3.4), which gives a concise formula to find the maximum regret
associated with a point p for the average cost objective.
Lemma 16. Given a point p, the maximum regret associated with p for the average cost
objective can be written as max(objAC1 (p), objAC2 (p)), where






i=j(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)
)
, where j is the smallest index
such that Rj > p and j ≤ k






i=k+2(p− Li) + (n− 2k)(p− Lk+1)
)
, where h is the largest index
such that Lh < p and h ≥ k + 2.
Proof. To prove this, consider the maximum regret associated with locating the facility
at p which is given by maxI∈I S(I, p)− S(I, pI). Given the fact that I = I1 ∪ I2, we can
rewrite this as max(maxI1∈I1 S(I1, p)− S(I1, pI1),maxI2∈I2 S(I2, p)− S(I2, pI2)). Now, let
us consider each of these terms separately in the cases below.
Case 1: maxI1∈I1 S(I1, p)− S(I1, pI1). Let us consider an arbitrary input I1 = (`1, . . . , `n)
that belongs to I1 (if I1 = ∅, then we define maxI1∈I1 S(I1, p)− S(I1, pI1) = 0). Now, the
regret associated with I1 is given by















































((p− `i) + `i − p) +
k∑
i=j
((`i − p) + `i − p) + (n− 2k)(`k+1 − p)
)








(`i − p) + (n− 2k)(`k+1 − p)
)
.
Therefore, if objAC1 (p) = maxI1∈I1 S(I1, p)− S(I1, pI1), then we have that
objAC1 (p) = max
I1∈I1








(`i − p) + (n− 2k)(`k+1 − p)
)
.









(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)
)
,
where j is smallest index such that Rj > p and j ≤ k.
Case 2: maxI2∈I2 S(I2, p)−S(I2, pI2). Like in the previous case, consider an arbitrary input
I2 = (`
′
1, . . . , `
′
n) that belongs to I2 (if I2 = ∅, then we define maxI2∈I2 S(I2, p)−S(I2, pI2) =
0). Now, doing a similar analysis as in Case 1, we will see that the regret associated with




i=k+2(p− `′i) + (n− 2k)(p− `′k+1)
)
, where h is the largest index such






i=k+2(p− Li) + (n− 2k)(p− Lk+1)
)
, where h is largest index such that Lh < p and
h ≥ k + 2.




Using the lemma proved above, one can show that for the minimax optimal solution, popt,
objAC1 (popt) = obj
AC
2 (popt) (this is proved in Claim 17, which is in Appendix B.3). And this
observation in turn brings us to our next lemma (which is, again, also stated in Section 3.4)
which shows that popt is always in the interval [Lk+1, Rk+1].
Lemma 17. If popt is the minimax optimal solution associated with the avgCost objective
function, then popt ∈ [Lk+1, Rk+1].
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Proof. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that popt < Lk+1 or popt > Rk+1. We will
consider each of these cases separately and show that for both the cases Mk+1 has a lesser
maximum regret, thus contradicting the fact that popt is the minimax optimal solution.
Case 1: popt < Lk+1. From Lemma 16 we know that n · objAC1 (Mk+1) = 2
∑k
i=j(Ri −
Mk+1) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 −Mk+1), where j is smallest index such that Rj > Mk+1 and j ≤ k
(if there is no such j, then set j = k + 1). Next, consider the input I1 = (R1, . . . , R2k+1)








(Ri − popt) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − popt)
)







(Ri − popt) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − popt)
)








(Ri − Lk+1) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − popt)
)








(Ri − (2Mk+1 −Rk+1)) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − (2Mk+1 −Rk+1))
)
(as Lk+1 = 2Mk+1 −Rk+1)
= objAC1 (Mk+1) +
1
n
(n− 2j + 2)(Rk+1 −Mk+1).
Now, since popt is the optimal solution and maxRegret(popt, I) = objAC1 (popt) (from Claim 17),
we have that objAC1 (popt) ≥ regret(popt, I1), which in turn implies that from above we have





(n− 2j + 2)(Rk+1 −Mk+1). (B.5)
Next, let us consider objAC2 (popt). Note that, given Claim 16 and since popt < Lk+1,
I2(popt) = ∅. Therefore, objAC2 (popt) = 0, and so from Claim 17 we know that since popt is
an optimal solution, objAC1 (popt) = objAC2 (popt) = 0. However, j ≤ k + 1, and hence from
(B.5) we have that objAC1 (popt) > 0, thus in turn contradicting the fact that popt is the
minimax optimal solution.
Case 2: popt > Rk+1. We can do a similar analysis as in Case 1 to again show that this
cannot be the case.
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Hence, from both the cases above, we have that popt ∈ [Lk+1, Rk+1].
Input: For each agent i, their input interval [ai, bi]
Output: Minimax optimal solution for the given instance
1: popt ← 0, mR←∞
2: Let {Li}i∈[n] be the sorted order the points in {ai}i∈[n] and {Ri}i∈[n] be the sorted order
the points in {bi}i∈[n]
3: Let C = {Ri, Lj |i ≤ k + 1, j ≥ k + 1, Lk+1 < Ri, Lj < Rk+1} and H = {h1, . . . , h|C|} be
the sorted order of the points in C.
4: for each hi ∈ H, where i ∈ {1, . . . , |C|} do
5: xi ← #(Rj), where Rj ≥ hi and j ≤ k
6: yi ← #(Lj), where Lj ≤ hi and j ≥ k + 2
7: S1i ←
∑
(Rj), where Rj ≥ hi and j ≤ k
8: S2i ←
∑
(Lj),where Lj ≤ hi and j ≥ k + 2
9: end for
10: for each [hi, hi+1], where i ∈ {1, . . . , |C|} do
11: if objAC1 (hi) == obj
AC
2 (hi) and objAC1 (hi) < mR then . Is hi a possible solution?
12: popt ← hi,mR← objAC1 (hi)
13: end if
14: if objAC1 (hi+1) == obj
AC
2 (hi+1) and objAC1 (hi+1) < mR then . Is hi+1 a possible solution?




xi+1+yi+(n−2k) . If popt ∈ (hi, hi+1), then use the fact that obj
AC
1 (popt) = obj
AC
2 (popt)
18: if pi ∈ (hi, hi+1) and objAC1 (pi) < mR then . Is pi feasible and is it a possible solution?




Algorithm 9: Algorithm to compute the minimax optimal solution.
Equipped with the lemmas proved above, we are now ready to compute the minimax
optimal solution.
Proposition 42. If popt is the minimax optimal solution associated with the avgCost
objective function, then Algorithm 1 computes popt in O(n log n) time.
Proof. We know from Lemma 17 that popt ∈ [Lk+1, Rk+1]. So, all we are doing in Algorithm 1
is to consider all the points in C = {Ri, Lj|i ≤ k + 1, j ≥ k + 1, Ri > Lk+1, Lj < Rk+1} in
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sorted order (which is the set H in the algorithm) and check if for every interval [hi, hi+1],
whether popt = hi, popt = hi+1, or popt ∈ (hi, hi+1) (see lines 10–21). In the last case,
since there are no points in C that are between hi and hi+1, we can use the fact that for
an optimal point popt, objAC1 (popt) = objAC2 (popt) (this is proved in Claim 17, which is in
Appendix B.3) to obtain a value of pi (line 17). In line 18 we just check if this point actually
lies in (hi, hi+1) and also see if it is better than the best solution we currently have.
Through the cases we consider in Algorithm 1 we are trying out all possible values the
minimax optimal solution can take and hence the correctness follows. Also, it is easy to see
that this can be done in O(n log n) time.
B.3 Additional claims
Claim 15. For all i ∈ [n], Li ≤ Ri. Additionally, Ri − Li ≤ δ.
Proof. Note that the statement is true if we show that for every Li there are at most (i− 1)
values in {Rk}k∈[n] such that they have a value less than Li (this is enough as this would
imply that Ri ≥ Li). To see why that is true, consider the numbers Li, . . . , Ln which are
left endpoints of the reports of some agents. We know that each of these have a right
endpoint associated with them (i.e., a b′, where the input is of the form [Li, b′]) that are
greater than them. Now, these constitute (n− i+ 1) numbers and since there are only n in
total, there can at most i− 1 of them that have value less than Li.
To see the second part of the claim, consider the smallest j such that Rj − Lj > δ. Now,
if b is the right endpoint associated with Lj, then the fact that Rj − Lj > δ implies that
b < Rj (because otherwise Rj − Lj ≤ b− Lj ≤ δ). Additionally, this in turn also implies
that for some Lk, where k ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}, there is a right endpoint b′ associated with Lk
such that b′ ≥ Rj. However, since j is the smallest index value such that Rj − Lj > δ, we
now have a contradiction as δ < Rj − Lj < Rj − Lk ≤ b′ − Lk ≤ δ.
Claim 16. For any input I = (`1, . . . , `n), `i ∈ [Li, Ri].
Proof. Recall that, as mentioned under notations in Appendix B.2, the `s are in sorted
order and I is valid input if and only if there is a entry associated with every agent in it
(i.e., for every agent i, ∃j : `j ∈ [ai, bi]). Now, let us assume for the sake of contradiction
that `i < Li. This implies that for I to be a valid input, there has to be (n− i+ 1) values
in it that are greater than `i—one from each agent i who reported an interval [ai, bi] such
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that ai ≥ Li. However, this is not possible since there can only be at most (n− i) values
greater than `i as `i is the ith element in a sorted list.
Similarly, one can argue analogously for the case when `i > Ri. Therefore, `i ∈ [Li, Ri].
Claim 17. If popt is a minimax optimal solution, then objAC1 (popt) = objAC2 (popt).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume without loss of generality that objAC1 (
popt) < obj
AC
2 (popt). Also, for the point popt, let j be the smallest index such that Rj > popt
and j ≤ k (if no such j, then set j = k + 1) and let h be the largest index such that
Lh < popt and h ≥ k + 2 (if no such h, then set h = k + 1). Note that if n is even, then
both j and h cannot be k + 1, for if so then objAC1 (popt) would be equal to objAC2 (popt).
Now, consider the point p = popt − ε, where ε = n(obj
AC
2 (popt)−objAC1 (popt))
max((n−2j+2),(2h−n)) , and let us compute








(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)
)








(Ri − (popt − ε)) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − (popt − ε))
)
(note that j′ = j1)
= objAC1 (popt) +
1
n
ε(n− 2j + 2)
≤ obj
AC





Computing objAC2 (p) similarly we see that objAC2 (p) < objAC2 (popt). Now, since objAC1 (
p) < objAC2 (popt) and objAC2 (p) < objAC2 (popt), this implies that popt cannot be the minimax
optimal solution as its maximum regret is larger than that of p’s.
Claim 18. In the δ
2
-equispaced-median mechanism, let [a, b] be an interval of length at
most δ and let x and y be the points that are closest (with ties being broken in favour of
points in [a, b] in both cases) to a and b, respectively. Then, the interval [x, y] can have at
most 3 points that are also in A.
1because if not then popt is not optimal since we can move to Rj′ 6= Rj and it can be verified that this
point has regret less than that of popt.
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Proof. Suppose this were not the case and there existed two other points x′ < y′ such that
x′, y′ ∈ A and x′, y′ ∈ (x, y). Now, for this to happen x has to be less than a and y has to
be greater than b, for if otherwise then using the fact that x and y are the points that are
the closest (with ties broken in favour of points in [a, b]) to a and b, respectively, one can
see that we can have only at most 3 points in [x, y]. However, this would imply that
2(b− a) = (b− y′ + y′ − x′ + x′ − a) + (b− a)
> (y − b) + (y′ − x′) + (a− x) + (b− a)
(b− y′ > y − b and x′ − a > a− x, because x, y are closest to a, b and using the tie-breaking rule)
= (y − x) + (y − x′)
= 2δ, (y − x = y − y′ + y′ − x′ + x′ − x = 3δ
2
as the distance between points in A is δ
2
)
which in turn contradicts the fact that b− a ≤ δ.
Claim 19. Consider a mechanismM = (X,F ) such that it is very weakly dominant for
any agent to report her candidate locations if it is a single point. Let i be an agent with
candidate locations Ki = [ai, bi] and p be the outcome of the mechanism for some profile of
candidate locations (Ki, K−i). Then, if pa and pb are the outcomes ofM for the profiles
(ai, K−i) and (bi, K−i), respectively,
maxRegreti(p) = max(|ai − p| − |ai − pa|, |bi − p| − |bi − pb|).





C(`i, p)− C(`i, F (σi(Ki), s−i(K−i))),
where s−i(K−i) is some set of strategies played by the others.
Now, since it very weakly dominant for any agent to report her true candidate locations if
it is a single point inM, we have that
maxRegreti(p) = max
`i∈Ki
C(`i, p)− C(`i, p`)
where p` is the outcome ofM for the profile (`, s−i(K−i)).
Given this, let us assume that the claim is false. This implies that there exists a c ∈ (ai, bi)
such that C(c, p)−C(c, pc) > C(ai, p)−C(ai, pa) and C(c, p)−C(c, pc) > C(bi, p)−C(bi, pb).
However, we will show that this is impossible in both the cases below.
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Case 1: c ≤ p. In this case, we have,
C(c, p)− C(c, pc) = |c− p| − |c− pc|
= (p− ai) + (ai − c)− |c− pc|
= (p− ai)− |ai − pa|+ (ai − c) + |ai − pa| − |c− pc|
= C(ai, p)− C(ai, pa) + (ai − c) + |ai − pa| − |c− pc|
≤ C(ai, p)− C(ai, pa) + (ai − c) + |ai − pc| − |c− pc|
(using very weak dominance for single reports)
≤ C(ai, p)− C(ai, pa).
Case 2: c > p. We can handle this analogously as in Case 1 and show that C(c, p) −
C(c, pc) ≤ C(bi, p)− C(bi, pb).
Claim 20. Let popt be the minimax optimal solution associated with I = [a1, b1]× . . .×




· d ≤ maxRegret(p, I)−OMVAC(I) ≤ d.
Proof. If {Li}i∈[n] and {Ri}i∈[n] denote the sorted order of the sets {ai}i∈[n] and {bi}i∈[n],
respectively, then from Lemma 16 we know that for any point p the maximum regret
associated with p can written as max(objAC1 (p), objAC2 (p)), where






i=j(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)
)
, where j is the smallest index
such that Rj > p and j ≤ k (if no such j, then set j = k + 1)






i=k+2(p− Li) + (n− 2k)(p− Lk+1)
)
, where h is the largest index
such that Lh < p and h ≥ k + 2 (if no such h, then set h = k + 1).
Additionally, if popt is the minimax optimal solution, we know from Claim 17 that OMVAC(
I) = objAC1 (popt) = objAC2 (popt).
Now, let us assume without loss of generality that p < popt. Then, it clear that from above



















(Ri − p) + 2
k∑
i=j′
(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − popt + popt − p)
)







(popt − p) + n · objAC1 (popt) + 2
k∑
i=j′
(popt − p) + (n− 2k)(popt − p)
)
(since Ri ≤ popt for i ≤ j′ − 1 and n · objAC1 (popt) = 2
∑k




2kd+ (n− 2k)d+ n · objAC1 (popt)
)
(popt − p ≤ d and j ≥ 1)
= d+ OMVAC(I).
To see the upper bound, it is easy to see from above that one can set j = k + 1 and hence
we would have that objAC1 (p)−OMVAC(I) ≥
(n−2k)
n
(popt − p) = (n−2k)n · d.
B.4 Minimax optimal solution for maxCost
Given the candidate locations [ai, bi] for all i, where, for some δ ∈ [0, B], bi − ai ≤ δ,
here we are concerned with computing the minimax optimal solution popt such that popt =
arg minp∈[0,B] maxI∈I
(
S(I, p)−minp′∈[0,B] S(I, p′)
)
, where I = [a1, b1]× . . .× [an, bn] and S
is the maximum cost function. Note that from the discussion in Section 3.5 we know that if
I = (`1, . . . , `n) (as stated previously, we can assume without loss of generality that the lis
are in sorted order) is a valid input in I, then minp′∈[0,B] S(I, p′) = S(I, pI), where pI = `1+`n2 .
Therefore, we can rewrite the definition of popt as popt = arg minp∈[0,B] maxI∈I S(I, p) −
S(I, pI).
Next, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 43. Given a point p, the maximum regret associated with p for the maximum cost
objective can written as max(objMC1 (p), objMC2 (p)), where




• objMC2 (p) = p− L1+Ln2 .
Proof. Consider the maximum regret associated with locating the facility at p, which is
given by maxI∈I S(I, p)− S(I, pI), and the sets I ′1, I ′2, where I ′1 ⊆ I is the set of all inputs
such that for every I ′1 = (`1, . . . , `n) that belongs to I ′1, `1+`n2 ≥ p and I
′
2 ⊆ I is the set
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I = I ′1 ∪ I ′2, we can rewrite maximum regret associated with locating the facility at p
max{objMC1 (p), objMC2 (p)},
where objMC1 (p) = maxI′1∈I′1 S(I
′
1, p) − S(I ′1, pI′1) and obj
MC
2 (p) = maxI′2∈I′2 S(I
′
2, p) −
S(I ′2, pI′2). So, now, let us consider each of these terms separately in the cases below.
Case 1: objMC1 (p). Let us consider an arbitrary input I ′1 = 〈`1, . . . , `n〉 that belongs to I ′1
(if I ′1 = ∅, then we define maxI′1∈I′1 S(I
′
1, p) − S(I ′1, pI1) = 0). Now, the regret associated
with I ′1 is given by
regret(p, I ′1) = S(I
′
1, p)− S(I ′1, pI′1)
= max {|`1 − p|, |`n − p|} −
∣∣∣∣`n − `1 + `n2
∣∣∣∣













Therefore, making use of the fact that `i ∈ [Li, Ri] (this is proved in Claim 16, which is in
Appendix B.3), we have that
objMC1 (p) = max
I′1∈I′1












Case 2: objMC2 (p). Like in the previous case, consider an arbitrary input I ′2 = 〈`′1, . . . , `′n〉
that belongs to I ′2 (if I ′2 = ∅, then we define maxI′2∈I′2 S(I
′
2, p)−S(I ′2, pI′2) = 0). Now, doing







. Hence, again, making use of the fact that `i ∈ [Li, Ri] (see Claim 16), we have
that
objMC2 (p) = max
I′2∈I′2












= p− L1 + Ln
2
. (B.7)
Combining (B.6) and (B.7), we have our lemma.
Equipped with the lemma proved above, we can now find the minimax optimal solution for
the maximum cost objective.
Proposition 44. If popt is the minimax optimal solution associated with the maximum cost
objective, then popt = L1+R1+Ln+Rn4 .
Proof. Note that the statement immediately follows if we prove that for a minimax optimal
solution, popt, objMC1 (popt) = objMC2 (popt). And the latter proposition is easy to see, for if
objMC1 (popt) 6= objMC2 (popt), then using Lemma 43 we can see that the maximum regret
associated with popt is greater than R1+Rn−L1−Ln4 , whereas the maximum regret associated







Omitted material from Chapter 4
C.1 Additional claims
Claim 21. For i ∈ [n], let ai ∈ N and let vi be the valuation function of ai, where vi is
a unit-sum valuation function and for all h ∈ Ai such that rank(ai, h) = 1, vi(h) < 1n1/3 .
Then, for all j ∈ [k], where k = b 3
√
n/2c, and h ∈ Ai such that rank(ai, h) = j, vi(h) ≥ 12n
Proof. Let t1 = 1n1/3 . For any j ∈ [k] and h ∈ Ai such that rank(ai, h) = j, we will show
that vi(h) ≥ 1−(j−1)t1n−(j−1) . To see this, consider the smallest j
∗ such that for h∗ ∈ Ai with
rank(ai, h
∗) = j∗ and vi(h∗) < 1−(j
∗−1)t1
n−(j∗−1) . Note that j
∗ ≥ 2, since vi is a unit-sum valuation
function and hence vi(h) ≥ 1n for all h ∈ Ai such that rank(ai, h) = 1.
Next, note that, for any ` ∈ {2, . . . , n} and U` = {h ∈ Ai | rank(ai, h) ≤ ` − 1}, if there
exists an h ∈ Ai such that rank(ai, h) = `, then it follows from the definition of rank that










≤ vi(h∗) + (j∗ − 1) · t1 + (n− j∗) · vi(h∗)
< (j∗ − 1) · t1 + (n− (j∗ − 1)) ·
1− (j∗ − 1)t1
n− (j∗ − 1)
= 1.
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However, this in turn contradicts the fact that vi is a unit-sum valuation function.
Therefore, since t1 ≤ 12k , for all j ∈ [k] and h ∈ Ai such that rank(ai, h) = j, we have that
vi(h) ≥
1− (j − 1)t1
n− (j − 1)
≥ 1− k · t1
n− (j − 1)
≥
1− k · 1
2k




Claim 22. Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)), a matching µ is a
i) rank-maximal matching w.r.t. I if and only if it is a priority-p matching, where
p = (p1, . . . , pn) and, for j ∈ [n], pj = n2(n−j+1).
ii) max-cardinality rank-maximal matching w.r.t. I if and only if it is a priority-p
matching, where p = (p1, . . . , pn) and, for j ∈ [n], pj = n2n + n2(n−j).
iii) fair matching w.r.t. I if and only if it is a priority-p matching, where p = (p1, . . . , pn)
and, for j ∈ [n], pj = 4n2n − 2n(j−1).
Proof. i). (⇒) Suppose µ is a priority-p matching (which in turn implies that it is the
max-weight matching in GI with weights {we}e∈E , where, for an edge e = (ai, hj) and
r = rank(ai, hj), we = pr), but is not rank-maximal w.r.t. I. Let µ′ be a rank-maximal
matching w.r.t. I, and the let the signatures of µ and µ′ be (s1, . . . , sn) and (s′1, . . . , s′n),
respectively. Since µ is not rank-maximal, consider the smallest j ∈ [n] such that si = s′i
for all i < j and sj < s′j. Next, note that both µ and µ′ are matchings in GI , and that the
weight of a j-th ranked edge is n2(n−j+1). This in turn implies that weight of µ′ is greater
than weight of µ, since n2(n−j+1) > n · n2(n−j), or in other words that taking a j-th ranked
edge in GI with weights {we}e∈E is more beneficial than taking any number of edges of
lower rank. However, this contradicts the fact that µ is the max-weight matching in GI .
(⇐) Suppose µ is a rank-maximal matching, but is not a priority-p matching. This implies
there is another matching µ′ such that µ′ has a higher weight than µ in GI with weights
{we}e∈E , where, for an edge e = (ai, hj) and r = rank(ai, hj), we = pr. Also note that µ′
cannot be rank-maximal, since all rank-maximal matchings will have the same weight in
GI with weights {we}e∈E . Given this, it is easy to see that we have a contradiction given
our choice of pjs and the fact that µ is rank-maximal.
ii). (⇒) Suppose µ is a priority-p matching. First we will argue that µ is a max-cardinality
matching in GI . To see this, suppose not. This implies there is another matching µ′ such
that |µ′| > |µ|. Next, note that if W [µ] denotes the weight of µ in GI with weights {we}e∈E ,
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then W [µ] ≤ |µ| · p1. Also, note that we have, W [µ′] ≥ |µ′| · n2n > |µ| · p1 ≥ W [µ], where
the second inequality follows from the fact that |µ′| − |µ| ≥ 1 and |µ| ≤ n. However, this in
turn contradicts the fact that µ is a priority-p matching.
Now that we have the established that µ is a max-cardinality matching, we need to show
that it is rank-maximal (among max-cardinality matchings). And the proof of this can be
obtained by proceeding as in the corresponding case in i) above.
(⇐) The proof of this can be obtained by proceeding as in the corresponding case in i)
above.
iii). This case can be handled as in ii) above, with the only difference being that the
signature in this case is the (n+ 1)-tuple (
∑n
i=1 si,−sn,−sn−1, . . . ,−s1).
Claim 23. Given an instance I = (N ,H,P) and priorities p = (p1, . . . , pn), where p ∈ P,
let µ denote a Pareto optimal matching or a priority-p matching w.r.t. I. If Bi denotes the
set of agents matched to a rank-i edge in µ, k is a positive integer that is at most bn/2c,
and B = ∪ki=1Bi, then |B| ≥ min {k, |µ|}.
Proof. Let B′ = ∪ni=k+1Bi be the set of agents who are matched to an object of rank at
least k + 1 in µ. In order to prove our claim, let us first consider the case when k ≥ |µ|.
For this case we will show that |B′| = 0, thus implying that |B| = µ. To see this, suppose
|B′| ≥ 1. Without loss of generality, let a1 ∈ |B′| and let Ok1 = {h ∈ A1 | rank(a1, h) ≤ k}.
Since µ is a Pareto optimal or priority-p matching, all the objects in Ok1 are matched
to some agent in N \ {a1}, because if there exists an unmatched, say, h1 ∈ Ok1 , then
µ \ {a1, µ(a1)} ∪ {a1, h1} Pareto dominates µ and has the same size as µ. However, this in
turn implies |µ| ≥ (|Ok1 |+ 1) = k + 1, a contradiction.
Next, let us consider the case when k < |µ|. To prove our claim, let us assume for the sake
of contradiction that |B| < k, which in turn, along with the fact that k < |µ|, implies that
|B′| ≥ 1. Let Y = |B′| and w.l.o.g. let us assume that {a1, . . . aY } are the agents in B′.
Note that, for i ∈ [Y ], ai finds at least k + 1 objects acceptable since they are matched to
an object of rank at least k + 1.
Now, consider any i ∈ [Y ] and let Oki = {h ∈ Ai | rank(ai, h) ≤ k}. As argued above for
the case when k ≥ |µ|, since µ is a Pareto optimal matching or a priority-p matching, all the
objects in Oki are matched to some agent. Additionally, also note that, when combined with
the previous observation, there is at least one object, say, hsi ∈ Oki such that it is matched
to an agent, say, ap ∈ B′ such that rank(ap, hsi ) ≥ k + 1 (because otherwise, |B| ≥ k, a
contradiction); we will refer to hsi as ai’s special object. Given all the observations above,
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we will now argue that if µ is such that |B| < k, then there exists a matching µ′ such that
µ′ Pareto dominates µ and has the same size as µ.
To see this, consider the graph G′ = ({a1, · · · , aY }, E ′), where there is a directed edge from
ai to aj if µ(aj) = hsi (i.e., if aj is matched to ai’s special object). Since, for every i ∈ [Y ],
ai has a special object hsi and hsi is matched to one of the agents in {a1, · · · , aY } \ {ai},
note that this graph has to have a cycle. So, now, consider this cycle and implement the
trade indicated by this cycle—meaning, if (ai, aj) is an edge in this cycle, then allocate
µ(aj) to ai. Note that the resulting matching, say, µ′ has the same size as µ and also Pareto
dominates µ (since every agent ai in this cycle gets an object that is in Oki ), which in turn
contradicts the fact that µ is a Pareto optimal or priority-p matching.
Claim 24. Given an instance I = (N ,H,P), let µ1 be any arbitrary matching in GI , and
µ2 denote the matching in GI that matches as many agents as possible with an edge of rank
at most k, where k = b 3
√
n/2c. If Li and X ′i denote the set of agents matched to a rank-i







Proof. Let Y =
∑n
i=k+1 |Li|, i.e., the number of agents who are matched to an object of
rank at least k + 1 in µ1. Since all the agents in ∪ni=k+1Li find at least k + 1 objects
acceptable, this implies that there is a matching of size z = min{k, Y } in GI where all the
agents are matched to a rank-i edge, where i ∈ [k]. Now, since µ2 is the matching in GI
that matches as many agents as possible with an edge of rank at most k, X ′ ≥ z.
C.2 Missing proofs from Section 4.3.2
C.2.1 Proof of Theorem 31
Theorem 31. Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)) and a vector of priorities
p = (p1, . . . , pn), where p ∈ P, Algorithm 5 asks one non-adaptive query per (agent, object)
and returns a priority-p matching that achieves an O(n2/3)-approximation to the optimal
welfare among all priority-p matchings for the case when agents have unit-sum valuations.
To prove this, we use the same notations and terminologies that were introduced for the
proof of Theorem 29, except that now these are defined with respect to priority-p matchings.
Next, we prove the following lemma, which is almost identical to Lemma 30.
Lemma 45. Let µ be the matching that is computed in line 12 in Algorithm 5. Then,
SW(µ∗H) ≤ n2/3 · SW(µ).
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Proof. This can be proved by proceeding exactly as in the proof of Lemma 30.
Proof of Theorem 31. First, it is easy to see that for the given priority vector p ∈ P the
matching returned by Algorithm 5 is a priority-p matching. Next, let S be the set of agents
who answered “Yes” w.r.t. t1 (i.e., all these agent have a value of at least t1 for (one of) their
first choice object(s)). Also, let Bi be the number of agents who are matched to (one of)
their i-th choice object(s) in µ. Note that since µ is a priority-p matching, we know that
|Bi| = |Hi| + |Li| for all i ∈ [n] (since all priority-p matchings have the same signature).
Additionally, we also know that SW(µ) ≥ |B1| · 1n , since the agents have unit-sum valuations.


























≤ n2/3 + n2/3 + n2/3, (C.1)
where the first inequality by using Lemma 45 and the fact that L1 ≤ B1, second inequality
follows from the fact that SW(µ) ≥ t1, since |S| ≥ 1. and the final inequality follows from
our choice of t1 and t2.
On the other hand, if |S| = 0, then, first, let k = b 3
√
n/2c. Next, note that every agent
values their first choice at a value less than t1. This in turn implies that, since their
valuations are unit-sum, for j ∈ [k], their value for a rank-j object is at least 1
2n
(see
Claim 21 in Appendix C.1 for a proof). Additionally, let B = ∪ki=1Bi and B′ = ∪ni=k+1Bi;












































≤ n2/3 + 2n2/3 + 8n2/3, (C.3)
where the first inequality follows from using Lemma 45 and the fact that Li ≤ Bi for all
i ∈ [n], the second inequality follows from Claim 5, and the final inequality follows since
|B| ≥ min{k, |µ|} and tk+1 ≤ 2/n.
Finally, combining (C.1) and (C.2) gives us our theorem.
C.3 Additional discussions
C.3.1 Power of ordinal algorithms
In this section we look at the power of ordinal algorithms—meaning we want to understand
the worst-case loss in welfare experienced by an ordinal algorithm (i.e., an algorithm which
only uses the ordinal information given by the agents). We argue that when agents have
unit-sum valuations functions, any deterministic algorithm A is such that L(A) ∈ Ω(n2).
The proof of this is similar to the proof of result by Amanatidis et al. where they show that
the distortion of any deterministic ordinal algorithm is Ω(n2) [Ama+21, Thm. 1]. Also, just
like in Amanatidis et al. [Ama+21, Thm. 1], this bound is asymptotically tight.
Theorem 26. Let X denote one of the properties in the set {Pareto-optimal, rank-maximal,
max-cardinality rank-maximal, and fair}. Let A be a deterministic ordinal algorithm that
always produces a matching that satisfies property X. If there are n agents with unit-sum
valuation functions, then L(A) ∈ Ω(n2). Moreover, this bound is asymptotically tight.
Proof (sketch). The proof here follows almost directly from the proof of Theorem 1 in
the paper by Amanatidis et al. [Ama+21] where they show that the distortion of any
deterministic ordinal algorithm is Ω(n2).
The main observation to note is that for the instance they construct if there are j pairs of
agents and if an agent in the i-th pair gets the top-choice object a, then any matchingM
that matches the other agent in the i-th pair to their second choice bi, one of the agents in
pair ` ∈ [j]\{i} to their second choice b`, and the remaining agents to their highest possible
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choice (i.e., for pair ` ∈ [j] \ {i}, allocate object c`−1 to the agent who has not received
their second choice) is Pareto-optimal/rank-maximal/max-cardinality rank-maximal/fair.
Given this, one can construct valuation functions as described in their proof and see that an
ordinal algorithm cannot distinguish between matchings that have welfare of at least n/4
and ones which have a welfare of at most 1/n, thus resulting in a lower bound of Ω(n2).
Finally, to see that the bound is tight, first note that when agents have unit-sum valuation
functions, as long as there is at least one agent who is matched to their top-choice object,
L(A) ∈ O(n2), since the maximum social welfare achievable is n, and the agent who
gets their top-choice has a value of at least 1/n for their top-choice object. Now, in
order to achieve this, one can run any Pareto-optimal/rank-maximal/max-cardinality rank-
maximal/fair algorithm and the matching returned by any such algorithm has at least one
agent matched to a rank-1 object (see Claim 23 in Appendix C.1 for a proof).
One can derive a similar lower bound for unit-range valuations and show that it is Ω(n).
This can be done by making similar observations as in the proof of Theorem 26. The only
part that needs to be modified is in the way the valuation functions are defined; all we need
to do here is to define the value of each top-choice object to be 1 and the least preferred
object to be 0. Moreover, this is again asymptotically tight because of the exact same
reason mentioned above for unit-sum valuations. The only difference is that when agent
have unit-range valuations, the value of the top-choice object is 1, thus resulting in an O(n)
bound.
Theorem 46. Let X denote one of the properties in the set {Pareto-optimal, rank-maximal,
max-cardinality rank-maximal, and fair}. Let A be a deterministic ordinal algorithm that
always produces a matching with property X. If there are n agents with unit-range valuation
functions, then L(A) ∈ Ω(n). Moreover, this bound is asymptotically tight.
C.3.2 The unit-range case
In this section we discuss the case when agents have unit-range valuations. Note that the
adaptive algorithm presented in Section 4.3.1 works for both the unit-sum and unit-range
case. Therefore, here we look at the non-adaptive case, in particular focussing on the case
when an algorithm is allowed to ask at most one query per (agent, object) pair.
181
Input: an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)) and priorities p = (p1, . . . , pn)
Output: returns a Pareto optimal matching when pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n], priority-p matching
otherwise
1: GI = (N ∪H, E)← graph induced by I
2: t1 ← 1
3: ti ← 1√n , for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}
4: for e = (ai, hr) ∈ N ×H do
5: r ← rank(ai, hj)
6: if Q(ai, hj , tr) then
7: we ← pr + tr
8: else
9: we ← pr
10: end if
11: end for
12: µ← max-weight matching in GI , where weights are (we)e∈E
13: if pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n] then
14: µ← with µ as the initial endowment, run modified top-trading cycles (TTC) algorithm
by Saban and Sethuraman [SS13, Algorithm 1, Rule 2] and return the resulting matching.
15: end if
16: return µ
Algorithm 10: An O(
√
n)-approximation algorithm for finding the optimal social welfare
among Pareto optimal or priority-p matchings for the case when the agents have unit-range
valuations.
C.3.2.1 Improving welfare when asking one query per (agent, object) pair
Here we show an algorithm that achieves an O(
√
n)-approximation to the optimal welfare
among all Pareto optimal or priority-p matchings when it is allowed to ask at most one query
per (agent, object) pair. In the next section, we will show that this is asymptotically optimal.
At a high-level, the algorithm is very similar to Algorithm 5, with the main difference being
that instead of tis defined there, where we used t1 = 1n1/3 and ti =
1
min{i,n1/3}·n2/3 for all
i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, here the values are more uniform and we use t1 = 1 and ti = 1√n for all
i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Note that the query Q(ai, hj, t1), where hj is such that rank(ai, hj) = 1, is
not really useful since all the agents will answer “Yes” to this because of the fact that they
have unit-range valuations. Nevertheless, we still use it in Algorithm 10 to make it clear
that it is very similar to Algorithm 5.
Theorem 47. Given an instance I = (N ,H,P = (P1, . . . , Pn)), and a vector of priorities
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p = (p1, . . . , pn), where p ∈ P ∪ {(0, . . . , 0)}, Algorithm 10 asks one non-adaptive query per
(agent, object) pair and for the case when agents have unit-range valuations returns a
i) Pareto optimal matching that achieves an O(
√
n)-approximation to the optimal welfare
among all Pareto optimal matchings when pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
ii) priority-p matching that achieves an O(
√
n)-approximation to the optimal welfare
among all priority-p matchings when p ∈ P.
Proof. Just like we did to prove Theorem 29 let us introduce some notation. Given the
priority vector p, let µ∗ denote the matching that achieves the optimal social welfare among
Pareto optimal or priority-p matchings when the agents have unit-range valuations. Let Hi
denote the set of agents who are matched to their i-th choice in µ∗ and have value at least
ti for their partner in µ∗. Similarly, let Li denote the set of agents who are matched to their
i-th choice in µ∗ and have value less than ti for their partner in µ∗. We define H = ∪ni=1Hi,
L = ∪ni=1Li, and, for some S ⊆ N , µ∗S ⊆ µ∗ be the set of edges (ai, hj) such that ai ∈ S
and (ai, hj) ∈ µ∗.
Additionally, let µ′ be the matching that is computed in line 12 in Algorithm 10. Note
that if µ is the matching returned by Algorithm 10, then µ′ = µ when p ∈ P. Also, for
the case when pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n], SW(µ) ≥ SW(µ′), since µ is the matching returned
by the modified TTC algorithm by Saban and Sethuraman [SS13, Algorithm 1, Rule 2]
with initial endowments µ′ and we know that the resulting matching is individually rational
[SS13, Theorem 2].
Next, it is easy to see that the matching is Pareto optimal when pi = 0 for all i ∈ [n] and
is a priority-p matching when p ∈ P. (This can be seen by proceeding exactly like in the
second paragraph of the proof of Theorem 28.)
Finally, in order to bound the approximation ratio, we will directly bound the ratio of
SW(µ∗)
SW(µ) . To do this, first note that we can proceed exactly like in the proof of Lemma 30 to
see that SW(µ∗H) ≤
√
n · SW(µ′). This is so because the only difference is in the way the
tis are defined for all i ∈ [n]. Second, note that SW(µ∗L) ≤ |µ∗L| · 1√n ≤
√
n, where the first
inequality follows since |L1| = 0 and every agent in Li for i ∈ {2, . . . , n} has value at most
ti = 1/
√

















where the last inequality follows since SW(µ) ≥ 1, as there is at least one agent who is
matched to a rank-1 edge in µ (since µ is either a Pareto optimal or a priority-p matching
and hence we can use Claim 23).
C.3.2.2 Lower bounds
Here we derive a lower bound that is similar to one for unit-sum valuations and show that any
deterministic algorithm A that produces a Pareto-optimal/rank-maximal/max-cardinality
rank-maximal/fair matching and that asks at most one query per (agent, object) pair has
L(A) ∈ Ω(
√
n). Note that this implies that Algorithm 10 is asymptotically optimal.
Theorem 48. Let X denote one of the properties in the set {Pareto-optimal, rank-maximal,
max-cardinality rank-maximal, and fair}. Let A be a non-adaptive deterministic algorithm
that always produces a matching with property X and asks at most one query per (agent,
object) pair. If there are n agents with unit-range valuation functions, then L(A) ∈ Ω(
√
n).
Proof (sketch). The proof of this is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 32, with the
main difference being the way the utility functions u0, u1, . . . , u8 are defined. For this proof,
we redefine u0, u1, . . . , u8 the following way, to ensure that they are unit-range valuation
functions.
u0 = (1, c
2
1, 0, . . . , 0)
u1 = (1, c1, 0, . . . , 0) u2 = (1, 1/2, 0, . . . , 0)
u3 = (1, c1 + ε, 0, . . . , 0) u4 = (1, 1/4− ε, 0, . . . , 0)
u5 = (1, c
2
1, 0 . . . , 0) u6 = (1, c1 − ε, 0, . . . , 0)
u7 = (1, c
2
1, 0, . . . , 0) u8 = (1, c1/4, 0, . . . , 0),
Given these definitions, one can now proceed exactly like in the proof of Theorem 32. Note
that the proof will be simpler in this case because for unit-range valuations, the queries of
the form Q(·, ·, Ti1) are not useful, since by definition all unit-range utility functions have
value 1 for the most preferred good.
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Appendix D
Omitted material from Chapter 5
D.1 Brief descriptions of various fair and efficient algo-
rithms
Here we provide brief descriptions of the following algorithms that guarantee PO and at
least EF1.
i) Adjusted winner protocol [BT96a; BT96b]: The adjusted winner protocol returns an
EF1 and PO allocation for two agents and it proceeds the following way.
• One of the players (say, player 1) is designated as the winner and the other
player is the loser. Initially, all the goods are allocated to the winner.
• Sort the goods by decreasing value of v`(g)/vw(g), where v`(g) (respectively,
vw(g)) is the value that the loser (respectively, winner) attributes to good g.
• At each step, among the goods that the winner has, consider the “best” good
according to the order in step 2 (i.e., one with the highest value of v`(g)/vw(g)),
and allocate it to the loser. Continue this process until the loser does not envy
the winner by more than one good.
ii) Leximin solution [PR18]. The leximin solution returns a PMMS and PO allocation
for two agents by finding an allocation that maximizes the minimum utility any agent
gets, then, subject to that, maximizes the second minimum utility any agent gets,
and so on.
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iii) Maximum Nash Welfare solution [Car+16]. The maximum Nash welfare solution
returns an EF1 and PO allocation for any number of agents by finding an allocation
that maximizes the product of utilities of the agents.
iv) Fisher-market based algorithm [BKV18]. The algorithm by Barman, Krishnamurthy,
and Vaish [BKV18] returns an EF1 and PO allocation for any number of agents. The
algorithm is quite involved and requires several definitions, so we only provide a very
brief and high-level description here. We refer the reader to Algorithm 1 in [BKV18]
for a complete description.
• The main idea in this algorithm is to start with a Pareto optimal allocation
(in particular, a welfare maximizing allocation) that corresponds to a market
equilibrium of a Fisher market. Following this, it performs a series of swaps
between the agents ensuring that each intermediate allocation is an equilibrium
outcome, and it does this until the allocation satisfies what is referred to as price
envy-freeness up to one good (or a suitable approximation of it). The latter
property entails that at the current prices spending of any agent i is at least as
much as the spending of another agent j up to the removal of the highest priced
good from agent j’s bundle.
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